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ABSTRACT 
University of Bolton 
A thesis submitted to the University of Bolton for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, School of 
Law 2018 
The Legal Conceptualisation of Securities in the Nigerian Capital Market: Opportunities and 
Challenges 
Ikpenmosa Uhumuavbi 2018 
 
Tensions created by continuous disruption in the financial landscape leading to increased market 
convergence have suddenly rekindled the age long philosophical dispute between ‘form’ and 
‘function’ as it relates to the conflict between indigenous and received legal traditions. This research 
tests these competing theories in the conceptualisation of securities. The formalist explanation 
considers the degree of institutional influence a sole reliance on legal texts play in achieving 
statutory coherence and utility; such as applying the strict interpretation of legal letters to reduce 
the uncertainties of contexts. By contrast, the functional explanation captures the limitation of legal 
texts without an examination of contexts. Therefore, statutory design and definition must seek to 
operationalise the outcomes of historical, political, economic, and socio-cultural contexts in its 
formation. This research raises the hypothesis that formalism places significant constraints on the 
language of statute to optimise products development, while functionalism enables the aggregation 
of legal and non-legal themes to create products. It goes further to tests these hypotheses on critical 
literature review and on a data set of regulatory agencies and market participants in Nigeria. It 
explores the conflicts created and how they continuously erode the underlying conceptual structure 
of securities. The research finds strong support for the functionalist context sensitive explanations. 
Therefore by developing and proposing a functional court-centred context-sensitive model as 
solution, this research suggests that formalist structure contributes to definitional incoherence of 
securities and places significant constraints on the capacity of language to optimise securities laws 
for increased product development in capital markets.  
The research further stresses the usefulness of real world semantics within language philosophy in 
shaping representionality of legal texts by providing a basis for the context sensitive 
conceptualisation. Through the use of focused group case study research technique, the thesis 
identified the legal obstacles to the conceptualisation of securities in the Nigerian Capital Market. It 
clarifies the place of negotiability, transferability and circularity components within the context of 
securities concepts of rights and duties. This is with a view to unearthing the legal nature of 
negotiable risk that sits at the core of securities. The research proposes a context sensitive definition 
of securities for the Nigerian Capital Market to replace the current definition in Section 315 of 
Investment and Securities Act 2007. 
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Chapter 1 –  
1.0. General Introduction 
1.1 Background 
There is clearly no small irony as markets continuously grapple with the consequences of the 
financial crisis caused by complexities of financial instruments. These fundamental pieces of 
inconveniences have often been waved off in a dignified fashion as investors contend with new and 
unexpected occurrences. Tensions between indigenous and received legal traditions as they relate 
to the battle for form or coupled with technological exploitation of the gaps, now unsettle the 
underlying dimensions of securities function and erode their post-crisis regulatory achievements.1 
These conflicts are creating webs of uncertainties and capitalising on the complexities of securities 
as a concept.2 Indeed, the conceptualisation of securities has been extremely controversial. This is 
because of its unprecedented scope and limited understanding. Its fluid nature both at domestic and 
international levels is a subject of immense debate within institutional circles. On the part of 
investors, there is inertia in exploring new horizons partly because of regulatory hurdles created by 
these conflicts. Even market operators are now wary of innovative schemes to mobilise saving 
towards investments.3 These broad tensions between institutions, markets and investors have 
created two problems. Firstly, it has created a drift in the underlying dimensions of securities which 
now makes its identification, classification and characterisation extremely difficult. The 2008 to 2010 
financial crisis was largely traced to the complexity and poor understanding of investment products.4 
Secondly, it has made the international investment environment more vulnerable to systemic 
collapse due to the absence of an agreed legally binding universal framework for the 
conceptualisation of these instruments.5 This therefore means that markets are constrained and 
limited to monoline plain vanilla products, designed along prescriptions of domestic regulation. The 
increase in these monoline products means fewer investment options, limited markets depth and 
strong disincentive for cross-border interactions. Even in cases where cross-border transactions are 
                                                          
1
 Martin Wolf, ‘Donald Trump and Xi Jinping’s battle over globalisation’, Financial Times, January 24, 2017, 
https://www.ft.com/content/74b42cd8-e171-11e6-8405-9e5580d6e5fb ; John Authers, ‘Wounds from the 
2008 financial crisis are still bleeding’, Financial Times, September 23, 2016, 
https://www.ft.com/content/e8f0abf0-80f8-11e6-bc52-0c7211ef3198 ; Martin Wolf, ‘The tide of globalisation 
is turning’, Financial Times, September 6, 2016, https://www.ft.com/content/87bb0eda-7364-11e6-bf48-
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conceived, they are plagued by efficiencies around high compliance costs and slow pace of capital 
mobility. These problems have once again highlighted the need to develop a model for the 
conceptualisation of securities across the globe. 
The call to regulate has placed significant burden on market regulator both at the global, regional 
and national levels for years. This is despite a decline in the powers of global and regional regulatory 
agencies in recent years due to gradual growth of populist movements and perception of 
international regulatory bodies as biased and lacking independence.6 Even as national markets 
engage and play host to international market participants, the local regulators are caught up with 
the challenge of providing adequate regulation and required oversight to ensure government 
confidence. Traditional approaches to securities conceptualisation have failed to address the 
problem of meeting the expectation of diverse range of domestic and foreign market participants. 
Therefore, the effectiveness and efficiencies of securities at achieving its optimum is blighted. 
Securities can be useful at helping to mobilise savings for investment where a coherent framework 
and jurisprudence for its conceptualisation exist. It is therefore argued that the development of a 
conceptual framework would provide certain level of interpretative uniformity and coherence in the 
overall definition of securities. Apart from providing cross-border linkages for engagement, it will 
create clarity and uniformity in the application of the components that constitute securities and 
provide a basis for their recharacterisation.  
After the 1929 market crash till date, academics and commentators have continuously questioned 
the rationale for a localised approach to securities conceptualisation.7 In fact they raised several 
points to support pre-existing arguments that a globalised conceptualisation technique for securities 
is imperative. They argued that the measure of global technique meant that no one country is 
subject to the superfluous influence of other countries when it comes to trade and investment. 
Indeed, even when laced with the best of intentions, such views will not neutralise those myriads of 
regional and global institutional inhibitions that facilitate further entrenchment of nationalistic 
systems.8 For instance, while distinct national governments maintained their national frameworks, 
they engaged in various forms of coordination and cooperative arrangement that gave persuasive 
reciprocal recognition to regional and global bodies. For this reason, national governments have the 
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upper hand in this conflict between regional and global regulation. To this end therefore, domestic 
governments now solely possess the necessary internal networks needed to facilitate securities 
development, management and enforcement in the market.9 For this reason, they wield significant 
influence over the institutional tools that shape the concept of securities. One of those tools is the 
logic of language, while the other is the ownership of the interpretative philosophy that animates 
the legal concepts of securities.10 It is the case that both language and its interpretative theories 
facilitate the exploitation of ideas that catalyses innovation in investment securities within the 
market. Therefore, a study of the origins and operational nature of these interpretative theories in 
legislative design and implementation within the context of legal language is crucial. This thesis 
examines these points and argues that the history and conflict between the broad interpretative 
theoretical paradigms that support the construction of legislation, contribute to the definitional 
incoherence of securities. More specifically, this research looks at how the misapplication of these 
tools has created the problem of definitional incoherence and conceptual ambiguities in the Nigerian 
Capital Market. 
 
1.2 Statement of Problem 
The Nigerian Capital Market has underperformed from its inception in comparison to similar markets 
worldwide. This has been traced partly to legal contradictions which culminate in limited product 
availability to meet diverse investment preferences. Lack of strategic fit between legal model and 
non-legal themes like political economy and socio-cultural dispositions have accentuated the 
problem. These internal problems have external dimensions in terms of effectiveness of cross-
border transactions and willingness of investors to take a long term outlook of the market. This has 
led to a critical inquiry by seeking answers to the following research questions: 
 
1.3 Research Questions 
1.Whether the absence of a universally accepted conceptualisation framework for legal concepts in 
securities contributes to their definitional incoherence and in turn affect product development in 
markets?; 
2.Whether the tensions between formalism and functionalism in their conceptualisation of legal 
concepts in securities contributes to the definitional incoherence of securities and places constraints 
on poor understanding of securities and prevents product development in markets?; 
3.Whether the adoption of similar statutory design on the basis of historical nexus is sufficient to 
guarantee similar legal outcomes without the necessity of requiring strategic fit between design of 
legal concepts of securities and non-legal themes in the conceptualisation of securities? 
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1.4 Aim of Research 
This research seeks to develop a model that will enable the understanding and conceptualisation of 
securities. Apart from providing a basis for the contextual definition of securities, the model will also 
help in the application of the concepts of securities for the purpose of investment product 
development to meet diverse investment objectives. 
 
1.5 Objectives  
In view of the absence of a holistic and globally accepted framework for conceptualising securities, 
there is need to highlight the risks to market and market participants. The impact of poor global 
coordination especially where it fails to capture the multi-sectorial and multi-dimensional nature of 
securities is also highlighted. This research goes further to demonstrate that non-legal factors like 
philosophy, politics, economics, history, social and cultural themes play a major role in shaping the 
nature of securities creation and regulation. Given these myriads of dynamic forces, any attempt at 
entrenching a global institutional form will most likely be incapable of addressing the divergent 
concerns of various interests. Therefore to achieve harmony across all spectrum of investors’ 
expectation, a flexible framework is needed to cater for the multi-lateral networks of interests. For 
instance, common measures of mutual recognition are needed to incentivise participation and 
create contextual access to more product development. To achieve far-reaching discussion, this 
research seeks to explore structures that could enhance practical product development when 
applied across market segments to enhance market growth and development. 
To achieve the stated aim, the research adopts the following objectives: 
1. To show that there is a problem with the definition and conceptualisation of securities 
within the Nigerian Capital Market which is inhibiting poor understanding of investment 
products and their development in the market for the purpose of increasing investment. 
2. To show that this problem partly results from the conflict between formalist and 
functionalist legal philosophies. 
3. To show that this conflict is impacting and continuously eroding the concepts and 
components of securities even as the structure of these products are evolving and changing 
at a fast pace due to technological disruptions. 
4. To show that this problem still persists 
5. To explore other legal barriers to investment product development within the Nigerian 
Capital Market. 
6. To develop a practical legal model that is national in approach but with structures to suit the 
Nigerian Capital Market’s proposed engagement with cross border activities. This model 
seeks to achieve the following: 
a. Harmonise the concepts, components and theories of securities 
b. Show areas of alignment upon which to create a coherent network of concepts, theories 
and components 
c. Provide a basis for the development of a coherent jurisprudence for the 
conceptualisation of securities and better understanding of the product for increased 
development and investment in the Nigerian Capital Market. 
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1.6 Focus of this Research 
This research focuses on Nigeria with literature review of major markets in North America, South 
America, Europe, Asia and Africa. The scope of this research addresses four functional categories in 
the definition of securities: 
i. The definition of securities and concepts 
ii. The structure of the definition and concepts 
iii. The use of language operators and effect on concepts 
iv. The interpretative model adopted and effect on concepts 
 
1.7 Research Methodology 
This cross-sectorial study investigates the regulation of equities, debts and derivatives from multiple 
directions. It considers the concept of securities regulation from a legal standpoint by examining 
legal theories, components, concepts and approaches. This is viewed from a national prism in 
relation to regional and global perspective. The research assesses this subject from epistemological 
standpoint of contextualism. Contextualism is grounded on constructively functional epistemology 
that sees reality as an amalgam of legal and non-legal contingencies laced in political and moral 
values 
a. Research Philosophy 
This research adopts the contextualist tool because it addresses social and legal phenomena within 
the capital market by deploying multidisciplinary framework with the ultimate objective of 
emancipating functional realities. Since the researcher’s view cannot be distinct from the research, 
the data must be interpreted based on his insight and influences. Contextualism seeks to push ideas 
and frameworks to their limits by identifying contradictions and exploring the subjective meaning of 
legal rules. This stimulates responses and elucidates realities behind actions. On the basis of the 
aforementioned, the tool appropriate for this study. Contextualism seeks to understand the subject 
reality of legal subjects within the capital market by exploring their actions in response to the 
construction of laws, regulations, responses, motives and actions. 
b. Research Design and Method 
The research design indicates the manner in which research is to be carried out in line with the 
contextualist tool as a vehicle to explore functionalist instrumentation of language in legal design to 
achieved pre-set objectives. 
i. Data Collection Method 
A researcher administered unstructured interview is used to measure the impact of current law and 
regulation on ability to develop new investment product in the market. That is whether the 
Investment and Securities Act 2007, Companies and Allied Matters Act 2004, Securities and 
Exchange Rules, Corporate Governance Code, Chartered Institute of Stock Brokers Rule and Nigerian 
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Stock Exchange Rule. This interview method intends to capture the concerns and contributions of 
practitioners within the industry. The interview will be conducted with senior members, middle 
management and employees/practitioners that are responsible for products development, 
regulation and enforcement in the market. This would involve lawyers and in some cases judicial 
officers. 
The self-administered unstructured interview method will be applied in Chapter 4 to discuss the 
current legal environment in the country. This will be followed by a third method of participant 
personal observation to understand the manner in which standards setting, cross-border market 
approach, mutual coordination and sharing of regulatory experiences are achieved in the market. 
The usefulness of this mixed approach is to identify likely gaps between the views of practitioners 
within the industry and actual realities on ground. It may as a matter of fact, also identify other 
variables outside the legal environment that currently contributes to the problems. This could 
include socio-political structure/disposition, economic realities; technological situation and 
environmental issues. 
ii. Sample Selection 
This research proposes to study ten (10) organisations within the Capital Market. Five (5) of these 
organisations will be drawn from the Capital Market Operators and investors’ segment, and Five (5) 
from the regulators segment. 
The operators segment will be sub-divided into local and foreign operators. This research seeks to 
select four (4) out of (5) operator organisation within the Nigerian Capital Market. These include 
Broker-Dealers, Market Makers, Investment Management Company, Issuing Houses, Trustees, 
Investment Advisers (lawyers, accountants), Securities Clearing and Settlement Companies. Within 
this group, the research proposes to apply a combination of personal observation of the Nigerian 
Capital Market working environment and unstructured interview of an estimate of two (2) senior 
members each of the legal and enforcement team or Chief Executive Officer of these organisations. 
Also Three (3) of the Five (5) regulators will be chosen from Nigeria. This includes the Securities and 
Exchange Commission and the Nigerian Stock Exchange, NASD OTC and FMDQ OTC. Within this 
category, the researcher intends to personally observe the operations of the Nigerian Stock 
Exchange and the Securities and Exchange Commission and engage at least One (1) senior member 
each of the legal and enforcement team, preferably the head of the team in an unstructured 
interview. In all these cases, the middle management and lower staff will also be personally 
observed (disclosed and undisclosed), accompanied with unstructured interviews. 
iii. Analysis Method 
Current literatures identify two main research methods (quantitative and qualitative methods). 
While the quantitative method analyses numerical data from questionnaire and structured interview 
to achieve scientific outcomes, qualitative method is used in interviews and observational data 
analysis to achieve social realities. 
This research which adopts the doctrinal method utilises the qualitative approach because of the 
nature of the research. Qualitative method makes it possible for researcher to explore the social 
contradictions within legal theories. 
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The doctrinal method which represents a systematic set of procedures for developing theory from 
data is considered useful in measuring the regulatory effectiveness of national laws/rules in the 
development and management of securities.11 This will be particularly useful in Chapter 5 where 
qualitative analysis of legal models of Nigeria is assessed against conditions applied to specific 
products available in those markets to understand their respective outcomes. While utilising 
qualitative analysis through doctrinal method, the researcher will deploy grounded theory tools such 
as theoretical sampling, coding and comparison drawn from laws, contracts in Nigeria at national 
level and thereafter compared with the respective regions. 
With this choice method of analysis, the outcomes expected are a modification of existing theories 
to fit into data. 
 
1.8 Contributions 
The idea of multiplicity of conceptualisation frameworks by different countries may be seen as 
attractive today because of the possibility of cooperation and mutual recognition. However, this 
approach has its demerits. Firstly, it creates significant compliance burden on countries as they try to 
navigate, interpret and justify similarities or differences between every aspect of financial 
instruments. Secondly, the fluid nature of securities and increasing technological disruptions by 
Digital Ledger Technologies and Crypto-Instruments makes it difficult to anticipate the scope of 
these instruments. Thirdly, it is also the case that whilst nations are caught in the dilemma of either 
preserving historical traditions to retain uniqueness or embracing foreign traditions to ensure 
economic growth, significant tensions is created in the underlying structures and understanding of 
securities. This conflict is militating against cross-border coordination and harmonisation efforts. The 
danger of increased market fragmentation has left regional regulators with the option of increasing 
the threshold of compliance and/or raise standard of membership in regional blocks or groupings. 
Even though this may possibly present short term positive results, the long term disadvantages may 
lead to loss of competitiveness at the regional level as a result of potential arbitrage opportunities 
inadvertently created for non-members.  
To address these concerns, this research argues and firmly makes the point that formalist approach 
to the conceptualisation of securities is insufficiently equipped to accommodate the various contexts 
that constitute securities as a concept. By so doing it makes the following contributions: 
a. Looks to fill the vacuum and initiate debate on the conceptualisation of securities in Nigeria 
and the selected countries. 
b. It stresses the usefulness of real world semantics in language philosophy as it shapes 
representionality of legal texts by providing a basis for their context-sensitive 
conceptualisation. 
c. Through the use of focused group case study research technique, this thesis identified the 
legal obstacles to the conceptualisation of securities in the Nigerian Capital Market 
d. Proposes a suitable national definition of security by attempting to clarify and harmonise the 
inconsistencies in the concepts of securities in the Nigerian Capital Market. 
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e. Development of a model for the clarification and harmonisation of the components and 
concepts of securities (The Conceptual Onion). It demonstrates the capacity of the model to 
clarify the place of negotiability, transferability, circularity within the context of securities 
and its concepts of right and duties. 
This research is an original contribution to knowledge as it clarifies the yawning inconsistencies in 
conceptualisation of equities, debt and derivatives. By exploring pre-existing researches to identify 
gaps in the understanding of investments and analysing concepts, this research develops the 
Conceptual Onion Model for the categorisation of securities. 
The Conceptual Onion is established on the basis of a multi-layered exploration of national 
conceptualisation models of different countries. It will expand existing frameworks of national 
regulation in several ways: 
a. It shows the cyclical interactions of the concepts of securities by clarifying uniformities in 
legal relations with parties. These circular networks are both at the levels of the instruments 
themselves and their derivatives. 
b. It facilitates the understanding of the concepts and their likely cooperation with regards to 
enforcement in regulated markets within and outside national boundaries. 
c. The model shows that comparative and contextual studies of structures and approaches 
adopted by different countries provide a framework for standard setting, and create the 
basis for combination of regulatory theories and practical application in these countries. 
d.  By putting the courts at the heart of conceptualisation, the model demonstrates its capacity 
to galvanise the development of a coherent jurisprudence while setting out criteria for the 
determination and weaving together of legal and non-legal contexts 
Apart from these contributions to knowledge, the researcher is also inspired by the role of securities 
in enabling the capital market to deliver economic growth and development. The challenges faced 
by regulators in their quest to mobilise savings for investment, lower financing costs, facilitate 
equitable wealth distribution, can only be addressed by increased product availability in the market. 
Therefore, it is imperative to explore the practical and theoretical elements that support the 
development of investment products in markets. 
  
1.9 Why Nigeria?  
Nigeria is an attractive choice for a study of this nature because of its unique position on the 
continent of Africa and the world. As undoubtedly the largest economy in Africa, its Capital Market is 
the second largest on the continent. This underperformance has been traced to limited product 
availability to meet diverse investment preferences.12 The impediment to product development is a 
result of internal incoherence in the definition and application of concepts that constitute securities 
and lack of strategic fit between legal and non-legal themes. 
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1.10 Challenges to research 
Lack of understanding of securities at a conceptual level made the sourcing of data within the 
market difficult. This was also made worse by the fact that no literature currently exist on this aspect 
of securities in Nigeria and Africa at large. 
To address the problems and challenges highlighted above, this research is structured into chapters. 
1.11 Structure of Thesis 
Chapter 1 sets out the background of this research to show the damaging effect of the philosophical 
divides that have perpetuated this definitional incoherence of securities in capital markets. 
Chapter 2 considers the definition of securities (equity, debt, derivative and various hybrids) with a 
view to understanding their nature and propriety for specific regulatory models. It presents a 
general overview of the essential and universally accepted component of securities. It identifies the 
competing theories, concepts and approaches to securities categorisation. The chapter further 
highlights the merits and demerits of these various approaches as a window to distil the best 
normative approach to achieving definitional coherence and by extension product development in 
the capital markets in Sub-Saharan Africa/Nigeria. This chapter concludes that the formalist 
conceptualisation contributes to the definitional incoherence of securities and limits their economic 
functions. While acknowledging the preponderance of weak institutions as a likely risk to the 
successful implementation of the recommended functionalist judicial context-sensitive approach, 
this chapter demonstrates how the US has adopted this approach to overcome similar challenges in 
its history as it fashioned a coherent framework for the conceptualisation of securities. This has led 
to increased product development and market growth.  
Chapter 3 details the research methodology and justifies the choice of research strategies 
Chapter 4 identifies statutory and administrative formalism as the model/concept at play in Nigeria. 
It presents the historical origin and demonstrates its contribution to the weak mechanisms that 
sustains definitional incoherence and poor product development in the Nigerian capital market. It 
goes further to identify and discuss through empirical data the limitations, confusions, 
contradictions and negative disruptive implications of formalist language structure that have shaped 
securities legislation and negatively impacted the development of Nigerian capital market. It 
assesses and analyses collected data against the main thrusts of the framework developed in 
chapter 2. Such analyses should either support the views that formalist approach places significant 
constrains on the effective conceptualisation of securities and product development in the Nigerian 
Capital Market.  The chapter also identifies and explores non-legal themes (socio-political and 
economic factors) that have shaped the definitional/language crisis and perpetuated a cycle of 
under-development of market products.  It concludes that the difficulties experienced in the 
Nigerian capital market are traceable to the definitional incoherence of securities borne out of 
strategic misalignment between legal and non-legal themes. 
Chapter 5 examines the legal issues within the model against Nigerian Investment laws (as captured 
in chapter 3) and data. Through hypothetical case study this chapter explores relevant provisions 
within the Investment and Securities Act, SEC Rules, CAMA and Clearing Rules to practically show 
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how functionalism (contextualism) can improve the functioning of market through contextual 
application of laws. The results achieved are further assessed to produce recommendations. 
Chapter 6 Summarises the research and makes suggestions 
Chapter 7 Captures the findings and contributions to theory, policy and practise. It also addresses 
the epistemology of the contribution and implications 
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Chapter 2 – Securities in Context (Theoretical Framework) 
2.1 Introduction 
For reasons captured in previous chapter above, the broad literature and jurisprudence on 
the conceptualisation of securities is fraught with fundamental gaps, contradictions and 
dilemmas. Hudson identifies these as a source of definitional incoherence and threat to 
global financial stability.13 This view seems to enjoy wide support from a cross-section of 
market participants who have long advocated for a coherent framework for global 
application of securities law. For the most part this research reflects a strong consensus on 
four unique and interconnected points.  
a. First, the absence of a coherent jurisprudence and framework for the 
conceptualisation of securities has given rise to multiplicity of interpretative 
approaches of securities instruments and increased market fragmentation. Ever 
increasing differences in national laws and their interpretation have continuously 
widened the gaps in understanding and worsened investors’ dilemmas. The desire to 
ensure free movement of capital across borders for purposes of trade and 
investment is inhibited by difficulties in achieving mutual recognition and/or 
equivalent status. A major source of this controversy essentially, is the conflict 
between the formalist and functionalist interpretative philosophies.14  
b. Second, apart from gaps and lack of uniformity in the interpretation of securities, the 
absence of a definitional framework for the characterisation of the specific concepts 
within negotiability that make up securities, further deepens its incoherence. This 
creates tensions in markets as participants fashion out how best to achieve mutual 
recognition and/or equivalent status for the purpose of cross border transactions.15  
c. Third, the absence of uniform application of these concepts in the conceptualisation 
and characterisation of securities across all jurisdictions contribute to its definitional 
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incoherence. Some of the causes of this include inherent limitations in language and 
linguistic interpretation of legal texts,16 the promotion and protection of legal 
traditions. It also include the poor institutional capacities of certain nations to 
accommodate changes to new legal regimes or take full advantage of changes 
imposed by the adopted (new) legal traditions.17  
d. Fourth, the inadequacy or lack of definition of the specific financial instruments is 
traceable to the desire to perpetuate dogmas. There are practical dangers in the 
failure to provide a definitional framework to delineate the contours and scope of 
these instruments.18  
e. Fifth, the agreements in paragraphs (a) to (d) above make a strong case for the 
development of a flexibly robust context sensitive functionalist model for the 
conceptualisation of securities to address these challenges.19 
To resolve the above challenges, this research addresses the two main parts of legal 
philosophy. The first being the development of a theoretical framework of legal studies and 
the second, the examination of legal concepts such as rights, duties, liabilities, immunities 
etc. as they relate to private law and contract. These concepts and theories are explored 
within the context of ‘meaning’ in language philosophy on the one hand, and reference 
implications propositions as embedded in context on the other hand.20 An investigation of 
this nature is essential to shape the philosophy in the area of securities regulation. 
Part 1 of this chapter attempts defining securities and explore the theoretical framework so 
as to serve as the conceptual framework for the review of literature on the structure of 
securities. The chapter adopts the functionalist/contextualist approach as a window to 
examine how language and the use of its concepts like ‘means’ and ‘context’ constrains or 
support the understanding of securities, its component and concepts. The choice of judicial 
context sensitive functionalism to frame this perspective is borne out of the multital legal 
relations of securities and the need to capture its nominal essence. Hence this approach 
helps to amalgamate several theories and concepts to create the needed focus point for 
structuring this review. 
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Part 2 on the other hand examines new ways of thinking about securities, its definition and 
the concepts in practice. It indeed explores how the courts have been used as an instrument 
to weave together all the theories, concepts and legal relations in fashioning a holistic 
jurisprudence for securities. 
 
2.2 Basis of choice of Literature and Markets for this study 
This review seeks to identify the gaps and contradictions in the conceptualisation of 
securities in major markets of the world, explain the effect of those gaps and propose 
solutions. To achieve this, the review relies on case law, statutes, seminal works, journals 
and newspaper articles on securities law in major capital markets of the world. This research 
explores the inner workings of concepts of securities and underlying components. It 
examines the themes that influence and are influenced by these concepts in such a way that 
they shape market behaviours, attitudes and knowledge of concepts within the markets. 
Therefore the literatures of choice are foundational and contemporary in that they explore 
these investment products internally to understand the laws in practice and how they 
reinforce negotiability, transferability and circularity. By concentrating attention on these 
categories, it is possible to identify the contemporary legal arguments borne out of conflicts 
in interpretative systems that participants are constantly confronted with in the market. 
This is with a view to unearthing how these interpretative structures either militate or 
support the seamless movement of title within the market. This literature review covers 
legal issues emanating from disputes about product categories, types and legal effects. The 
focus is not on the activities of participants and regulation with respect to investment. 
Rather it is on how legal issues within these rules shape the activities of respective 
participants and regulation as they relate to their choices in the market. This is with a view 
to focusing on how legal rules promote and constrain the conceptualisation of securities 
towards achieving circularity. In deliberating on negotiability, transferability and circularity, 
emphasis is on the network of concepts like rights and duties captured by language 
operators within securities that guarantee circularity in the market. 
The same is true of the choice of markets. Brummer identified the dominant influence 
bigger securities markets have on smaller one within regional blocks as it relates to their 
legal structure and securities regulation.21 Considering the need of this research to explore 
the legal effects created by conflict of philosophies, the identification of the major markets 
within sub-regional blocks in every continent was explored to understand the interpretative 
philosophies in operation. Therefore this choice of markets was informed by size, legal 
sophistication and regional influence. With this in mind, it becomes imperative to state that 
distinctiveness of markets only exist at the mercy of their interconnectedness. The US 
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securities market has global appeal because of its size, legal sophistication and influence 
within the NAFTA trading block. Germany, France, Italy, Spain, United Kingdom are 
influential on the one hand because these countries are major markets within the world’s 
largest trading block (the European Union). On the other hand, these countries still maintain 
some form of influence over the legal and financial systems of their former colonies. Hong 
Kong and Singapore are explored because of their regional influence in Asia, sophisticated 
legal regime that captures the cultural variations of the region and also membership of the 
common wealth. This is important now that the common wealth is increasing gaining 
importance in the wake of BREXIT. Japan is studied because of its size, influence and 
sophistication. Finally, the choice of South Africa, Kenya and Nigeria is borne out of their 
sub-regional influence as the continent moves towards a single trading bloc under the 
recently signed African Free Trade Partnership in Kigali Rwanda (also known as the 2018 
Accord). 
 
PART 1 
The legal jurisprudence (whether general or particular), as in this context represent the 
study of securities and their uses. By securities, we refer to traditional instruments and 
synthetics. With respect to their uses, reference is made to how they are conceptualised 
and applied to transactions. At the core of securities is its representative character. Aside 
exceptional cases, the definition of securities have been couched with cognisance of their 
purport and coherence. To interpret these definitions within the context of transactions 
require analysis of their representative contents and grammatical structures. In achieving 
this study the language concept of ‘means’ and ‘context’ are explored against those legal 
concepts that underlie securities. These include negotiability/transferability which is better 
described as a bundle of rights within instruments that guarantee their unhindered or 
uninhibited transfer, exchange of values and storage of the said values within regulated 
markets. The identified rights in themselves are both paucital and multital and therefore 
form the basis of this research to understand their nature and function and impact of 
legislation on their function. 
 
Do we really need a definition of securities? 
The question of examining securities on the basis of its component like negotiability seems 
particularly attractive these days. This is partly due to the difficulties faced in different 
jurisdictions as relates to arriving at one that captures the very essence of these products 
and the conceptual difficulties faced in understanding rights as a concept. These problems 
are both internal and external. The internal issues relate to lack of consistency in the 
conceptualisation approach of these products which is borne out of differences in legal 
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regimes, language philosophies, cultural and economic priorities. The external factors relate 
to the attitude of governments, politics and the ideological dispositions of the framers of 
the laws. 
Hart in his concept of law identified working models as the only way to present different 
standards of legal systems in place of definitions.22 To him, practical life clarity can only be 
attained by understanding concepts from the way they function in particular linguistic and 
logical frameworks. Without jettisoning the real essence of definitions as reducing 
complexities and drawing attentions to key criteria, word construction in this sense has the 
potentials to perpetuate dogmas. To this end, it is important to adopt multiple approaches 
in the analyses of securities as a concept. This will include atomism, real essence and 
nominal essence.23 Although these logical analysis methods are treated distinctly in practice, 
they are not mutually exclusive. Wollheim criticised the real essence analysis model as 
lacking in their elucidation of meaning, provision criterion of validity of law and schema of 
legal system validity. He however advocates for nominal essence model.24 Freeman 
disagrees with Wolleim when he cautioned that words and their construction within legal 
texts have potentials of improving or constraining legal validity. These tensions are reflected 
in the unease and uncertainties in defining securities. 
 
2.3 Uncertainties in defining securities 
Achieving an all-embracing definition of securities has not been easy. Legal systems all over 
the world have struggled to surmount definitional challenges by adopting different 
strategies. 25The first strategy is about the structure of the definition, the second strategy is 
definition on the basis of institutional ideologies, the third strategy is on the basis of the 
underlying component of securities and the fourth approach is definition on the basis of 
practical criteria. 
The first strategy is broken into three sub-strategies. This includes definitions: 
a. Supplanting definitions by listing broad categories of products commencing with the 
word ‘Context’ or ‘Means’ 
b. Another sub-approach adopts a highly restrictive technique of categorising securities 
on the basis of their resemblance to pre-existing instrument (UK) 
c. The third sub-approach is one that fashioned a definition through the creation of 
theories and tests through a court system (USA). 
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The second approach is more of institutional attempt to define securities based on the 
ideological positions. Statute and courts tend to tow uniquely similar yet conflicting lines 
when it comes to defining securities. In the US for instance, statutes adopt the formal 
divergent view of securities as distinct pieces of contractual instruments with lives of their 
own,26 the courts explores the functional convergent approach of looking at the rights and 
obligations emanating from the labels parties give to their contracts.27 This therefore 
highlights the tensions that currently exist. For other countries, their statutes have played 
significant roles without a supporting jurisprudence from the courts. The outcome of this 
statutory approach has been mixed. In some jurisdictions,28 it heightened the level of 
uncertainties and created risk aversion. In others,29 it has contributed to the low level 
development of investment products in those markets because investors factor in the 
strength of supporting institutions in their decision to invest. The meeting point for both 
views should rest on the importance but salient identification of the linkages in the 
governing variables that constitute securities and more fundamentally, their conceptual 
nature.30 
For the third approach, some writers have attempted to ascribe securities to some 
classification systems which include criteria like currency denomination, ownership rights, 
maturity, liquidity, tax treatment, income payment, credit rating, industry types, sectors, 
market, region and country.31 The difficulties in these generalised classifications stem from 
inconsistencies in the choice of application criteria, universality of a particular system of 
classification and the lack of certainty as to the methods to be applied at a given situation or 
circumstance. 
The fourth approach to defining securities explores theories to understand the true nature 
of securities and their dispersal within the market.32 Attempts have been made to identify 
some basic constituents of securities which consist of terminologies like ownership, 
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relationships; rights to ownership and negotiability.33 These terminologies have however 
not been explained to provide clarity. 
IOSCO through its 35 Principles for the Regulation of Securities identified 
negotiability/transferability as the essential component of securities. Without providing a 
definition for the term, a community reading of the entire principles indicate that 
transferability as the characteristics of negotiability so that where instruments are capable 
of moving freely within a regulated exchange, they are deemed negotiable. The fact of 
unhindered movements of assets within a market does not resolve the question of what is 
transferred, its nature and capacity to confer binding title on the other party. Therefore and 
as a first point, questions of ownership which has suffered dispersion over the years to great 
masses of shareholders who clearly do not have control over their shares, was not 
addressed as a way of clarifying the component. Secondly, the clear departure from 
property law of ownership that emphasises control has been left unattended. Thirdly, the 
legal definition of ‘relationship’ has suffered disruptions especially within the context of 
right of ownership and beneficial ownership as they relate to law and equity. 
From the foregoing, it is clear that authorities are divided on the true nature of securities34. 
The debate is a product of historical understanding of the uses of products and various 
regulatory definitions. Importantly, three broad classifications exist in summing up the 
interest they elicit. Firstly, there are arguments as to whether securities are properties 
(therefore subject to property law Lex Situs Rule).35 A second group argues that securities 
are mere contractual rights,36 while a third group argue that they are neither property nor 
contract but investments of a special kind that is created by the law to circulate in a 
regulated exchange.37 These distinctions have far reaching effect on tax laws, property laws, 
corporate accounting principles as applied to securities and their tradability in the market.  
Benjamin38 in a bid to define security interests distinguished it from securities by stating 
that they are different and any attempt to bring them together is a legal risk. Such a view 
may not hold especially with the dematerialisation of property interests and increased 
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complexities in the world of intermediation39. Even in the 1990s when such positions were 
held, the underlying rights conveyed by a certificate were essentially intangible and could 
have existed separately as investments. What she seems to suggest by that position is that 
interest in a share certificate for instance could be characterised as an instrument of 
payment or investment. What is however unclear is whether both payment and investment 
can exist simultaneously on the same securities. If the answer is in the affirmative, then 
there must be a basis for their demarcation. Conversely, in cases where the concept of 
ownership is inferred in both securities as payment and investment, then is there basis for 
separation must be apparent. 
For this research the word security is a legal construct. It is descriptive in character and 
exists in the word of function rather than form. Securities in one sense are the conceptual 
embodiment of rights (entitlements) and interests in an investment on a subject matter that 
is either tangible or intangible. These rights create obligations. While these rights are self-
preserving, the subject matter invested in forms the fulcrum on which the value of these 
interests are measured and re-assigned. In other words, while providing a protected 
entitlement for investors, it also enables a claim against itself for the sustenance of pre-
agreed obligations. 
The definition of securities by listing a set of items does not cover sufficiently the 
extensiveness of the concept.  Bonds, shares and derivatives do not constitute securities in 
themselves but serves as mere descriptive devices of rights and obligations that are created 
through contracts that securities represent. This explanation is more relevant in the capital 
market where price movements form the basis of investible obligations. Such obligations 
become payable in line with the underlying contracts that sustain their exchanges. 
Therefore, securities constitute a bundle of legal entitlements captured within contractual 
devices that exist to protect itself and obligations within it for the purpose of substituting or 
reallocating values. The extent to which these rights are punctuated by intermediation and 
their specificity in the face of multiple layers of intermediaries are important 
considerations40. This is useful in the determination of whether these rights are effectual if 
not specifically tied to identifiable individuals or groups.41 
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Therefore, securities are better known as instruments that do the following: 
a) Guarantee protection of investors’ asset by providing a form known and recognised 
among the three identifiable variants (equity, debt and derivative). The distinction 
between equity and debt is consistently blurred by the frequency of debt – equity 
conversion within the market.42 
b) Provision of exchangeability for value and negotiability. Securities as an existing 
medium of transferability of recognisable transferable rights of value for value 
between the transferor and transferee. 
c) The modicum of un-hedged risk. 
The above conditions constitute the sum total of the nature of securities which significantly 
finds more expression in function it performs rather than the form it exists in. Its structure 
which better explains its definition is captured in the diagram below. 
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Fig. 1 – The Cellular Structure of a Security 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                        
Figure 1 above represents the microscopic structure of a security showing the 
characteristics and function of securities. It basically demonstrates that a security is nothing 
more than a bundle of tradable rights which are intricately interwoven and in constant 
communication. Under prescribed rules which allocate powers that create and reinforces 
rights and duties, this indicates how these concepts rely on one another to exist and 
function. The square diagram shows that the rights themselves perform dual functions of 
wealth creation and storage. This empowers the holder to wield control and influence. They 
create wealth by facilitating easy transferability, tradability and convertibility of risks. These 
rights are a store of wealth by providing opportunity for capital appreciation, retrieval and 
monetisation of itself. The ability to protect values, guarantee safety and security of stored 
values are special advantages. 
 
Rights and obligation in 
securities conferred by power 
and authority 
Right and 
obligation to 
establish control 
Right and 
obligation to 
protect value 
Right/obligation 
to exchange and 
transfer value 
Right/obligation 
to store and 
retrieve value 
Right and 
obligation to 
convert value 
Right and 
obligation to 
monetise value 
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One unique feature of securities is the fact that they are represented in contracts or 
contractual terms and regulated by statute. The question as to what extent statutes 
influence these contracts and guarantee the protection of rights created within it is the 
essence of registration. In other words, registration of rights created within the instruments 
is a means of control of the content therein.43 Several discrepancies exist on the question of 
control and the recognition of specific rights currently captured. It is inimitable to assume 
this on the basis of mere statutory language. Parties to a contract would question the illogic 
of exerting control merely on the basis of statutory language read into labels placed on their 
private transactions. The highhandedness that characterises absence of a democratic 
mandate in statutory application which in a sense carries historical and cultural significance, 
has led to controversies in methodological approaches.44  
The tensions identified above raise the following fundamental questions: 
1. What is the nature of rights and obligations that constitute securities as captured 
within the concepts identified in Figure 1 above? 
2. How are these concepts connected to create the required legal relations identified in 
Figure 1 above? 
3. What these rights and obligations represent? 
4. How these concepts identified in Figure 1 above ensures compliance to create the 
legal relations that guarantee uninhibited transfers. 
These questions can only be answered by exploring the legal systems and content of laws 
regulating securities. By legal system, Fuller thinks of morals that carry internal structure 
and exemplary code of legality in achieving a relationship between laws and legal 
concepts.45 Raz disagrees with Fuller’s theory and believes that relationship between law 
and concept is possible only if a legal system can tackle the questions of existence,46 identity 
and member47 and structure.48 Identifying the relationship between law and legal concept 
does not guarantee compliance without establishing validity of the system. Therefore, 
where the various legal systems have been identified, the test for their validity will 
necessitate the adoption of three distinct approaches. Firstly, the behavioural approach 
which evinces the attitude of the legal system towards its laws and legal concepts by looking 
at the effectiveness as a measure of validity. The two main types of legal system under this 
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approach are realism and positivism. Secondly, the socio-psychological approach sees 
validity from the basis of legal compliance by official and citizens of a country. Thirdly, the 
deontic approach which looks at logical analysis of law as a basis for its effectiveness. 
One need not see the law as a standalone creation. Freeman sees it as a social continuum 
that is constituted by values, institutional philosophy and language of the law interacting at 
varying degrees.49 This is the basis upon which laws and concepts must be seen. Therefore, 
to properly discuss these themes within the context of securities concepts, this research 
adopts the four analytical categories of Robert Summer.50 He recommends four main steps 
to be taken in ‘engaging variety of analytical activities.’’ 
1. Analysis of existing conceptual framework of or about the law 
2. Construction of new conceptual framework with accompany terminologies 
3. Rational justification of institutions and practices, existing and proposed 
4. Purposive implication tracing out of what the acceptance of social purposes ‘implies 
in terms of social arrangement and social ordering. 
This research relies on these categories in the analysis of legal concepts so as to achieve a 
thorough appreciation of contemporary legal philosophy of securities. 
 
2.4 Existing conceptual framework of securities law (Formalism versus Functionalism) 
In view of the universal acceptance of negotiability as the component of securities and the 
fact of its description as constituting rights and duties (obligations) which are created by 
law, there is need to explore the concept of law to discover their nature and function.51 Hart 
insist on the use of context and language to elucidate rules and obligation rather than 
disagree with Austin’s theory of definition.52 To him, legal system is simply comprised of 
social rules derived from varied experiences which operate regulate, provide guidance and 
promulgate standards upon which conducts are measured and criticised.53 Hart believes 
that these social rules are made of rule of law (which create obligations and make certain 
conducts obligatory) and rules of morality (which is also known as systematic quality, 
mediates primary duty imposing rules and secondary power conferring rules). To Mullock, 
secondary (power conferring rule) provides the legal basis for contracts and allocate powers 
through rules to courts, legislature; securities regulators as well as prescribe their 
composition.54 The primary rules on the other hand impose duties. Hart recognised the 
unique relationship between primary and secondary rules as determinative of the texture of 
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a legal system, but stated that the basic differences between legal systems and standards 
for acceptability are predicated on three categories of secondary rules: 
1. Rules of adjudication which empowers officials in the course of legal enforcement to 
pass judgment. This is in cases where either the regulation or courts or both are 
allowed to act in judicial capacity 
2. Rules of change empower official bodies to enact laws which have the ability to 
change legal relations between individuals to achieve specific ends. As in this case, 
legislature to enact Securities Act. 
3. Rules of recognition which prescribes the criteria for validity of these rules. So that a 
legal system is said to exist where valid rules that regulate behaviours in accordance 
with the system’s criteria of validity exist. In addition, these rules of recognition, 
change and adjudication must be accepted as common prerequisite of behaviour by 
parties and officials. This is because the absence of these rules makes concepts like 
power and system of adjudication ineffectual thereby limiting the operational effects 
of legal and moral obligations. 
 
Therefore, Hart hinges his Systematic Quality on the normativity of law as reflected in 
human attitudes and actions towards law. He emphasised the relationship between moral 
influences to obey laws based on internal conviction as to its validity and the understanding 
of the significance of effect of human actions to self and society when they are obeyed or 
disobeyed.55 MacCormick identified this suasion as a product of distinctive language 
reflecting the critical characteristics of these social rules.56 Karl Olivercrona’s view seems in 
tandem with MacCormick’s especially on the question of the capacity of legal words to 
delineate, create, and determine legal relations.57 This means the role of linguistics is 
increasing becoming relevant in legal interpretation58 even as S. Winter59maintains that the 
role of linguistic legal interpretation is only confined to cognitive linguistics. Freeman 
disagrees with the idea of cognitive linguistics exclusively without social linguistics in 
elucidating legal systems.60 Harris captures this view succinctly in voicing his support for the 
power of words in capturing the nominal essence of legal concepts in the determination of 
systematic quality and legal relations61 
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“Followers of this approach seek insights into the nature of legal concepts by careful 
attention to all the subtle variations of language comparing their uses inside and outside the 
law” 
This is what Bentham refers to as Deontic Logic.62 Tarski’s discussion on the variations of 
language in achieving representionality confirms Harris’ and Bentham’s views.63 He 
formulated the theory of formal language (formalism) which divides language and its uses 
into two broad sets. The first is the ‘Meaning-Proposition’ which sees representational legal 
and language concepts from their usage as a function of attitude as distilled from truth 
condition of the initiator. This according to him is borne out of his state or predetermined 
end and not from a considered collaborative exchange of mutual representionality. In other 
words, ‘means’ as it is used in statutory definition is meant to coerce outcomes. According 
to Tarski, 
“The epistemic counter-factual and modal positioning of formal language is not intentional 
in the sense that the object of their truth are not based or determined by reference to their 
parts” 
Therefore ‘meaning’ is not distilled or referenced from ‘sub sentential constituents’ 
The second view which is the ‘Possible World State’ (functionalism) as popularised by Saul 
Kripke considers representionality from the situation of how the world would look like ‘if the 
set of basic proportions with which they are defined where true’.64 This view which operates 
within the realm of context is conceived on the basis of four related premises:65 
1. A world state which is metaphysically impossible but epistemically possible 
2. A world state which occupies inquiry-relativity spaces within theories 
3. A world state which encapsulates apriori knowledge66 
4. A world state which is either known by its self-description or a product of empirical or 
indexical views 
These assumptions that place representionality of legal concepts within the realms of 
context have been criticised as insufficient. Saul Kripke,67 Richard Montague,68 David 
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Lewis,69 Robert Stalnaker70 and David Kaplan described Tarski’s formal language (formalism) 
as lacking in the underlying features of natural language which includes context sensitivity, 
intentionalities and logical truth. They see formal language as too weak to determine 
meaning and truth assigned to sentences. While jettisoning Tarski’s formal language 
technique, world state proponents advocate the Tarski’s style theory of ‘truth to context of 
utterance and possible states of the world’ also known as ‘Possible World Semantics’. The 
‘Possible World Semantics’ provide a more robust approach to unpacking language by 
incorporating modal concepts that tend to capture context and natural language. Conflict 
between the ‘Meaning-Proportion’ and the ‘Possible World State’ constitute a major 
conceptual challenge for the philosophy of language and stand in the way of rationalisation 
of legal system, legal rules and concepts. 
 
The Conflict between Formalism and Functionalism 
Formalism is essentially hinged on the Meaning- Proposition. It sees no transcendent 
conception of legal rules outside their literal or textual content.71 It argues that law is 
rationally determinate, autonomous, comprehensive and logically ordered.72 Therefore 
application of legal rules should be purely from mechanical deductions to produce single 
correct outcome instead of engaging in functionalist approach that manipulate legal rules 
through the lenses of political influence, moral views and personal biases. The fundamental 
ideals of the law in relation to society is deduced and conveyed by their statutory structure 
and language. To this end, formalism generally attempts to preserve legal tradition and 
control through the adoption of statutory structure that guarantees certainty in 
interpretation without the need for judicial support.73 
Functionalism revolves around the Possible World State. Functionalism disagrees with the 
formalist views that ascribe personal and societal prejudice in legal interpretation as 
prejudicial to legal purity and essence.74 It argues that purity of the law is achieved by 
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looking beyond legal texts to understand the state of affairs that regulate the objectivity of 
legal texts and subjectivity of its interpretation to clarify underlying phenomena. As a 
normative theory, it distances itself from the rigidity of formalism by embracing creativity in 
interpretation of legal text to ensure law serves the end of society through the 
entrenchment of good public policy, promotion of social justice and human rights 
improvement.75 It questions the logic in ascribing resolution of coordination problems in 
society to the coercive existence of law. Functionalism argues that law operates in letters 
and spirit which capture the prevailing state of market functioning. By so doing, it 
incorporates norms and various contexts into its legal design. Unlike formalism, the 
functionalism believes in the limitation of statutory language and therefore promotes the 
need for theoretical contextual frameworks through case law or empirical data to guarantee 
relative stability in a highly fluid market.76 In the final analysis, functionalism (unlike 
formalism) is illuminating not merely from the point of context, but also of function; 
therefore contextualising the process of interpreting statutes help in not just looking at the 
meaning of words but also their uses.  
This divergence in the mode of understanding the law is fundamental and far reaching. One 
major casualty of this dispute is the component of securities (negotiability). The vital 
question is whether the Meaning-Proposition or the Possible World State best elucidate this 
component to achieve representionality? This is a question that goes to the construction of 
1. The nature of legal system as it relates to relationship between social rules and their 
capacity for elucidation of legal concepts. 
2. The content of the law/rule as it relates to the desire to achieve systematic quality 
3. The interpretative approach to guarantee compliance or obedience 
Therefore, negotiability of a document is essentially affected by 
1. The statutory formalities and language used in its making 
2. Proper Endorsement or Delivery and the legal/language construction of what 
constitutes endorsement and delivery 
3. The legal/language construction of transferee’s right of ‘Holder in Due Course’ within 
the context of representionality 
Worthington describes negotiability as right within the rules that allows the passing of 
ownership from one party (transferor) to another (transferee) by endorsement or delivery.77 
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As a creation meant to substitute money within an exchange, it requires that the transferee 
is assured of its payment and also protected from the actions or defect of the transferor. 
The fact that a document is negotiable insulates the transferee from the transferor’s 
attempt to assert any legal defence against any transferee. This means the ability of an 
instrument to effect a transfer free of legal defences. 
The capacity to deliver this is a function of various rights captured within primary and 
secondary rules. This is why negotiability has been defined as legal aggregation of rights 
guaranteed by statutes and rules conferred on instruments to ensure their unhindered 
transfer within a regulated exchange. Hohfeld attempts to elucidate the nature of these 
rights. He defined rights as an aggregate of eight jural relations with other people.78 He 
believes that these eight jural relations constitute the lowest common denominators of law 
and the lowest generic conception of which any legal quantities may be reduced. Arthur 
Corbin agrees with him when he called the relations ‘fundamental’ because they are 
constant elements into which all of the variable combinations can be analysed.79 He 
however decomposed the eight concepts into two recurring themes of ‘power and duty’ and 
posited that using power and duty, one may arrive at the remaining six concepts definitely 
quickly. Goble80 however disagrees and thinks the basic legal concept is ‘power’ and that all 
others are derivatives of power, while Kocoureki81 characterises the entire concepts as 
‘claim’ and ‘power’. Morse insists that the entire system is based on ‘rights and duties’.82 
Whichever way it goes, it is clear that particular and correlative relations exist between 
parties which need elucidating. 
Hohfeld breaks down rights into eight distinct concepts which are right, duty, privilege, no-
right, power, liability, immunity, disability. To eliminate ambiguities he defines these terms 
relative to one another by grouping them into four pairs of 
Jural Opposites – Figure 2 
(1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Right  Privilege   Power  Immunity  
No – right  Duty   Disability  Disability  
 
Jural Correlatives – Figure 3 
(1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Right  Privilege   Power  Immunity  
Duty  No - right  Liability  Disability  
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By achieving these pairing, concepts that correlate are easily distinguishable from their 
opposites in determining legal relationships. The importance of achieving pre-determined 
legal effect is philosophical. Hohfeld posits that the use of words like right and privilege for 
instance, corresponds respectively to concepts of claim right and liberty right so that rights 
held and duties owed across all of these relationships disclose the degree of liberty.83 
Therefore, there is a need to allocate these concepts in such a way as to derive the expected 
results within a system. Collision; Andrews define the concepts as seen in the Table 3 below: 
Figure 4  – Definition of the eight Jural Concepts  
Right  This is one’s affirmative claim against another 
Duty  This is one’s affirmative obligation to another 
Privilege  This is one’s freedom from the right or claim of another 
No-right This is the absence of any obligation from another 
Power  This is one’s affirmative control over a given legal relation as against 
another 
Liability  This is one’s affirmative subjection to the control of another in a given 
relation 
Immunity  This is one’s freedom from the legal power or control of another as 
against legal relations 
Disability  This is the absence of any legal power or control of another as regards 
some legal relation 
 
An individual would be considered to have perfect liberty if it is shown that no one has a 
right to prevent the given act. Hohfeld argues that there is nothing like right against a thing 
(right in rem), and that legal relations can only be had between persons.84 Therefore since 
securities is neither property (subject to right in rem) nor contract but instrument of a 
special kind created by law with liberty (negotiability) to circulate in a regulated market, the 
extent of its liberty is controversial. 
Therefore questions have been asked as to: 
1. Whether negotiability can really guarantee the liberty it professes? 
2. Whether it can really be said that there is no interference with the choices made by 
parties within a regulated exchange? 
3. Whether the correlatives constitute one such interference with choice? 
4. Whether and to what extent both transferor and transferees are imbued with choice 
and control over choices? 
These questions can be answered by examining the practical operations of negotiability. 
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2.4.1 Negotiability and Liberty 
The importance of liberty cannot be over-emphasised because it guarantees control over 
choices and actions. Liberty in this sense is defined as an absence of both right and duty.85 In 
the case of negotiability, it is defined as freedom of title to pass in exchange for value in a 
regulated market. That means a transferee is free to take title without fear of prior adverse 
title because he is under no obligation to recognise any reserved right from transferor or 
third party.86 But this does not in any way prevent the transferee from recognising 
transferor’s right under certain moral considerations or benefits to the third party.87 In such 
situation, the third party may have a right against transferor to enforce duty. Therefore, it is 
inconceivable to expect the existence of liberty from correlatives of rights and duty between 
two people who are limited by their choices to act outside legal and moral confines. This 
means that freedom or liberty does not really exist. The right of the transferor and 
transferee within a regulated market are in personam and as such guided by terms upon 
which title can be exchanged for value and circulate within the market. This locks in 
preserved rights and obligations that are enforceable between specific parties on an inter-
connected basis. Property rights on the other hand are quite distinct and arguably not 
within this purview.  
A property right is multital or (in rem) because a property owner has a right to exclude not 
only a specific person from his property, but the whole world.  If this is the case, can a lawful 
title pass in the market without some form of exclusion applied against third parties not 
privy to the in personam rights between transferor and transferee? If exclusions do exist, to 
what extent can it be said that there is liberty and title is freely transferable within the 
market? It must be suggested however that in personam right can also exclude others not 
privy to it which in a sense convey some kind of proprietariness and enforceable (like 
property law breaches) through civil action. These are conceptual issues with significant 
legal effects which continuously throw up the following questions: 
1. Are legal relations governed by civil liability solely?88 
2. Are legal relations governed by rules of positive law solely?89 
3. In terms of securities, are legal relations governed by both civil liability and positive 
law or by property law (lex situs)? 
4. Are the legal relations between parties regulated by contract law so that parties are 
only restricted to rights and duties and civil liabilities arising therefrom? 
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The first two questions are answered by first addressing the concepts as they reflect the 
goal of society (sometimes referred to as social policy). So that the interpretation of 
whether legal relations are governed by civil liability or positive law is a question that goes 
to the heart of how they are constructed.90 This is where a determination is made as to 
whether social policy gives rise to rights. Understanding the nature of these rights and 
duties that emanate from relations in a regulated exchange remains important. Secondly, 
the influence of social policy positioning on the system of law and the approaches adopted 
in applying the concepts, implicates their purpose and the importance of words in the 
creation. 
To address the last three questions above, positive school which Collison says informed the 
Hohfeldian concepts is of the view that duties arise from the rules of positive law.91 This 
means principles of contract may have no say; a view that seems to contradict Anderson 
position where he identifies the existence of civil liability or remedy borne out of a duty.92 
To say that the transferor has power as against the transferee to make the transfer solely on 
the basis of positive law, speaks to the attitude of the rule of law. This raises questions as to 
the representionality of a law that give no room to other considerations. While positive law 
provides for remedy irrespective of defects in positive law, the legal realist sees such law as 
unrepresentative. They therefore advocates for a law which includes inputs from non-legal 
themes so that where transferor or transferee fail under their duties in a contract due to 
unanticipated natural occurrences, their rights are protected.93 
Despite arguments from the realist, positive law still remains attractive in regulating 
securities in many markets because of the need to enforce unhindered circularity of 
instruments. For instance, the rule of positive law ensures that legal duty exist where the 
law would make a person liable for inaction. So that in the case of transfers within the 
market, the rule of civil liability makes the transferor liable to transferee only where a duty 
exist which preclude withholding such transfers. This duty even extends to the courts either 
at first instance or appellate where they are obliged to stick to precedents. However, courts 
in certain circumstances, depending on the social philosophy would base their decisions on 
duties which do not arise from pre-existing positive law. The question therefore will remain 
as to whether and to what extent this furthers circularity. For example: 
“If the defendant is liable for the plaintiff’s losses, not because the rules of law make him 
liable, but because (in our opinion) it is socially or economically desirable that he bear the 
loss rather than the plaintiff”. 
Question will be raised as to what extent social philosophy furthers unhindered circularity of 
values within the regulated Exchange. Although the presence of social philosophy that 
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informs this fact that the courts are allowed to exercise discretion outside positive law is 
one of the distinctive features that demarcate legal system, the extent to which discretion 
can be exercised outside laid down principles, tests the extent to which social philosophy 
are subject to prevailing state of affairs. This is especially important when viewed against 
the degrees of variability of context and its likely effect on consistency in the exercise of 
discretion. It then becomes a major consideration as to whether legislature is willing to 
include the courts in the process of securities regulation. 
Another possible demarcation is the effect of a decision reached by a superior court on the 
lower courts’ exercise of discretion. Once the case is decided and liability imposed, the 
doctrine of precedent is used to impose liability on people who do what the initial 
defendant did. It is unclear whether this liability places a duty on lower courts to follow 
judgment. This raises questions of context and the possibility of achieving clear cut 
similarities in all cases. So that where for instance the context and nature of transaction 
between transferor and transferee are different, the issue is whether the court would rely 
solely on the form of transfer without the substance and legal effect it creates in the 
determination of rights and duties. One of such areas where the courts are particularly 
active in deriving a duty not expressly captured within positive law is in dispute involving 
issues like the duty of vigilance. The question is whether the transferee owes a duty of 
vigilance and whether such duty extends to the regulator of the exchange? 
While it is now accepted that the transferee owes a duty to the transferee in the above 
sense, the next question is whether such duty create corresponding liability or privileges 
with respect to the parties or third party or the exchange? These are not questions that can 
easily be answered by statute because of the practical difficulties of statute to envisage 
every scenario. The inputs of the court are necessary in many regards. This is so that where 
instruments are transferred in the market with the expectation that the transferee can take 
subject to the transferor’s defects in title, this does not excuse the transferee of his duty to 
take reasonable steps to verify the transferor’s title before acceptance of the instrument. 
The duty of vigilance on the part of the transferee is one of such that emanates from 
positive law which are non-hohfeldian because they do not arise from liability.94 It is merely 
a duty to mitigate damages and ensures corrective and distributive justice. Another non-
hohfeldian duty is one which arises from positive law that places a duty on officials, 
participating entities and their employees within the market. This is a duty to ensure or 
show that these bodies have taken reasonable steps to vet market participants and staff of 
regulators in the market. The court is expected to be active in this area as it tries to balance 
the need of market credibility with the logic of circularity. 
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2.4.2 Legal relations and interference with circularity 
The question of how to guarantee certainty through non-interference with seamless flow of 
values within the market given the ever changing context in legal relations is a difficult one. 
Hohfeld used the term duty as the basis of the logic of legal relations between pairs of 
specific people with respect to an act.95 Without defining what it really means, he identifies 
its practical use in inter-party transactions.96 For instance, when used in specific ways, duty 
should include one who owes the duty and one to whom the duty is owed.97 The exchange 
and network of these duties arising from the rules of liability, forms a basis for the logic of 
circularity in the market. 
In the case of a regulated exchange, the transferor might owe a Hohfeldian duty to 
transferee but he cannot owe such a duty to himself. This duty owed to transferee pursuant 
to the powers conferred by law comes from transferee’s right to receive and corresponding 
liabilities on the transferor which may inhibit or facilitate such transfers. Therefore, if under 
the rule of law, the transferor is liable for failure to make a transfer, it therefore means the 
transferor owes a duty to do it.98 The same is true where transferor’s liability extends to 3rd 
party.99 In this case however, transferor owes a separate duty to third party because his 
liability to third party is separable.100 While these ensure the weight of duties is evenly 
spread by promoting unidirectional flow of duties amongst market participants and 
multidimensional rules of liability, such unidirectional flow inadvertently creates privilege – 
a no-right relation which reduces the efficacy of the rules of liability. For instance pursuant 
to power/liability relations guaranteed by rule of law, transferor might owe two separate 
duties to transferee and third party but cannot owe the same duty to both. This creates 
privilege no-right relations which provide a basis for the promotion and destruction of 
seamless circularity. 
Another possible interference with circularity is the fact that liabilities emanating from the 
transferee’s exercise of the non-Hohfeldian right of non-interferability may promote 
circularity but transferee’s duty of vigilance disrupts the logic. This is because that duty 
creates corresponding rights on the transferor that could impinge the transferee’s right to 
receive. In other words, the contingency placed on transferee’s right to receive by the duty 
of vigilance, defeats the logic of uninhibited circularity of values within the market. There 
are also instances where power to create future rights can impose correlative duties on the 
transferor or transferee which may inhibit seamless circularity. The same is true of the 
effect of a possible rule that empowers the exchange to underwrite present and/or future 
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risks within the market in the event of losses.101  Therefore, the effect of transferor’s duty to 
transferee is really about how the rule of law would treat both parties if it happens that 
there is a breakdown in legal relations on grounds of non-compliance. The conflicting nature 
of the consequences of non-compliance also poses significant test to the logic of circularity 
and risk to the unhindered flow of values within the market.  
The other concepts also have similar challenges and inhibitions to the circularity principle. 
For instance, transferor’s legal right is perceived as a duty from transferee’s perspective.102 
This makes the right and duty correlatives.103 It also means that where the transferee is seen 
to be owed a duty either emanating from power/liability relations, he has a right to demand 
it. The result from this therefore is that the entitlements of the transferor and transferee 
are coterminous to the extent that changes occasioned by power - liability relations do not 
tilt the balance in favour of one party on grounds of social or economic philosophies. The 
purpose for such equality is to promote circularity. This is shown in a particular case of 
transferor’s duty not to deprive transferee of his right to receive those instruments as much 
as the transferee’s right against the transferor to demand for the said transfer and actions 
of the rule of law to create liabilities for non-compliance. There are however conditions that 
could impede this flow of values between parties. The transferor might decide to invoke the 
power of abandonment of the duties owed to transferee on the ground of transferee’s 
failure to fulfil his duty of vigilance. This could create uncertainties especially as to whether 
such power invalidates the transfer or whether the transferor can legally be mandated to 
make such transfer nonetheless. Where such transfer has already been made, it raises 
questions as to the capacity or effectiveness of ‘Holder in Due Course’ to pass valid title 
where such appears to be defective. Adam disputes this scenario on the basis that while 
failure on the part of transferee’s duty of vigilance may invalidate transfer where title is 
defective, it does not foreclose transferee’s right to receive.104 There indeed negative 
implications in putting forward ‘Holder in Due Course’ principle as part of the economic 
philosophy of circularity without the concept of distributive justice. Remedies for wrong 
arising from practices made express and not by power of abandonment could deal a major 
blow to the principle of circularity and negotiability as a whole. 
In addition the Hohfeldian Privilege – No-right relations that arise to exculpate transferor or 
third party from the rule of liability, this rule may not also apply to reinforce circularity at 
the expense of justice. While privilege does not mean absence of right – duty relations, it 
however refers to lack of accountability for actions or failure to act. There are reliefs in 
respect to or from the operations of power – liability relations to remove possible lack of 
accountability. So that failure on the part of either party or third party to account for their 
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rights or obligations cannot go untested.105 It is however unclear in the real sense how the 
law can sustain privilege – no-right relations within a unidirectional flow of values which is 
sustained by right – duty relations. 
2.4.3 Power – liability relations and privilege – no-right relations and circularity 
pursuant to rule of law 
The vital question is whether power has the capacity to create privilege – no-right relations 
within a right and duties relation? The answer may be based on the rule of law and the 
extent to which it accommodates party autonomy.106 That is if positive law will create 
liability against transferor for failure to transfer, then transferee could safely assert that 
transferor owes a duty not to interfere with transferee’s access to the instrument by 
withholding it, refusing to transfer or making transfer substantially different from that which 
is agreed. Although this principle remain clear as its effect on circularity is likely to be 
positive, there are however several uncertainties. Firstly, the presence of condition 
precedents to the validity of a transfer could be interpreted as interference. In other words, 
the very existence of a privilege – no-right relation is a direct curtailment of the potency of 
right – duty relations. So that it is not really about the transferor having a privilege against 
transferee’s right of non-interferability, or the transferee’s no right to interfere with or 
question the transferor’s enjoyment of his privilege. It is more about how positive law 
would not make the transferor liable to transferee for denying transferee’s access to his 
instruments without remedies. This is the basis of questions as to how this furthers the 
essence of unhindered circularity. 
Secondly, that the transferee’s has no right against transferor and the fact that transferor 
cannot deny transferee access to instrument may be construed as a privilege in favour of 
the transferor to further the principle of circularity. It is also the case that this privilege may 
be seen as obstructing circularity because transferor can decide not to comply with 
transferee’s demand for the instrument. Such action could impede circularity. This is not to 
be interpreted to mean that transferor is under a duty not to deprive transferee of the 
instrument, but on whether the transferee has instant right against transferor for failure or 
refusal to transfer. 
In effect, Hohfeld’s schema merely explains paucital relations between two or more persons 
that give effect to the performance or refrain from performance of certain acts.107 This so 
that where duty exists pursuant to power of rule of law, liability follows, but where duty is 
absent, privilege is present. Hohfeld identified the types of privilege.108 He distinguished 
privilege to do from the privilege not to. To him, this is a way of assessing the extent to 
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which privilege – No-right relations further the circularity principles. Where certain liabilities 
are withheld from the transferor through the grant of specific privileges, the language of 
those privileges must be explored against the object of circularity in the exchange. It must 
also be ascertained whether such powers to the transferor places liabilities on the 
transferee that are capable of preventing transferee’s exercise of its powers and thereby 
impeding circularity.109 
On the other hand, where privilege exists and the transferor enters a contract with 
transferee to make the transfer, then he would have no privilege to make the transfer, but 
he will be privilege not to transfer. This also indicates a privilege with respect to his duty and 
no privilege against it. This means he is subject to the full right of the other parties without 
any form of protection from the law. So Hohfeld is of the view that the construction of rule 
of law determines the nature of these concepts. It is the rule that authorises the doing of an 
act just as it is the rule of law that forbids. Given that the rule permits the creation of the 
type of legal relations between transferor and transferee that is how the law forbids certain 
acts between transferor and transferee. This is not to say that power cannot be accountable 
to authority. 
These show that the rule of law can bestow both on a party under certain circumstances or 
either. But both privileges cannot be absent in a party at the same time. This will mean a 
transferor for instance is liable whether he makes a transfer or not. The type of privilege as 
discussed which guarantees doing a thing or not doing it seems to be antithetic to the 
format of jural relations where one concept either correlates or is opposite to the other and 
not simultaneous.110 Perhaps he also wants to say that the transferor may be accountable to 
transferee if the said transferor interferes with transferee’s right to receive those 
instruments. Thus in Hohfeld’s view transferee position against transferor is a privilege not 
to retransfer the instrument and a right that his privilege is not interfered with. This means 
that the transferee’s right to non-interference with transferor’s privilege produces certain 
liabilities and accountability on the part of transferor. If this is the case therefore, one 
wonders how the element of circularity will be achieved. The exercise of that privilege will 
clearly occasion uncertainty in circularity within the market. 
The holding of instrument by transferee itself is not a right but a privilege. Non-
interferability of that privilege is a right. It is unclear if the intentions of holding a privilege 
could be interpreted as withholding or a right to withhold. Therefore the non-interferability 
of a privilege as a right comes with the question of whether the transferee can exercise this 
right by withholding the instrument. This raises questions as to: 
 
                                                          
109
 This means he has a liability and in this sense, right is power. 
110
 Hohfeld supra 756 
58 
 
1. Whether this means that this right has to be silenced to give effect to negotiability in 
the market 
2. Whether the concept of privilege exists within the exchange? If so, what is its 
philosophical and logical relevance to negotiability 
3. Whether the fact of withholding an instrument without transferring it, defeats the 
very essence of negotiability/transferability? 
4. Whether the withholding of instruments by transferee and refusal to transfer, strips 
the instrument of its negotiability or negotiable qualities? 
5. Pursuant to the right emanating from the non-interferability of a privilege, is it safe 
to say that this makes the holding of an instrument a right? 
6. What of if the transferor decides to exercise his power of abandonment (if any) 
which is capable of extinguishing the myriads of relations 
These questions which have legal, philosophical and logical basis are subject to multiple 
constructions.111 For instance in law, when a court refers non-transfer of instrument to 
transferee as a right, it is merely saying the following: 
1. Firstly, that a transferor has privilege to hold the instrument and not re-transfer it in 
the sense that he is not legally accountable if he does not transfer it to transferor or 
third party. In this case, non-transferability could easily be legal and the exercise of 
this privilege and resulting right clearly infringes the concept of negotiability 
2. Secondly, the transferor’s right not to have privilege interfered with arbitrarily is 
sacrosanct in the sense that he will have a legal remedy if such privilege is interfered 
with.112 
Where a court refers to holding of an instrument as a privilege, the court means that a 
privilege to hold or withhold instrument makes the holder not legally accountable if he does 
not transfer it. It also means that the privilege to hold or withhold the instrument can be 
withdrawn without legal remedies. This raises questions of what legal protection the law 
therefore gives to transferor and transferee from non-interference or non-interferability. 
Hohfeld responds by emphasising the capacity of power – liability relations to shape all 
other relationships.113 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
111
 Pound, ‘Fifty Year of Jurisprudence’, 50 Harv L. Rev. 557, 570 (1937) 
112
 This therefore raises the question regarding the legal effect of having a right to non-interference without 
some level of accountability 
113
 Hohfeld supra pages 756-769 
59 
 
2.4.4 Power and its capacity to change legal relations 
Power – Liability and Immunity – Disability relations are concerned with changes in legal 
relations under the rule of positive law rather than rules of civil liability. The power – liability 
relations especially is capable of converting jural correlatives into jural opposites. That is it 
converts  
a. immunity – disability into power – liability 
b. power – liability into immunity – disability 
c. privilege – no-right into right – duty 
d. right – duty into privilege – no-right 
Apart from changing the legal relations of parties as seen above, power within the rule of 
law also has the capacity of altering the legal relations of the holder and between persons 
other than the holder. For example where the transferee offers to enter a contract with 
transferor, the transferor acquires a power to change the legal relations between both 
parties by accepting transferee’s offer. This means that the rule of law must provide a basis 
for the existence of power and its capacity to effectively change legal relations. Achieving 
such a feat is a matter of construction of legal texts. In relation to securities market, 
questions have been asked whether signing up to an exchange is an invitation to treat or an 
offer? Where the construction of law makes it an invitation to treat or offer, does that 
create a duty on the exchange and its participants to either make offers or accept his offer 
for the sake of circularity? If not, are the dealing members under certain privileges with 
respect to what to offer and accept?114 Has transferee got power to refuse an offer from 
transferor or vice versa without liability? Can they safely exercise their right of non-
interference, if any? Can the transferor act under a power to revoke an offer before 
acceptance without liability? 
Through the instrumentality of power, it must be noted prima facie that accepting the offer 
would under the rule of contract convert transferor and transferee’s privilege – no-right 
relations into right – duty relations.115 Where this is the case, does it therefore open the 
door to the application of principles of contract law? Can the power convert right – duty 
relations into immunity – disability relations through a party’s exercise of power of 
abandonment? These questions are better answered through construction of the rules. The 
transferee generally has the power of acceptance while the transferor has a correlative 
liability.116 So that under the rules of law that govern securities, an offer is an exercise of 
power conferred within the rules because of the power of revocation before acceptance. 
This however raises further question as to the nature an offer or acceptance takes. While it 
is a matter of legal construction, points have been raised whether it is at the point of signing 
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up as participant in the exchange that makes one liable to accept every offer automatically 
in order to promote circularity? This question may be difficult to answer without clarifying 
whether a party in the exchange can lawfully exercise a power of abandonment just to 
emphasis a certain level of liberty in furtherance with the principles of party autonomy. 
The argument for liberty is not only philosophical, but also has transactional implications 
when explored against the need for circularity and negotiability. It is a matter for 
deliberation especially where the extent to which participants can freely exercise and 
revoke power of offer before acceptance without corresponding liabilities.117 This power 
should also be constructed in such a way the transferee is not placed under a perpetual 
state of disability by the excessive use of the power of revocation to the detriment of 
circularity. There is a follow up problem even in circumstances where offer and acceptance 
is effectively consummated. This plays out where the transferee accepts the offer before it 
is revoked by transferor thereby creating contractual right and duties relations. Such a move 
could be avoided so as not to precipitate a breach of transferee’s duty of vigilance. Under 
this circumstance, does a breach extinguish the transferee’s right and convert it into 
privilege – no-right relations? What is the effect of this uncertainty to the idea of circularity 
and the concept of distributive justice? 
Legal construction of securities rules remain the only option to providing answers to these 
questions. This is especially true where the legal effects of these relations throw more 
questions with respect to participants, the exchange and third parties. On the question of 
third parties for instance, understanding the nature of how power allocated by securities 
rules impacts a trustee for investors in relation to his powers under Trust legislation and 
captured within a trust deed as they pertain to trust assets. The same is true of agents. The 
determination of who an agent is in the context of securities market is legal one. Where it is 
an agency, the agent analytically has at least two powers. 
a. The first is the power as against his principal when acting within express or 
ostensible authority 
b. Secondly, he has power against a 3rd party where the actions of the 3rd party are 
likely to interfere with his right, duty, privilege and power. 
The principal and 3rd party have correlative liability.118 Therefore where a party has a good 
cause of action against another party, it automatically vests power in the claimant to invoke 
the instrumentalities of the law against another party and the other party automatically 
operates under a correlative liability. Apart from securities regulators, the court is one of 
such institutions while acting under the power of rule of law has capacity to alter legal 
relations through its power to grant reliefs or remedies. This means therefore that by virtue 
of a judgment, power – liability relation changes to other categories of legal relations to give 
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effect to the desires of the judgment creditor and satisfy the philosophical demands of the 
market. Accordingly, the desire to achieve some level of certainty in the power relations 
architecture to ensure unhindered flow of value in a regulated exchange is not a straight 
forward process. 
Anderson, Mullock and Finan identified these tensions and uncertainties created by the 
interaction of the concepts and the inconsistencies generated in the analysis of legal 
problems. They however suggested a logical approach to resolving them. Mullock believes 
that applied deontic logic of obligation can streamline the myriads of legal relations 
generated to identify their ultimate connections and substance. By capturing their networks 
and modes of operation, a pattern is identified that would help craft a seamless flow of 
interest from one party to another with certainty in the regulated market. They suggested 
deontic logic as capable of providing this certainty. 
 
2.5 Fashioning a new conceptual framework from pre-existing framework 
 
a. Deontic Logic 
Tarski in his theory of formal language believes that the Mean-Proposition which is founded 
on logic holds the clues to resolving the uncertainties in interpretation of concepts. Even 
where Kripke attempts to develop the Real World Semantic as an alternative to Mean-
Proposition, the essential concepts of that theory were premised on the Deontic Logic 
distilled from Tarski’s theory of formal language. For negotiability, this meant identifying the 
logic between right, duty, no-right, privilege, immunity, disability, power, and liability. 
Finan119 took the first step by dividing the concept into two principal relations: 
i. Primary relations – right, duty, no-right, and privilege 
ii. Secondary relations – immunity, disability, power, liability 
 
Anderson thinks that identifying those factors that regulate the concept is the best 
approach to understanding and streamlining their operations. These factors are: 
i. Agent – the actor which is represented with the symbol X. In the case of 
negotiability in the market it is represented as Transferor  
ii. Patient – this is the recipient of the action with the symbol Y. In the case of 
negotiability, it is referred to as Transferee 
iii. State of affairs – this is the situation which the agent is said to bring about 
relative to the patient. It is represented with the symbol P 
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To understand the logic, Finan120 and Mullock121 developed symbolic logic of the basic unit 
of (X, P, Y). P is essentially the result of X and Y which means P is a factor of X and Y 
relations. To show the relationship between constituents of the basic unit, Anderson 
devised other symbols. 
iv. +O – indicates the relationship between X, P, Y as Obligatory 
v. –O – indicates not obligatory. This means it is permissive 
vi. +H – indicates the governing state of affairs. This means +H governs S.  
vii. –H – indicates the absence of a governing state of affairs 
H however is difficult to define because it is a product of the combined effects of contexts 
and non-legal influences. One would expect the factors that constitute and govern the state 
of affairs given their fluidity to be outside the realms of logic, but Anderson tries to painfully 
fit it in and argues that +H determines who creates the state of affairs P; i.e whether it is X 
or Y. Therefore, where +H decides that X will do P for Y or that X will create P for Y, both 
creates two distinct legal relations. The negation is –H = X will do P or X will create P. 
Mullock called this ‘a 3-place constant signifying the notion of social action’. In 
understanding within the unit (X, P, Y), which party is X and which is Y at any given point in 
time, Mullock demarcated the respective symbols within the units to indicate these. 
viii. (+X, P, Y)  – indicates that X  is the agent 
ix. (X, P, +Y) – indicates that Y is the agent 
x. (+X, P, +Y) – indicates that X is the agent, while Y is the patient 
xi. (-X, P, -Y) – indicates that Y is the agent, while X is the patient 
Mullock went on to demonstrate that O, H and (X, P, Y) can effectively define the eight 
concepts because the symbols show whether the relationship between X and Y are 
obligatory, whether the state of affairs will be created, and whether X is the agent. He 
answered the above questions by reducing the logical symbols into different relations while 
indicating their interactions. This research represents the views in Table 4 below 
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Figure 5 
Concepts Symbols Interpretation 
Right +O +H (X, P, Y) Presence of obligation, with a governing state of 
affairs for transferor (agent) to do or create state of 
affairs for transferee (patient) 
Duty +O +H (-X, P, +Y) Presence of obligation with governing state of 
affairs that transferor actor (formerly transferee 
patient) to do or create a state of affairs for 
transferee patient (formerly transferor actor) 
Disability  +O –H (X, P, Y) Presence of obligation on transferor(agent) not to 
do or create a state of affairs for transferee 
(patient) 
Immunity  +O –H (-X, -P, -Y) Presence of obligation but no governing state of 
affairs for agent/transferor (formerly patient 
transferee) to do or create a state of affairs with 
patient transferee (formerly agent transferor) 
Power  -O +H (X, P, Y) No obligation, which means it is permissive for the 
agent/transferor to do or create a state of affairs 
for patient/transferee  
Liability  -O +H (-X, P, -Y) No obligation, which means it is permissive for the 
transferor/agent (former transferee/patient) to do 
or create a state of affairs for transferee/patient 
(formerly transferor/agent) 
No-Right -O –H (X, P, Y) No obligation and No governing state of affairs 
which mean transferor (agent) cannot do or create 
a state of affairs for the transferee 
Privilege  -O –H (-X, -P, -Y) No obligation and No governing state of affairs. 
This means that transferor/agent (former 
transferee/patient) can neither do nor create a 
state of affairs for the transferee 
 
The above table represents the underlying basis of deontic logic on Hohfeld’s concepts and 
shows the following: 
a. On the point of correlative, it demonstrates that when X is an agent in one 
correlative, Y is an agent in the other correlative. 
b. Immunity and disability forecloses the act or forbearance which effectively forms the 
very core of right and duty. This is because of the existence of reverse obligation. In 
both cases, the notion of obligation determines certainty represented as O. Certainty 
is achieved where harmony with regards the parties’ notion of ‘duty’ intersect. 
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c. On the part of privilege, no-right, power and liability; their point of certainty is on 
the notion of ‘present freedom from obligation (duty), Mullock, Finan and Corbin122 
call them ‘Permissive Relations’ which is symbolised as –O. 
d. The governing state of affairs which is represented as H is not concerned about 
whether or not relations are obligatory but concern about the product of that 
relation which is the state of affairs. So that in the jural relations of right, duty, 
power and liability, the agent may or must create a certain state of affairs = H. Under 
a duty to create H. 
e. Conversely, the jural relations or privilege, No-right immunity and disability involves 
situations where the agent is under a duty not to create a certain state of affairs or 
where the agent is free not to do so, not under a duty to create H. 
Goble thinks that disability and immunity involves absence of power and immunity – 
privilege involves freedom from duty.123 Therefore these four concepts require the negation 
of state of affairs = H. 
The inferences drawn from the logic are captured under four sub-heading. They are as 
follows: 
i. Corollaries 
ii. Contradictories 
iii. Contraries 
iv. Sub-contraries 
Corollaries: 
With respect to power, disability and no-right, duty and liability, and immunity and privilege, 
the proof is that any act or forbearance which is performed pursuant to a duty may also be 
done voluntarily. Therefore, if a transferor is legally entitled to demand performance from 
transferee, under a duty/right, then the inference is that transferor is empowered to also be 
able to do the same voluntarily (power). 
Contradictories: 
Under this category where one jural relation exists, the other must not exist. Secondly, if 
one jural relation is true, the other has to be false. For instance, 
a. Right and no-right 
b. Power and disability 
c. Duty and privilege 
d. Liability and immunity  
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So in practical terms, a transferor cannot possess the power to alter a legal relation and at 
the same time lack the ability to do so (disability). It is also the case that a transferor cannot 
be under a duty to act and at the same time enjoy freedom from such duty by way of a 
privilege. 
Contraries 
There are two sets of contraries which include right and disability, duty and immunities. 
These jural relations may be absent at the same time, but they may not be present at the 
same time. That is both relations may be false, but cannot be true. For example in cases of 
duty and immunity, transferee may neither have a present duty to act nor permanent 
freedom from such duty (immunity). This principle holds true for rights and disability. 
Sub-contraries 
Under these categories, the jural relations may be present at the same time but they may 
not be absent at the same time. One other unique thing about this is that both may be true, 
but both cannot be false. The two sub-contraries are: 
a. Power and no-right 
b. Liability and privilege 
There are examples of interactions between power and no-right scenario under this 
category. These include where the transferor may not have a present duty to another (no-
right), but yet have the power to create such duty in the future (power). However where the 
aforementioned relations are absent, it becomes extremely confusing because even where 
the transferor makes the transfer, he will be unable to change transferee’s legal relations 
because he has no power to do so. This is in effect a disability in the transferor. Also in cases 
where the transferor is not under a present duty (for instance to make the transfer) with 
respect to transferee and the same transferor is has a right (for instance to non-
interferability), the presence of both present contradictory outcomes could grind circularity 
to a halt. It is becoming clear that present claim right and no-claim right (no-right) with 
respect to transfer of instrument (disability) cannot realistically coexist in the transferor at 
the same time if the desire of circularity is to be achieved. Therefore the conceptual basis of 
jural correlative is to ensure the seamless flow of interests within a regulated exchange. 
The effective operation of jural correlatives in promoting circularity and negotiability can 
sometimes be obstructed by what Mark Andrews calls the Jural Analog.124 Jural Analog is a 
schema that discloses the possible causes of actions and likely defences to those actions so 
that in a transferor’s claim against the transferee based on present right, it is sufficient 
defence if transferee can prove privilege. The defence of privilege may not suffice if 
transferor can show he is empowered by law to so claim. This means that the operations of 
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power have the capacity to influence every other variable towards its goal of circularity and 
negotiability. The influence of power to claim (power/right) maybe curtailed for instance 
where transferee power to create future duty on transferor is met by transferor’s immunity 
to change in his legal relations. It is however unclear logically how immunity relations can 
arise under market circumstances and the possible justification for power relations to be 
issued pursuant to the rules apportioning immunity. The logical analysis also predicates its 
effect on the actions of power in relation to other concepts without providing 
corresponding analysis on the checks on power relations. 
One other critical area of omission in the logical analysis is the failure to illustrate the duty 
and no-right relation. A no-right may exist to defend an action in quantum meruit to prevent 
what Mark Andrew calls ‘unjust enrichment’. The transferor and transferee’s claim and 
counter-claim with respect to performance of respective duties, now throw up question of 
who between them have the power to claim right. This then becomes a matter for legal 
construction as to whether a claim right exist and to whom it falls. It is however doubtful 
whether logical connection is sufficiently equipped to capture all variables required in 
making this determination. For example exploring the logic between disability and 
immunity, or where they are reversed, the resulting design suggests that there is an 
‘immediate inference’ on the side of transferor between immunity and no-right. The 
existence of immunity immediately implies the existence of a no-right. Thus the following 
statement would be valid where transferor is immune from changes to his legal relations 
thereby creating a disability in transferor’s power to change transferee’s legal relations. The 
lack of logical connection in this case, shows another weakness in the logical analysis of 
these concepts. 
Andrews125 also tries to address these logical disconnections by analysing the concepts using 
the Venn diagram. It attempts to use the Venn diagram to create an image of syllogism.126 It 
uses the three circles to develop major, minor and middle term syllogism. The three circle 
overlap creating seven areas within the circles and one open area outside. 
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Figure 6 
 
                                                                                                                
                             Duty                                                                             Liability  
 
                                                                                                                                   Privilege 
                               Power                                   Right 
 
 
From the diagram above, the circles indicate three symbols which define Hohfeld’s ideas –O, 
H, and (X, P, Y) 
a. The concepts inside the upper circle represent those relationship that are obligatory 
b. The concept that falls outside the upper circle represent relation that are permissive 
c. If the agent will create the state of affairs, the jural relation appears within the lower 
left circle 
d. If the agent will not create the state of affairs, the relation appears outside it 
e. If X is the agent, then the jural relations appears within the lower right circle 
f. If X is not the agent, the relation appears outside it 
 
immunity 
No-right disability 
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The basis for the development of these concept by Hohfeld which is to clarify legal thinking 
and attempt at using logic to clarify their relationships with some level of certainty raises 
questions as to the level of success. The application of logic in the analysis of the concepts 
assumes that: 
a. There are only eight jural relations 
b. That the relationship among the concepts are well defined 
c. That their relationships behave in predictable ways and therefore it is easier to 
analyse even complex legal questions to enable two disputing parties define 
unsettled questions more precisely and the courts, agency, or legislature are able to 
settle the same question with correspondingly greater precision. 
d. Cullison suggests that with this predictability in relationships could be translated into 
binary language system for computers analyses using special algorithms.127 With 
such information in a program, the computer may search for all statutes which 
create a jural relation symbolised by (1, 0, 1). This means using the following 
computer codes to represent the concepts: Right (0,0,0); Duty (0,0,1); Disability 
(0,1,0); Immunity (0,1,1); Power (1,0,0); Liability (1,0,1); No-right (1,1,0); Privilege 
(1,1,1). 
It is unclear how Collison128 will assume certainty or predictability of legal relationships from 
the Hohfeld’s legal concepts when: 
a. There is no precise definition or a mechanism for determining state of affairs and 
governing state of affairs  
b. Secondly, the contradictions in the jural analog relations 
c. Uncertainties in the key assumptions that form the basis of the logic H and S thereby 
defeating the very essence of the standard deontic logic. Also the relations that 
create absence of obligation are not contained in the logic. 
d. The logic only tries to explain the concepts without showing the likely effects of the 
transaction or operations in practice. 
e. While it attempts to show the relationship between the concepts, it assumes their 
relationships can only be internally determined and that there are no external 
influences on the relationship and changes in their structure. 
The determination of what constitutes the state of affairs and that which governs the state 
of affairs is outside the capacity of logic. This therefore forms the central focus of this 
research. Even where Dyadic Deontic Logic presents an interpretative proposition for the 
exploration of state of affairs within the concepts and their legal relations to deliver their 
nominal essence, it relates to Kripke’s theory of interpretation which is the real world 
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semantics and modal logic.129 As noted by Collison, power provides the centrepiece in the 
understanding of influences within and outside the Hohfeld’s concepts especially in the 
crystallisation of legal relations.130 Firstly, power plays in a role in the philosophical 
understanding and interpretation of the right of non-interferability, duty of vigilance and 
the power of interpretation, but the prescription of logical analysis of their experiences is 
often insufficient to guarantee seamless circularity. Secondly, power may have created a 
window to the understanding of the place of authority and its philosophical appreciation in 
securities conceptualisation, but this is insufficient to guarantee obedience of law and 
entrenchment of circularity principles. 
Neither Hohfeld concepts nor positive law have been able to provide all encompassing 
coverage of these problems which have significantly impacted representionality of the 
Hohfeld concepts. This makes compliance difficult. As a result of these, different legal 
systems have attempted to address these problems through statutory designs. The first 
statutory design is one based strictly on standard deontic logic. The proponents of this logic 
believe that the logical framing of the law makes it obligatory or permissible to comply 
with.131 Under this category, deontic logic which is a formal system that attempts to capture 
the essential logical features of these concepts was introduced. Therefore, when used in the 
development and analysis of statutory provisions, they are geared towards achieving 
certainty. While standard deontic logic is geared towards achieving certainty in 
statutory/legal analysis, it does not properly represent conditional obligations. This is 
because ‘deontic’ from its Greek interpretation is actually translated as ‘binding’. This infers 
that an operative word like ‘Mean’ was meant to achieve that certainty and binding effect. 
On the other hand, a conditional operator like ‘Context’ used within statute is inserted to 
create conditional obligations which cannot be represented by standard deontic logic O 
(A/B). I-Transferor + Transferee = I- Obligation Transferor T1 + Obligation Transferee T2. 
Therefore the existence of the inference that the transferor’s obligation to the transferee 
only exists where certain conditions can be inferred, fails the test of representionality. This 
is because a unary operator like O (obligation) cannot be defined on a binary basis O 
(T1/T2). The likelihood of designing statutes on the basis of faulty underlying logic is strong 
with a binary conceptualisation of legal concepts and relations that govern securities. The 
uncertainties that follow the interpretation of the following is most pronounced 
“O (Transferor + Transferee)” or “Transferor + O (Transferee)” 
This is where definition of securities in statute makes the internal elements within it 
obligatory as can be seen in the first category above. Under this particular definition, the 
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word ‘Means’ as the operator, is used to enforce certainty in relation to other elements of 
the definition of securities. This approach has been criticised as unrepresentative, coercive, 
repressive and authoritarian. Its formalist structure is incapable of capturing the complex 
dimensions of securities. Where transferor is under an obligation to transferee only on the 
existence of certain conditions as in the second category above, the word ‘Context’ is used 
as the conditional operator. To this end, instruments can only be seen as securities on the 
satisfaction of certain conditions. This structure may prove difficult to manage where 
context is unsupported by some form of certainty in language. 
Dyadic deontic logic which is used to represent conditional operator was therefore created 
to respond to this problem. Apart from the use of binary deontic operators, this logical 
method combines standard deontic operator ‘Means’ and conditional deontic operator 
‘context’. The notation is modelled P (Transferor/Transferee) + O (Transferor/Transferor), 
represented as P(X/Y) + O(X/Y) which means it is permissive that the transferor … (given 
Transferee …) and obligatory that transferor, (given transferee …). By applying conditional 
probability with the phrase ‘unless the context otherwise admit, securities means …’, it 
escapes the problems of standard (unary) and conditional deontic logic. 
This is also subject to problems of its own. The normative attitude of the courts which is not 
based on a ‘true’ and ‘false’ scenario is of particular concerns. While deontic logic analyses 
normative propositions, the norms themselves and their effects left unattended in the 
determination of truth. Generally, courts enter only two kinds of judgments: 
a. Those granting remedy which imposes civil liability 
b. Those denying remedy and imposing no liability in the case of civil liability 
Those granting relief as the legal effect of an act and those granting relief as to the legal 
effect of an act (privilege – no-right). Hohfeld’s right-duty and privilege – no-right relations 
are fairly manageable since the number of ‘legal effect’ they refer to are limited to only two 
counts remedies 
a. Liability 
b. Non-liability 
But the principles behind Hohfeld’s power – liability and immunity – disability relations is 
much the same as right and duty because they also described the ‘legal effect’ on voluntary 
acts. However, these relations are not easy to manage because their effects are unlimited in 
number. The legal effects involved here are changes in legal relations and there are myriads 
of legal relations in the world. This has informed various statutory and interpretative 
designs to capture both the logic and philosophy underlying the concept in the analysis of 
legal questions. For the purpose of this analysis, this research identifies the approaches 
adopted by different jurisdictions across the globe in the interpretation of securities to 
create binding effects. They are: 
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1. Statutory formalism – which is fully reliant on standard deontic logic with the use of 
‘Means’ as operator 
2. Statutory functionalism – this uses the conditional deontic logic in statutory design 
and interpretation 
3. Judicial formalism – which uses Dyadic deontic logic by utilising the principles of 
stare decisis very strictly as a normative criterion 
4. Judicial functionalism – this is a combination of dyadic deontic logic as the statutory 
design and the underlying social or economic philosophy in the determination of 
legal effect on a context-sensitive basis. Under this system, the normative effect of 
stare decisis is not obligatory. This means cases are determined on the basis of their 
own merits. 
 
PART 2 
2.6 Statutory Formalism Approach– as rational institutional practices 
Statutory formalism is fully reliant on standard deontic logic with the use of ‘Means’ as 
operator. This type of formalism is usually expressed within the language structure and 
relationship within provisions in legislative texts for the purpose of defining a term. It has 
been used to define securities in civil law countries that seek legal certainty and binding 
effect through the use of formalistic operators. Under this category, statutory powers are 
conferred on administrative bodies to exercise regulatory and oversight functions with little 
or no judicial powers. The purpose is therefore to restrict the uncertainty of independent 
judicial influence in seamless transferability and circularity within the market. While this 
approach has guaranteed predictability of rules and their application within the market, it 
has stifled innovation borne out of inflexibility of rules and inability to suit changing 
circumstances. A case in point is the attempt to define ‘Transferable Securities’ in the 
European Union Directives. The attempt to consolidate into a single Act all the disjointed 
definitions of securities during the Pre-FSAP period, has not achieved much success due to 
their formalist structures.132 Firstly, the move to unify the definitions by adopting the Pre-
FSAP controlling words for all securities ‘Transferable Securities’, failed the clarity test. 
While these words remained undefined, they ran contrary to the language of Prospectus 
Directive and created practical difficulties for individual countries in terms of interpretation 
and application. Even with the subsequent amendment by Article 4(18) MiFID which now 
makes ‘Transferable Securities’ a part of the broader category of financial instruments 
captured within its provision, this is still largely unhelpful. Under this new provision, there 
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are challenges with delineating coherent criteria for characterising securities given their 
broader scope.  
Secondly, by consolidating earlier slew of Directives with new ones,133 the incoherence in 
the definition of securities is even made worse. It all started in 2003 when an attempt was 
made to define securities. The Prospectus Directive 2003134 defines securities to mean:- 
“Share in companies and other securities equivalent to shares, bonds and other forms of 
securitised debt which are negotiable on the capital market and other securities normally 
dealt in giving the right to acquire any such transferable securities by subscription or 
exchange or giving rise to a cash settlement excluding instruments of payments.”135 
While this definition rightly captured the conceptual ingredients of securities, it was vague 
in many respects. The identification of three types of instruments136 as constituting the 
hallmark of securities could not been seen as representative. Also, the use of the terms 
“negotiability” and “transferability” without stating their meanings, raised several 
contextual issues that left investors and regulators in a milieu. This was even exacerbated by 
the absence of a coherent jurisprudence to delineate the contours of statutes. It is the case 
that an approach that underscores an instrument as security only on the basis of 
transferability within the capital market, creates greater confusion especially at a time when 
markets clamour for certainty. The demand for clarity informed the 2004 definition of 
security. 
Market in Financial Instrument Directive (MiFID) 2004/39 Article 4(18) defines securities as 
follows: 
“A transferable security covers those classes of securities which are negotiable on the capital 
market except instrument of payment such as shares in companies and other securities 
equivalent to shares in companies, partnership or other entities and depositary receipts in 
respect of shares; bonds or other forms of securitised debt, including depositary receipts in 
respect of such securities. Any other securities giving the right to acquire or sell any such 
transferable securities or giving rise to a cash settlement by reference to transferable 
securities, currencies, interest rates or yields, commodities or other indices or measures.”137 
As MIFID attempts to harmonise the principles of national laws, individual countries’ 
approaches to the directive remains substantially varied. The application of techniques like 
gold platting, subsidiarity and single passport places significant constraints of the 
harmonisation efforts of the directive and further reinforces the divergence in the definition 
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of securities in Europe. The key to harmonisation as argued does not rest solely on a 
common approach of sticking to certain components like “transferable security” or 
“negotiability”, a broader understanding of the linguistic and transactional contexts seems 
to present even greater disparities. This has led to questions about the impact of MIFID’s 
definition on various countries in Europe. While France and Italy apply the concept of 
transferability, Spain seems to have embraced “negotiability”. The practical and linguistic 
differences of both terms are still unclear. Although Market Abuse Directive emphasises 
negotiability, the context for such use cannot be likened to transferability in the sense used 
in MIFID. This is particularly evident where the components are explored against the 
overriding purposes of the respective Directives. The MIFID for instance attempts to unify 
the language of other Directives on the question of transferability and negotiability by 
making its provisions the authoritative reference when it comes to defining securities.138 
There are clearly difficulties in the wholesale harmonisation of contexts even though that of 
language may be possible. The overlaps of legislative purposes draw a line between their 
attributes especially where the linguistic interpretation of some of the components at 
national level seem to be divorced from even their national understanding of the term 
securities. 
For countries that emphasis formalism, the strengthening of national frameworks on the 
basis of local languages imposes significant pressure on individual nations to justify their 
essence within the context of multi-lingualism. For instance, the translation of the term 
‘securities’ in German, Dutch, Spanish, French and Italian will throw up issues on linguistic 
contexts and semantics. This is partly due to their varied understanding and application of 
this concept. Looking at the language specifically from a transactional context, the French, 
Spanish and Italians would refer to securities as valeurs mobilieres or titres financiers, valori 
mobiliari (movable values or financial titles), and Valores (valuable) respectively. These will 
however not fly under a rigorous etymological and contextual construction of these words 
in relation to the law. A literal and contextually insensitive interpretation of these terms 
would certainly lead to absurdity. On the other hand, German, Lithuania and Estonia see 
securities as ‘Wertpapiere, Vaartpaberite and Verty biniai popieriai (paper value) and Latvia 
also see it as parvedami vertspariri (transferable paper values). This shows the confusion 
that could emerge from a literal or conceptual construction of these terms independently 
and collectively. The avoidance of such impeding calamity may have informed Guilliano’s 
suggestion that a combination of ‘cognitive tools that rely on a contextual linguistic analysis 
that transforms legal texts into legal norms’ be deployed.139 With legal norms and context, 
he meant a departure from the formalism to the introduction of the functionalism that is 
capable of harnessing contexts to create binding effects. 
The challenges identified in the formalism clearly cast deep light on national systems and 
explores the propriety of unsupported reliance on its prescriptions. Even the language of 
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international transaction (English) is not free from this entanglement. Therefore it has 
become imperative to review the legal techniques adopted in understanding securities, so 
as to save regional and international bodies from these yarning gaps in legislation that 
create arbitrage opportunities for market infractions. With changes currently taking place in 
the commercial world like the Digital Ledger Technologies, Crypto Currencies, Peer to Peer 
lending, Crowd Funding, investors now seek greater levels of legal protection as 
governments and regulators explore ways to guarantee continuous soundness of financial 
markets.140 
The Hungarian Real Estate crisis of 2004 and the Lehman Brother insolvency of 2008-2010 
exposed the untidiness that could greet the inappropriate characterisation of securities. In 
Hungary, a Ponzi scheme which collapsed and triggered systemic crisis escaped regulatory 
oversight because the shares that constituted it were not considered as securities. At a 
wider level, liquidation of Lehman Brothers’ cross border assets met significant challenges 
because of legal and regulatory divergence on the characterisation of securities. Part of this 
was accentuated by the choice of law controversies as most of the instruments linked to the 
company were multi-jurisdictional.141 Therefore, this choice of law debate draws the 
securities definition controversy even more into the international sphere especially with 
regards to securities holding. While it has become relevant at regional and continental level, 
application of choice of law clauses themselves still carry domestic weight. 
At the level of the European Union for instance, the choice of law clause becomes relevant 
because this is essentially regulated at continental level. The Convention on the Law 
Applicable to Certain Rights in Respect of Securities held with Intermediaries also known as 
the Hague Securities Convention was enacted to clarify and harmonise issues around 
applicable law for securities transaction in cases of inter-state relationship. This convention 
was a leap away from the lex situs rule that tended to curtail the wild intermediation 
opportunities inherent in indirect holding system and its associated uncertainties.142 
Apart from the question of choice of law, The Hague Convention gave insights as to what it 
considers as securities, when it defines same in Article 1(1) (a) as 
‘Securities means any shares, bond or other financial instruments or financial assets (other 
than cash), or any interest therein.’143 
It is unclear how the above definition that is so loosely structured, interfaces with others 
likes national, regional and continental definitions. This is even after several unsuccessful 
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attempts have been made at the international level to influence regional and national 
harmonisations. The common understanding at the national level is crucial to the 
harmonisation effort both at the regional and international levels, but up till date national 
definitions have been deeply divided. In Europe for instance144, two sets of definitions exist 
even within its seamless formalist structure. The French approach like most civil law 
countries is governed by Code du Commerce (Commercial Code)145 and Code Monetaire ET 
Financier (Monetary and Financial Code).146 Under the French system like in most civil law 
countries, more emphasis is placed on statutes and administrative acts over and above case 
law on the regulation of financial markets. This emphasis on statutes placed significant 
strain on interpreting both codes side by side in the determination of what constitutes 
securities. Apart from the intra-statutory challenge, an examination of both codes in 
relation to the MiFID created even more problems. To address the former, an attempt was 
made to unify both codes in the adoption of a suitable definition. Hence Article L228-1 Code 
du Commerce is now read alongside Article L221-1 French Monetary and Financial Code to 
get a sense of the true character of securities. The French Financial Code now reads thus 
‘Les titres financiers sont: 
1. Les titres de capital emis par les societe’s par action; 
2. Les titre de creance, a l’exclusion du effets de commerce et des bons de caisse; 
3. Les parts ou actions d’organismes de placement collectif.’ 
This is similar but more comprehensive definition is provided by the German version which 
reads: 
‘(1) securities  within the meaning of this Act, whether or not represented by a certificate, 
are all categories of transferable securities with the exception of instruments of payment 
which are by their nature negotiable on the financial markets, in particular: 
1. Shares, 
2. Other investment equivalent to share in German or foreign legal persons, 
partnership and other enterprises as well as certificates representing share. 
3. Debt securities; 
(a) In particular profit participation certificates and bearer bonds and order bonds as 
well as certificates representing debt securities. 
(b) Other securities giving the right to acquire or sell securities specified in nos 1 & 2 
or giving rise to a cash settlement determined by reference to securities, 
currencies, interest rates or other yield, commodities, indices or measures, units 
in investment funds (investmentvermogen) issued by an asset management 
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company (kapitalanlagegesellschaft) or a foreign investment company 
(investmentgesellschaft) are also deemed to be securities. 
(1a) Money market instruments within the meaning of this Act are any categories 
of receivables which do not come under the provisions of subsection (1) and are 
usually traded on the money market with the exception of instruments of 
payment.’147 
The German definition seems to have adopted the two main components of the MIFID 
4(18).148 Apart from the race towards compliance with MIFID, it also demonstrates breath 
by capturing all categories of securities and placing them under a unique classification of 
“other investments equivalent to shares... and “other securities giving rights to acquire or 
sell securities in numbers 1 and 2”. This structure therefore seems to accommodate both 
traditional instruments like shares, debt, units and other borderline instruments. Italy 
shares similar technique with Germany, but a more coherent technique compared to France 
in delineating the boundaries of securities. However both149 share some semblance in terms 
of language.150 The challenges with the Italian approach are its listing of its instruments 
which share similar characteristics with that of the United States and the characterisation of 
securities as a subset of other financial instruments. It defines securities as follows: 
‘Per valori mobiliari si intendono categorie di valori che possono essere negoziati nel 
mercato dei capitali, quali ad esempio 
(a) Le azioni di societa e altri titoli equivalent ad azioni di societa, di partnership o di altri 
soggetti e certificate di deposito azionario; 
(b) Obbligazioni e altri titoli di debito, compresi I certificate di deposito relative a tali 
titoli; 
(c) Qualsiasi altro titolo normalmente negoziato che permette di acquisire o di vendere I 
valori mobiliari indicate alle precedent lettere; 
(d) Qualsiasi altro titolo che comporta un regolamento in constant determinate con 
riferimento ai valori mobiliari indicate alle precedent lettere, a valute, a tassi di 
interesse, a rendimenti, a merci, a indici o a misure.’ 
The Italian model specifically stressed ‘negotiability’ as core to its characterisation. This in a 
sense mirrors the US approach and represent a slight departure from the European 
technique. There seems to be significant differences in the use of terminologies. While some 
countries emphasize transferability, movability, other uses negotiability. It is unclear how 
these terms could be made similar, with such patent differences and potential source of 
confusion. Apart from the fact that individual nations are empowered to legislate on 
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securities in a manner that suit their function, the definitions of these countries share 
certain contradictions and gaps that blur all chances of clarity. The provisions do not clarify 
the extent to which they operate within or outside the ambit of MIFID. Although they are 
expected to make reference to Directive as a guide, the scope of that guidance in relation to 
their function is unclear for purposes of investor confidence. The absence of that 
clarification also means that a slew of listed and unlisted securities which may or may not be 
transferable or negotiable are not catered for.  
Whilst Germany addressed issues around domestic and foreign issuer, the definition was 
silent on the place of issue vis-à-vis the residence of issues in the determination of the 
nature of interest or underlying interests. France and Italy made no adequate provisions for 
this important qualification that has a far reaching effect on the nature of interest they 
possess. In addition, these countries made no effort at demarcating the nature of issuers as 
to whether they are governments, corporate or individuals –local or foreign. This 
qualification should have been necessary to properly situate their risk weighting and give 
insights to a larger class of investors to take advantage of available opportunities in the 
market. These opportunities could exist around the value chains of issue, holder-ship and in 
some cases transaction. These also lack sufficient clarity. 
In Germany for instance, it is not certain if the said issue by German or foreign issuer has to 
satisfy the trading and listing requirement for it to be considered transferable or negotiable, 
since these components are nowhere defined in the law.151 Most countries studied in 
Europe have included “other investment” in their definition without clarifying what the 
term constitute and how they should be characterised. This has direct implication for 
borderline instruments outside the typical equity/debt categorisation. While the United 
States courts developed the Howey Test to delineate the contours of investment contracts, 
the formalist approach adopted by European countries make such approach impossible 
because of its strict reliance on statutory language that is essentially context insensitive. 
The United Kingdom securities law is also caught in similar statutory cross currents.152 
Hudson voiced his disappointment at the lack of coordination in the statutory framework 
and jurisprudential depth on the subject.153 Apart from the legislative cratering that 
implicates the mismatch in principle-based and rule-based regulations154 which were 
directly imposed by the European Union, there are also hazy interactions between private 
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law and regulation. This confusion in the statutory layout, partly underscores a lack of 
success in integrating formalism which it see to adopt from the European Union by virtue of 
its membership and the functionalism which forms its historical core as a common law 
system.155  
Notably, the United Kingdom presented a more elaborate definition that captured various 
categories of instruments as security. Also by a stroke of legislative ingenuity, the term 
“transferability”156 which formed its hallmark for the determination of what constitutes 
security, was effectively distinguished from money market instruments157 through statutory 
devices. Despite the thoroughness in this approach, several transactions and activities 
needed to be regulated while at the same time create allowances for those classes of 
investors to benefit from the protection that comes with regulation without the rigours of 
registration. To this end, the Regulated Activities Order pursuant to the FSMA 2000 
incorporated three categories of instruments as securities. Firstly, those instruments which 
have been specifically enumerated by MiFID 2004.158 Secondly anything that have been or 
maybe admitted on the Official List and thirdly, “anything in relation to credit agreement or 
a consumer hire agreement, a mortgage, charge, pledge, bond, debenture, indemnity, 
guarantee, bill, note, or other right provided by the borrower or hirer or at the implied or 
express request of the borrower or hirer to secure the carrying out of the obligation to the 
borrower or hirer under the agreement.”159 
These statutory definitions in their expansive and elusive nature have by no means 
addressed the prevailing concerns arising from the incoherence in the characterisation of 
securities. Even where the UK definition is unclear with regards to whether RAO 2000 
applies only to categories of instrument specifically captured in Art 3(1) RAO only. This is of 
particular concern because the concept of transferable security only applies to instruments 
covered by the RAO 2000. Therefore other categories of instruments not within the scope of 
RAO need not be ‘Transferable’. In other words, transferability is not a central theme that 
runs across all instrument categories. This lack of consistency in approach is a challenge in 
terms of compliance cost for investors and operators in the market. In addition, there is 
limited clarity with respect to instruments covered by the RAO because of the absence of a 
coherent framework on what amounts to ‘Regulated Activity’. 
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Although Section 22 of the FSMA defines Regulated Activities to encompass those activities 
identified in Schedule 2 FSMA 2000, the identified activities have no common theme to 
suggest the basis for their inclusion.160 Even the courts are also at crossroads on this issue 
because of the absence of coherent criteria. An attempt was made to explain Regulated 
Activities from the purview of business by requiring an interpretation of the phrase ‘Carrying 
on Regulated Activities by way of Business.’ The definitions of ‘business’ and ‘activities’ are 
inconclusive from the statutory and judicial standpoint;161 also the attempt by the court to 
manufacture the Test of ‘Quality and Sophistication of Investment Choices’ is also not 
clear.162 It is not settled whether the general prohibition under Section 19(1) of FSMA 2000 
applies to all categories of instruments or exclusively to instruments covered by the RAO 
2000. 
The contextual basis for exclusion of certain instruments as securities and absence of a 
uniform criteria or jurisprudence for delineating securities remains a major challenge. Apart 
from the gaps highlighted above, more obvious lacunas have been identified. Section 22(1) 
FSMA and Schedule 2 Paragraph 2-9 of FSMA explains the element of securities to include 
that: (a) financial instrument must be issued by a public company through a public offer; (b) 
financial instrument must be traded in a regulated securities market, (c) financial instrument 
must be negotiable and transferable. It however failed to clarify if the category of 
instruments for trading excludes those not listed by public company through public offer. 
The definition also failed to clarify to what extent the instrument expressly excluded as 
securities pursuant to Schedule 11A of FSMA 2000 and Section 85(1) – (5) FSMA 2000, can 
function as securities if traded in the market even though not specifically recognised as 
securities under the legislation. 
These challenges of clarity seem to be pervasive across all continents even as catalogues of 
repetitions and imprecisions that characterised the statutory definition in the European 
countries seem to have also played out in South America and Africa. Historical factors may 
have played a significant role in this. In some sense, these countries have tried to 
incorporate the United States and European technique and in the process created 
definitions that are conceptually confused. Their definitions essentially do not carry 
recognisable themes upon which to base one’s judgement on the likely conceptual 
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approach adopted. This is especially so where the word ‘meaning’ precedes their definitions 
without operating words to prescribe the philosophical and conceptual underpinnings. 
Japan’s163 technique, however, seems to follow the South American and Kenya’s technique 
by commencing their definition with the word ‘means’. This is followed by a list of items 
that are referred to as securities without clearly stipulating the controlling word or central 
theme for the determination of products that fall outside the categories expressly listed. 
The Argentina Capital Market Law164, Mexico Securities Market Law, Brazil, Kenya, is useful 
cases in point. The Argentina law defines securities in Section 2165 as follows: 
‘When used in this law and regulations hereunder, the following terms shall have the 
meaning set forth below – securities issued both in certificated and book entry form, 
including in particular any negotiable instruments or instruments evidencing claims, shares 
of stock, mutual investment fund quotas, debt securities or certificate of participation in 
financial trusts or other collective investment vehicles, and in general any homogenous and 
exchangeable securities or investment agreements or receivable instruments issued or 
grouped in series and which may be traded in the same manner as and with effect similar to 
securities, and which on account of their nature and transfer requirement may be traded on 
a general and impersonal basis in financial markets’ 
‘Also, the term securities include futures, options and derivative contracts in general when 
traded in authorised markets, deferred payment checks, admissibility time deposit 
certificates, invoice payment commitments, certificate of deposit and stock warrants, 
promissory notes, bill of exchange and any other securities admitted to trading in secondary 
markets’. 
The Argentina approach went pretty close in its qualification to a point of description. Apart 
from generalising the products on the basis of negotiability which appears to have been 
common to South American countries,166 it also drew on their classification based on the 
physical nature of the instrument (certificated or book entry). What was however 
untouched, like its Mexico counterpart is the omission beneficial or underlying interests. 
This is very much unlike Brazil167 and even Japan that covered both direct and underlying 
interest leaving little or no room for doubt as to its formalist character thereby obviating the 
need for judicial incursion. While Argentina’s definition is inclusive enough to include 
derivative contracts, which makes it stand out of other South American countries, little 
clarity currently exist with regards to its classification on fractional interests, investment 
agreements and certificate of participation in financial trust. It also makes frequent use of 
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the word “or” without indicating whether it is conjunctive or disjunctive. This is clearly a 
source of confusion and uncertainty for investors. 
Mexico clearly identified detailed components for qualifying securities to include 
negotiability, registered, and unregistered, trading whether domestic or foreign. This is 
absent in Brazil and Argentina. Partial reference was made to the Financial Markets, 
Authorised Markets and Secondary Markets under the Argentina definition without clarity 
on whether it refers to domestic markets only. There is also doubt as to the bases of 
differences in description of the same market. One wonders if it was deliberate and whether 
it intends to convey a message. While Mexico is certain on the question of market which it 
termed “…exchange recognised by their securities law”, there are challenges with regards to 
proper demarcation of instrument which may have foreign content. There could be 
situations where either resident or non-resident investor issues a listed instrument under a 
foreign law for instance, a global depositary receipt, or where a resident lists a stock and 
places it in the third segment of the market which essentially makes the instrument non-
transferable. Both situations could present practical problems for this formalist definition. 
The approach to local or foreign Government Issue is somewhat different and could present 
conceptual problems for this definition. This therefore makes it imperative for judicial 
intervention to delineate the contours of statutory language in order to provide clarity. 
The functionalist approach believes in the insufficiency of statutory language and argues 
that the nature of securities as an amalgam of history, politics, socio-cultural and economic 
tool cannot be achieved by mere statutory design. The context should govern the 
characterisation of these instruments. This section explores countries that have adopted 
this approach to see how it has helped achieve statutory intent and developed their 
markets. 
It is the case that most countries with this approach have the leading Capital Market in their 
respective regions. The reasons for this could be traced to the capacity of investors to weigh 
on the flexibility that the markets present. The United States, South Africa, Hong Kong, 
Singapore are very good example of systems with this functionalism. Although this 
technique has been criticised for using contradictory terms, this is in a sense deliberate. The 
word “means”168 and the phrase “unless the context otherwise requires”169 are opposites. 
While the former attempts to provide some level of certainty, the latter is conditional and 
calls for an exploration into the unifying principle or philosophies that shape the underlying 
component of the provision and their legal effect. This is the basis for the need for statutory 
functionalism. 
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2.7 Statutory Functionalism as rational institutional practices 
Statutory functionalism uses the conditional deontic logic in statutory design and 
interpretation to avoid the ideological trap that creates the incoherence in formalism. This 
practice operates on the premise that the framework and statute seek that ultimate truth 
not only within the texts, but also beyond it. This means exploring contexts through the 
constant creation of meaning from words in statute.  There are wide advantages within this 
approach. Firstly, it empowers the regulator to exercise both administrative and judicial 
powers in implementing statute. While this has the tendency to speed up the process of 
resolutions, it may be open to abuse. Secondly, the presence of context opens the door for 
flexibility in product innovation due to the less rigid implementation of provision and the 
lielihood of working around themes that could occasion hardship. To this end, various 
countries have adopted this approach. A case in point is South Africa. The country has only 
recently amended its Securities legislation to adopt statutory functionalism after years of 
statutory formalism. 
The South Africa provision is very detailed on the question of qualification of instruments 
themselves and the controlling component. It defines securities as:- 
‘….. unless the context otherwise admit, … Securities means – 
(a) Listed and unlisted – 
i. Shares, depository receipt and other equivalent equities in public companies, 
other than shares in a share block company as defined in the shares Block 
Control Act, 1980 (Act No.59 1980) 
ii. Debentures and bonds issued by public companies, public state-owned 
enterprises, the South African Reserve Bank and the Government of the 
Republic of South Africa; 
iii. Derivative instruments; 
iv. Notes 
v. Participatory interests in a collective investment scheme as defined in the 
Collective Investment Scheme Control Act, 2002 (Act No 45 of 2002), and 
units or any other form of participation in a foreign collective investment 
scheme approved by the Registrar of Collective Investment Scheme in terms 
of Section 65 of that Act; and 
vi. Instruments based on an index; 
(b) Units or any other form of participation in a collective investment scheme licensed 
or registered in a country other than the Republic 
(c) The securities contemplated in paragraphs (a) (i) to (vi) and (b) that are listed on an 
external exchange; 
(d) An instrument similar to one or more of the securities contemplated in paragraphs 
(a) to (c) prescribed by the registrar to be a security for the purpose of this Act. 
(e) Rights in the securities referred to in paragraphs (a) to (d),  
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But excludes 
i. Money market securities, except for the purpose of chapter iv/ or if 
prescribed by the registration as contemplated in paragraph (d); 
ii. The share capital of the South African Reserve Bank referred to in section 21 
of the South African Reserve Bank Act, 1989 (Act No. 90 of 1989); and 
iii. Any security contemplated in paragraph (a) prescribed by the registrar;170 
Apart from the use of the term “context”, it clearly identifies “listed and unlisted” as 
essentially the basis for its characterisation of securities. The definition also provides 
limitations and clear cut demarcations of what rights are covered. Share Block Control Act 
1980 (Act No. 59 of 1980) clearly restricts the scope of equities, while certain classes of 
issuers demarcate debt instruments. Other participatory interests, units, forms of 
participation in foreign collective investment schemes are circumscribed by the Collective 
Investment Scheme Control Act of 2015 even as foreign issuers, issues and registration are 
catered for in paragraphs (b) and (c) the definition. Other rights associated with all 
paragraphs including derivatives, notes and instruments based on index are all catered for in 
this definition. The only challenge that exists is however that these rights are unqualified. 
While attempting to curtail the scope of some of the traditional instruments, other 
underlying rights and borderline instruments are left to flourish. This in a sense undermines 
the qualification in the first place. For instance, an option on an equity instrument is not 
curtailed in this definition. So also is a foreign issue or registration of those interests either 
by a resident or non-resident. The nature and character of fractional interests which have 
been referred lightly in the Collective Investment Control Act of 2015 is insufficient to cover 
the entire gamut of these interests. One would therefore assume that the word “context” 
simply comes to mind in addressing these concerns by the courts. 
Without including the word ‘context’ in their definition, one would have expected common 
themes wrapped within specific controlling words in the definitions. Hong Kong and 
Singapore for instance provides another good example. Every part of the Hong Kong 
Securities Ordinance has its interpretation section171 but provides no definition of securities. 
Reference therefore is made to Part 1 Schedule 1 of the Ordinance which provides a 
comprehensive definition of securities.172 It is unclear how this definition aligns with that 
provided in Section 285173 especially where the word ‘meaning and ‘context’ have been 
used in all categories.174   
‘In this Ordinance, unless otherwise defined or excluded or the context otherwise requires – 
securities means – 
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(a) Shares, stocks, debentures, loan stocks, funds, bonds or note of, or issued by, a body, 
whether incorporated or unincorporated, or a government or municipal government 
authority; 
(b) Rights, options or interests (whether described as units or otherwise) in, or in respect 
of, such shares, stocks, debentures, loan stocks, funds, bonds or notes; 
(c) Certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt 
for, or warrants to subscribe for or purchase, such shares, stocks, debentures, loan 
stocks, funds, bonds or notes; 
(d) Interests in any collective investment scheme; 
(e) Interest, rights or property whether in the form of an instrument or otherwise, 
commonly known as securities; 
(f) Interests, right or property which is interests, rights or property, or property, or is of a 
class or description of interests, rights or property prescribed by notice under Section 
392 of this Ordinance as being regarded as securities in accordance with the terms of 
the notice; (Amended 8 of 2011 s.14) 
(g) A structured product that does not come within any of paragraphs (a) to (f) but in 
respect of which the issue of any advertisement, invitation or document that is or 
contain an invitation to the public to do any act referred to in section 103(1)(a) of this 
Ordinance is authorised, or required to be authorised, under section 105(1) of this 
Ordinance, (Added 8 of 2011 s. 14) 
But does not include – 
i. Shares or debentures of a company that is a private company within the 
meaning of section 11 of the Companies Ordinance (Cap 622); (Amended 28 
of 2012 ss. 912 & 920) 
ii. Any interest in any collective investment scheme that is – 
A. a registered scheme as defined in section 2(1) of the Mandatory Provident 
Fund Schemes Ordinance (Cap 485), or its constituent fund as defined in 
Section 2 of the Mandatory Provident Fund Schemes (General) Regulation 
(Cap 485 sub. Leg. A); 
B. an occupational retirement scheme as defined in section 2(1) of the 
Occupational Retirement Scheme Ordinance (Cap 426); or 
C. a contract of insurance in relation to an class of insurance business 
specified in the First Schedule to the Insurance Companies Ordinance (Cap 
41); 
iii. any interest arising under a general partnership agreement or proposed 
general partnership agreement unless the agreement or proposed agreement 
relates to an undertaking, scheme, enterprise or investment contract 
promoted by or on behalf of a person whose ordinary business is or includes 
the promotion of similar undertakings, schemes, enterprises or investment 
contracts (whether or not that person is, or is to become, a party to the 
agreement or proposed agreement); 
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iv. any negotiable receipt or other negotiable certificate or document evidencing 
the deposit of a sum of money, or any rights or interest arising under the 
receipt, certificate of document; 
v. any bill of exchange within the meaning of the Bill of Exchange Ordinance 
(Cap 19) and any promissory note within the meaning of Section 89 of that 
Ordinance; 
vi. any debenture that specifically provides that it is not negotiable or 
transferable (excluding a debenture that is a structured product in respect of 
which the issue of any advertisement, invitation or document that is or 
contain an invitation to the public to do any act referred to in section 105 (1) 
of this Ordinance); (Amended 8 of 2011 s. 14) 
vii. interests, right or property which is interests, rights or property, or is of a class 
or description of interests, rights or property, prescribed by notice under 
section 392 of this Ordinance as not being regarded as securities in 
accordance with the terms of the notice; 
This provision is similar to the section 2(1) of the Securities and Futures Act of Singapore, 
Capital Market and Services (Amendment) Act.175  Singapore understands the importance of 
her place in Asia and leverages on that strategic location in the heart of the continent.176 Its 
cosmopolitan nature can only be better optimised with a securities law that captures 
contexts. This is also the thinking behind the Hong Kong Securities Ordinance. The 
definitions of both countries are similar in the area of qualifying the itemised instruments on 
the basis of “issuance”.177 While the Hong Kong approach goes even further to list all the 
categories of instruments and with a qualification of the scope of underlying interest therein 
covered, the Singapore approach only identifies the instruments and hinge underlying 
interest on the concept of “profit”.178 In other words, the element of profit determines 
whether an underlying interest qualifies as security. This condition seems to mirror the 
Howey Test in the United States especially around the jurisprudence of the “profit” 
component. The component of profit in paragraph (d) is followed by specific scenarios that 
could act as a guide to the courts. These include a reference to profit or loss arising from 
fluctuation in values or prices of instruments mentioned in paragraphs (a – c).179 
Another aspect of the Singapore’s definition which is similar to paragraphs (b) to (g) of Part 
1 Schedule 1 of the Hong Kong Ordinance is the provision for borderline instruments, units, 
unit trust and units in derivative trust.180 While Hong Kong took steps to qualify these 
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underlying interests by circumscribing them with Section 392, 103(1)(a) and 105(1) of the 
Ordinance, the Singapore model simply left this to judicial contexts. This therefore had the 
effect of demarcating property rights that exist within these interests and other rights. 
Therefore effective clarity is achieved especially to investors who essentially would be 
interested in the legal treatments of these rights. Such demarcations are however absent 
with the Singapore approach which seems heavily reliant on the “Profit” component for the 
characterisation of underlying interests. Both countries however have excluded similar 
categories of instruments as securities. These instruments fall under those short term 
products and those developed for payment purposes. While Singapore relies on short 
termism and decision or Authority exclusively, Hong Kong relies on the absence of risk 
factors in addition to short term instruments of payment element181 as the basis for its 
exclusion. In other words, any instrument that enjoys the protection of other Hong Kong 
statutes is excluded as securities.182 
Generally, the nature of the statutory design seems to be convergent and vague in terms of 
coordination amongst the components. The basis for this possibly is to create a window for 
judicial exploration in line with various contexts. For instance, the Securities and Futures Act 
of Singapore closed the door on Certificate of Deposit and described it as excluded 
instrument, and at the same time created a back entrance through paragraphs (c) and (h) of 
the Section 2(1), that allows any rights as securities and other products that the Authority 
may prescribe. This more or less broadens the scope and gives a leeway to the authority to 
capture even more products through the exercise of this discretion. The question therefore 
is who the authority is in this case? The debate may rage between the market regulators or 
the courts. Where the regulator is seen to be the Authority and as such exercises their 
discretion, are the courts prevented to question or overturn such exercise? What would be 
the basis for such exercise of discretion by the regulators or reversal by the courts? These 
questions make the functionalist approach the surest system for getting contextual answers 
and achieving practical depth. 
From the point of view of this functionalist Market Focused Approach of which the United 
States is currently leading, the Securities Act,183 remains the authoritative legislation on this 
issue. It expressly specifies items that constitute securities184 by providing thus: 
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“When used in this title, unless the context otherwise requires – (1) The term security means 
any note, stock, treasury stock, security future, security-based swap, bond, debenture, 
evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing 
agreement, collateral-trust certificate, pre-organisation certificate or subscription, 
transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a 
security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, any put, call, 
straddle, option, or privilege on any security, certificate of deposit, or group or index of 
securities (including any interest therein or based on the value thereof), or any put, call, 
straddle, option, or privilege entered into on a national securities exchange relating to 
foreign currency, or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a security, or 
any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, 
guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.”185 
 The Laundry List Approach of this provision has been criticised as heavy on words and light 
on details. The purpose of its inclusively rambling nature is to possibly capture all schemes 
that may have contributed to market abuse and failures under the Blue Sky laws. In 
addition, it attempts to categorise a catalogue of general and distinct labels as securities by 
using the phrase ‘Securities means any…’ This approach assumes that securities operate in 
isolation of the market and there exist no formal or transactional interactions with other 
asset forms not listed in the Act. The generous use of the word ‘’any’’ suggests a tendency 
of generalisation and lack the specificity needed for certainty in the market. This almost 
tends to render ineffective the purpose of the provision. 
It is an acceptable premise that the elusive categorisation of securities in the Act as ‘’notes, 
stocks, bonds, debentures, certificate of deposits, investment contracts, certificate of 
interest’’ makes them even more confusing. The practical difficulties become apparent 
when the question of what type of capital transfer is asked; given the number of ways 
capital is transferred and the boundless creativity that enables multiplicity of rights. There is 
also a question of whether or not Federal law is applicable. To a casual observer, exploring 
stock as securities might seem straightforward186, but when explored against the issuer and 
those holding them (Government, public, private, institutions), its nature might require 
further clarifications. The accommodation of notes within this category throws open an 
array of transactions which according to (..) includes consumer purchases on instalment 
basis and home purchase under Federal securities law scheme.187 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
any certificate of interest in participation in temporary or interim certificate for receipt for, or warrant or right 
to subscribe to or purchase any of the foregoing; but shall not include currency or any note, draft bill of 
exchange, or banker’s acceptance who has a maturity at the time of issuance of not exceeding nine months 
exclusive of days of grace, or any renewal thereof the maturity of which is likewise limited.’’ 
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It is however unclear what the following phrases mean.’’ Transferable share,188 Privilege on 
any security,189 Privilege entered into,190 Certificate of interest in participation in temporary 
or interim certificate,191 Right to subscribe to purchase,192 Profit sharing agreement193, 
Evidence of indebtedness194, Investment contract195.’’  
The above lack of clarity implicates the accident inherent in open ended cataloguing of 
items as security. It is the case that this is not a stroke of ingenuity in legislative drafting, but 
a desperate attempt to spread the fishing net wide enough to capture as many transactions 
into the regulatory web. These statutory landmines situation, underscores the limitation of 
legislative language and the need for jurisprudential intervention.196 
These legislative challenges highlighted above have hampered harmonisation efforts, made 
the investment extremely cumbersome, risky and inhibited cross border investment. 
Consequently, IOSCO introduced a supra-national dimension to the harmonisation efforts 
through it principles. After a careful study of the nature of definition in respective countries, 
the commission identified common opportunities and challenges. On the basis of this, it 
developed three core objectives and thirty-eight principles. 
While the objectives clearly align that of most countries, the principles created broad 
prescriptions which in themselves make sufficient room for manoeuvre. The three core 
objectives are namely, investor protection, ensuring market fairness, efficiency and 
transparency, and lastly, reduction of systemic risk. A thorough examination of the thirty-
eight principles leaves much doubt about clarity. First, there is no direct definition of the 
term “securities”. The closest to an express definition was a reference made of which 
securities are said to include derivatives where the context permits. The decision to omit 
such an important aspect of the debate, whether or not deliberate has sparked 
controversies amongst commentators and practitioners. While some197 have argued that 
IOSCO deliberately omitted the definition of security as a way of giving individual countries 
the leeway to developed appropriate definitions to suit their contexts, others198 hold the 
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view that the components inherent in the principles seems mandatory as could be seen by a 
broad acceptance by many countries. Among the components highlighted within the 
definition include “tradable” as expressly captured within the principles, and 
transferability/negotiability and investment. The sum total of its coverage identifies these 
components as constituting the framework for the conceptualisation of securities. Figure 7 
below is a diagrammatic representation of the thematic links between the various elements 
of securities identified and envisaged by IOSCO. The financial instruments and the concept 
of investment are seen to be linked with the concept of negotiability and transferability in 
an endless cycle of interaction. While “tradable” remains the subject and descriptive 
facilitator, the financial instruments constitute the object and basis for mutual exchange. 
 
Figure 7 - IOSCO Model 
  
The model shows in concentric layers the interaction between components of securities 
with the ultimate yardstick for their determination in order of importance. This is useful in 
the conceptualisation of securities amongst member countries. Financial instruments 
including equity and debt are moderated by the concept of investment and negotiability to 
produce prescriptive standards for regulating these products. However it falls short of 
actually providing the guidance needed.199 This is particularly evident in the drawbacks of 
the model. Firstly, financial instrument is not defined and it is unclear the framework they 
intend to rely on in defining what constitute financial instruments. Secondly, tradable is not 
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specifically defined and so it is difficult to understand it within the context of other 
elements. Thirdly, whilst adopting the concept of investment, it is unclear if it relates to the 
USA idea of “Investment Contract” as envisaged by the “Investment Contract Test” which is 
also known as the “Howey Test.” There is no framework within the IOSCO principles to 
demarcate the term ‘tradable’ from ‘investment’. Fourthly, the concept of negotiability 
which seems to be very popular in Europe and probably borrowed by the US system through 
case law, lacks the definitions required to bring them in sync with divergent views 
orchestrated by the conflict between formalism and functionalism. 
Despite the above challenges, a deeper examination of the IOSCO principle seems to exude 
some green shoots which simply captures a blend of the European Union and United States 
models. The development of products as a subset of financial instrument with negotiability 
and transferability as the controlling components which constitute the core of European 
Union’s MIFID has been embedded by IOSCO. The principles as a starting point also 
incorporate the predominantly United States “investment” component, which carries the 
likely effects of an exploration into the Investment contract or Howey Test. 
The vintage in the United States model which is absent in other systems, is the availability of 
substantial jurisprudence developed by the United States’ courts to delineate the contours 
of securities by espousing these elements.200 Although some may argue that the said case 
laws are far from embodying definitive answers,201 they however prove extremely 
authoritative in delineating the criteria for the characterisation of securities in line with 
market expectations. The judicial functionalist approach has been useful in this regard. 
 
2.8 Judicial or Court-Centred Context Sensitive Functionalism  
Judicial functionalism or court-centred approach is an approach that incorporates judicial 
reasoning in the interpretation of the logic of language and contexts. Judicial functionalism 
and judicial formalism are similar in approach, but in some cases different in outcomes. 
Having recognised the relative ignorance of rule-maker to facts and the relative 
indeterminacy of aims, both approaches put the courts at the heart of statutory 
interpretation. They see legal reasoning as indeterminate in many respects. Whereas judicial 
formalism adopts a more determinate approach on the basis of ratio-decidendi, judicial 
functionalism applies less machine-like criteria. This is because its reasoning enables greater 
illumination and insight into subject matter and nature of legal reasoning.202 
Dworkin while disagreeing with Hart’s ‘open texture’ admitted that judicial functionalism is 
not a limitless discretionary arena for judges. He maintains that they are guided by 
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principles within the genius of the law in the process of adjudication. Hart concedes, but 
argues that variable legal standards are a fair replacement for principles because not all 
conducts are suitable for principle-based regulation. Whether this falls within variable 
standards or principles, the bottom-line is in ascertaining the legal effect of applying 
normative statements by reference to rules in an adjudicatory process.203 Whilst judicial 
formalist would stick to the ordinary meaning of statutory text and the principles of stare 
decisis even if it leads to absurdity or occasion manifest injustice, the judicial functionalist 
on the other hand, explores the concepts and principles even deeper. The purpose of more 
exploration is with a view to aligning the concepts with the economic or social philosophies 
that shape the respective contexts and environment. So that in cases where the underlying 
philosophy is essentially economic justice, the concept of rights and duties are skewed 
towards principles that advance profit maximisation.204 But where the philosophy is social 
justice, the court will now be at liberty to use the principles to construct the concepts in 
such a way as to produce social benefits and social good.205 
Therefore in the case of securities conceptualisation, judicial functionalism seeks to 
decentralise and democratise securities concepts. This is meant to create opportunities for 
the court to look at individual contractual intentions to reinforce the principles of party 
autonomy. The use of empirical data obtained from litigants and business contexts to 
seamlessly integrate legal and non-legal themes is the hallmark of context-sensitive court 
centred functionalism. Its drawbacks could however be traced to the inconsistencies in 
application especially in developing countries with weak judicial systems. With corruption 
and poor reporting system these countries may struggle to put in place a robust framework 
for judicial functionalism. Such challenges are however minute when compared to the 
advantages this approach presents for developing markets to fill statutory gaps, 
inconsistencies and controversies, while opening the door to effective product and market 
development. 
United States court system for example has been able to address some of the gaps, 
inconsistencies and rigidity of statutes to guarantee the full application of principles. This 
informs the choice of the United States system for this study. Through the application of 
standard tests to concepts, the country’s legal system has been able to develop a coherent 
jurisprudence for the flexible conceptualisation of securities. For instance, the benefit of this 
approach is its flexibility and adaptability to varied circumstances that better serve the 
course of justice. The context-sensitive nature means that market participants are not 
subjected to the rigidity of formalism. Although formalism is often instituted in developing 
countries under the guise of reducing corruption by reducing excessive discretion of the 
judges and regulators, the risk of abuse of judicial discretion is not widespread. In fact the 
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inherent benefit of the approach is its capacity to use its coherent jurisprudence, tests and 
standards to check arbitrariness of judges. 
For instance, the very basis on which instruments are categorised as securities currently 
rests on the interaction of components like Trade-ability, Transferability and Negotiability. 
These words all revolve around the ability to exchange, to store value for returns. 
Technically, investment forms the hallmark of securities as contracts. The understanding of 
the underlying concepts and principles make for important contextual exploration. IOSCO 
alluded to the importance of investment as a key component of securities, but fell short of 
defining the term expressly. Numerous countries have in one way or other explored and 
used securities without clarifying the concept that underlies all their activities. The United 
States itself only made provision for the term without defining what it entails. The courts 
have however waded in to give effect to statutory intent of investor protection and 
flexibility. While creating a test to standardise the approach for this determination, there 
have been challenges with the application of some of the components of the test. This in 
some sense has been traced to historical, political socio-cultural and linguistic differences. 
Several principles have emerged from the definition of securities in the United States unlike 
other jurisdictions.206 The difficulties has always been with pinning down each type of 
instrument to one particular meaning especially where they are susceptible to different 
interpretations when explored using several analytical lenses. In Marine Bank v Weaver,207 
The Court raised a poser as to whether the basis for the categorisation of securities should 
be determined by (a) the content of the instrument in question which include rights, duties 
etc; (b) the purpose intended to be served, (c) the factual setting as a whole. Nine out ten 
judges in Reves v Ernst & Young 208applied the golden rule of interpretation to the phrase 
‘’any note’’ by looking at what congress attempts to achieve by the provision. It is the case 
that factual context must be differentiated from transactional context. In the case of 
securities law, the dangers in applying canons of interpretation to judicial analysis without a 
deeper understanding of the nature of financial instruments, only upholds factual decisions 
and forecloses transactional ones. This is the view of the Court in International Brotherhood 
of Teamster v Daniel209, where the US Supreme Court struck down a non-contributory 
pension plan as not a security in part because of the existence of the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act210. The Court in Marine Bank v Weaver211 cited above also made the 
case where it refused to hold a Certificate of Deposit as securities because the purchaser is 
guaranteed payment in full by the insurance of Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. The 
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basis of the Court’s decision was on the existence of federal laws and regulations serving the 
same protective role as the Securities and Exchange Commission.212 This factual position by 
the Court however, foreclosed any inquiry into the transactional contexts of these 
securities. This exploration would have been necessary in order to determine whether there 
sphere of operations exceeded the power of those laws that regulated them. 
The experience of American courts in interpreting securities statute has been mixed. 
Majority of instrument adumbrated by the Securities Act are non-contentious. A few of 
them posed significant challenges to the courts because of their frequency and complexity. 
Among these is the “investment contract”. This contract like many other instruments within 
the provision was not defined in the Act. The court was at a crossroad on the appropriate 
context suitable to achieve the best possible category. In determining the meaning of 
‘investment contract’,213 the Courts seem to have adopted the transactional context in 
assessing it for registration. The US Court in SEC v C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp;214 was 
confronted with a case relating to the offering and sale of assignment of oil leases. The 
thrust of the transaction was an offer by the promoters to do test drilling to ascertain the 
availability of oil. Although the 1933 Act included in its definition of securities ‘fraction in 
divided interest in oil, gas or other mineral rights’’, it was silent on leasehold subdivision and 
assignments. The failure to include divided interest in oil rights to the definition in the Act 
did not preclude the court from holding the offering as securities, despite the label 
‘exploration enterprise’, the parties gave to the transaction.215 Further, the US Court 
expanded the concept of its interpretation within transactional context in the landmark case 
of SEC v W.J. Howey Co.216 as a direct response to the criticism of the imprecision of the 
framework applied in SEC V Joiner Leasing Corp.217 In SEC v W.J. Howey, the combined use 
of Land Sale Contract, Warranty Deed and Service Contract to convey units of a Citrus 
Groove by Howey was in contention. W.J. Howey owned the massive tract of Citrus Acreage 
in Florida Lake County. Howey in the Hill Service Incorporated is a service company that was 
engaged vide a contract to maintain and develop these grooves including cultivation, 
harvesting and sales. Every customer is issued with both sales contract and service contract 
as a condition for investment in the groove. On meeting the above conditions, the 
purchaser was free to make arrangements with other service companies, but superiority 
rights must remain with Howey in Hill Service Incorporated. Based on these conditions, 85% 
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of acreage assigned was covered by service contracts with Howey. The details of the 
agreements were as follows: 
Land Sale Contract with Howey Company: 
a. ‘’Uniform purchase price per acre of fraction thereof, varying in amount only in 
accordance with the member of years the particular plot has been planted with 
Citrus trees. 
b. Upon complete payment of the purchase price, the land conveyed vide warranty 
deed to purchaser 
c. Purchases are usually effected in narrow stripes of land layout consisting of row of 
48 trees each 
d. The individual tracts were not separately fenced but only subtly marked on the plat 
book records to indicate several ownerships. 
The Service Contract with Howey in the Hills was as follows: 
a. It was a 10 years duration without option of cancellation 
b. It gives Howey in the Hills Service Inc. a leasehold interest with full and complete 
possession of the acreage. 
c. The company is allowed to exercise discretion and given full authority to cultivate 
the groove on the payment of the specified fees 
d. The consent of the company must be sought and obtained before the land owner is 
allowed entry to market the crops and no right to specific fruit guaranteed. 
e. The company is accountable only for an allocation of the net profits based upon a 
check made at the time of picking. 
f. All the produce is pooled by W.J Howey and other respondents which do business 
under their own names. 
The Court was confronted with the determination of whether the Land Sale Contract, the 
Warranty Deed and Service Contracts together constitute an investment contract within the 
meaning of Section 2(a)(1) of the 1933 Act and as such registrable under Section 5(a) of the 
Act; or exempted by Section 3(b) of the Act. 
In view of the fact that investment contract is not defined in the 1933 Act, the trial Court 
held that they are not investment contracts but real estate sale and an agreement by the 
seller to manage the property of the buyer (servicer or administrative agreement). This 
decision was based on the fact that the court treated the contracts and deeds as separate 
transactions even though such transactions under State Laws had in the past been 
construed by State Courts as one which offered the investing public full protection. 
The US Supreme Court while placing emphasis on the substance and economic reality rather 
than form, laid out the condition for the determination of a transaction as being ‘investment 
contract’. ‘’An investment contract thus came to mean for the purpose of the Act, a contract 
95 
 
or scheme for the placing of capital or laying out money in a way intended to secure income 
or profit from its employment under a common enterprise which depends solely on the effort 
of a promoter or third party’’. ‘’It’s being immaterial whether the shares in the enterprise 
are evidenced by formal certificate or by nominal interest in the physical assets employed in 
the enterprise. Such a definition permits the fulfilment of the statutory purpose of 
compelling full and fair disclosure relative to the issuance of many types of instruments that 
in our commercial world fall within the ordinary concept of a security’’.218 
The policy basis for this decision according to the US Court is that ‘It embodies a flexible 
rather than a static principle, one that is capable of adaptation to meet the countless and 
variable schemes devised by those who seek to the use of the money of others on the 
promise of profit’. The transaction in this case clearly involves investment contracts as so 
defined:- 
1. The respondents are offering something greater than fee simple interest in land, 
something different from a farm or orchard coupled with management services. 
2. The respondents are offering an opportunity to contribute money and share in the 
profit of a large citrus enterprise managed and partly owned by respondents. 
a. They are offering the opportunity to persons who reside in distant localities and 
who lacks the equipment and experience required for the cultivation, harvesting 
and marketing of the citrus product. Such persons have no desire to occupy the 
land or develop it themselves; they are attracted solely by the prospect of a 
return on their investment. Indeed, individual development of the plot of land 
that are offered and sold would seldom be economically feasible due to their 
size. Such tract gain utility as citrus groves only when cultivated and developed 
as component parts of a larger area. 
b. A common enterprise managed by respondent or 3rd parties with adequate 
personnel and equipment is therefore essential if the investors are to achieve 
their paramount aim of a return on their investment. 
c. Their respective shares in this enterprise are evidenced by land sales contract 
and warranty deeds, which serve as a convenient method of determining the 
investors’ allocable shares of the profits. The resulting transfer of rights in land is 
purely incidental. 
Thus, the Howey definition presents a much narrower, context sensitive and less flexible 
punch line compared to the Joiner Test.219 While the Joiner’s case only provide one general 
requirement, the Howey’s  Classical Test has three uniquely all-encompassing requirements. 
When applied in courts, the Howey Test which now provides a contextual basis for the 
                                                          
218
 H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong; 1
st
 Sees; Page 11 
219
  The Howey Test is a flexible device created by the United States’ courts to chieve some levels of 
standardisation in the conceptualisation of securities. It is context sensitive, normative and seeks to align these 
characteristics with the nature and economic functions of securities. Malloy M.P: (1983) Definition of Security; 
Marine Bank v Weaver 445, US. 551 at 560 (1982)  page 1063 
96 
 
determination of what constitute securities was generally broken down into three prongs in 
order to establish the existence of investment contract.220 These Test elements have 
however been reviewed in subsequent cases and broken down by the Supreme Court in 
four prongs with additional adjustments.221 The four prongs for the conceptualisation of 
securities are (1) There must be investment of money, (2) There must be expectation of 
profit, (3) The profit must arise from solely the effort of others, (4) The investment of money 
must be in a common enterprise: Although the elements appear quite straight forward, 
application in court have been fraught with controversies around interpretation of the tests 
between functionalism and functionalism.222 The disagreements however only exist with 
some elements of the test rather than the test itself. For instance, with respect to the prong: 
1. Investment of Money:- This generally refers to investment commitment “by an 
investor,” in a manner that exposes investors or potentially make them susceptible 
to financial losses or exchanging specific values for new kinds of distinct financial 
interests. In other words, “a contractual provision that gives Weavers the veto 
power over future loans and gave them a measure of control over the operations of 
the slaughterhouse is not characteristic of security.”223  
It is a requirement that those investing the money must be an investor, not an 
employer.224 The question of investment of money for the purpose of determining 
securities has raised conceptual issues. These include the meaning of ‘money’ and 
‘investment’ in this context. There are conflicting views on this question. The first 
was raised by the court in International Brotherhood of Teamsters V Daniel where 
the court rejected the employee’s argument that he invested labour in return for 
employer’s pension pay out. The court found that the employee’s pension plan 
constituted an insignificant and indivisible part of the employer’s overall 
compensation package and as such impossible to distinguish a separable element 
constituting consideration for the alleged security.225 
 
2. Expectation of Profit: - The question of what constitute profit is another source of 
controversy. The courts were divided on what constitute profit in Forman’s case. 
While the circuit court disregarded form for substance226 in construing the nature of 
proceeds from shares in a coop, it found the rental reduction resulting from income 
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produced by the commercial facilities established for tenant’s use at the co-op city 
as sources of profit.227 In the same case, the appellate court found that the tax 
deduction from the portion of the monthly rental charges allowable to interest 
payments on the mortgage as another source of profit.228  The appellate court also 
determined that savings attributable to the fact that the apartments at the co-op city 
were significantly less in price compared to the unsubsidised apartments were 
sources of profit. The Supreme Court strongly disagreed with the lower courts and 
set the basis of determining what constitute profit in line with Howey Test. It 
distinguished the three sources of incomes captured by the lower courts from the 
Howey Test: 
Firstly, the supreme court held that the rental reduction from income produced by 
the commercial facilities created for the tenants’ use at the co-op city did not qualify 
as profit under Howey Test because the said potential income were far too 
speculative and insubstantial to bring the entire transaction within the ambit of the 
Securities Act.229 The court made it clear that the distinguishing character of this case 
from the Howey case was the fact the profits from Forman’s case were in the form of 
a commodity for personal consumption.230 
Secondly, the Supreme Court also found those deductions for portion of monthly 
rental charges allocable to interest payments on the mortgage not to constitute 
profits within the meaning of Howey Test.231 This is because, these benefits were 
available to all home owners who were paying interest on their mortgage, and as 
such, were not unique to this situation.232 
Thirdly, the Supreme Court found that the savings resulting from the lower cost of 
apartments at Co-op city were not profits within the Howey Test, because, low rent 
was derived from financial subsidies made available by the New York State.233 Hence, 
“… profit must emanate from capital appreciation derived through initial investment 
or from participation in earning resulting from the use of investment funds.234 This 
profit must not be in the form of a commodity for personal consumption.235 
 
3. Profit arises solely from the effort of others: - The courts are also divided on the 
application of this prong.  In United Housing Foundation v Forman, the Supreme 
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Court while defining the term “Profit”236 adjusted this condition to make it applicable 
by providing that expectation of profit must emanate from “entrepreneurial or 
managerial effort of others.”237 In other words, where investors are seen to retain or 
maintain control, there is no investment.238 This has created a lot of questions 
around the threshold allowable. Indeed the uncertainty has prompted the inclusion 
of an additional requirement to Howey’s profit prong which require the expected 
profit to emanate from the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others.239  
Therefore, in determining whether a holding pyramid scheme in which the selling 
efforts of the investor were partially responsible for the profit, the court made “a 
critical inquiry into whether the efforts made by those other than the investor are 
undeniably significant one to constitute essential managerial efforts which could 
affect the failure or success of the enterprise.”240 In arriving at a decision, the US 
Circuit Court relied heavily on the decision in SEC v Glen Turner Enter., where a 
condominium offered together with servicing arrangement was held to be 
investment contract even when facts showed that the investor was wholly active.241 
This controversy has been left largely unresolved because the US Supreme Court in 
United Housing Foundation v Forman242expressly declined to indicate whether the 
court was right in Glenn Turner’s case.243 
 
As a result of the above uncertainties, courts have adopted functional rather than 
the literal approach in understanding the intentions of the legislature on the 
question of profit solely from the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others. To 
establish this particular ingredient, a court looked at the motive of the buyer of the 
investment product to see if the motivation is borne out of the prospects of profit on 
investment, rather than intention to use personally or consume product so 
purchased. This approach has also not yielded much because the court in 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v Daniel244 was faced with an issue of 
whether an employee’s interest in a compulsory pension plan was a security within 
the meaning of the Act.245 The terms of the pension plan stipulated that the 
employees paid nothing into the pension fund, exercise no choice with regards to 
participation and could not demand pay-out from employer’s contribution in lieu of 
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eligibility (which is twenty-years of continuous service).246 In a suit by the employee 
for payment from the pension fund, contended that by allowing the employer pay 
money into a fund in return for his labour, he had made an investment which 
satisfies Howey profit requirement.247 The employee’s contention was rejected by 
the court on the basis that “the purported investment in the pension plan was a 
relatively insignificant part of the employer’s total and indivisible compensation 
package.”248 Though conceding that proceeds from pension plans depended on the 
performance of its assets, the court was quick to distinguish this pension fund from 
this transaction by establishing that a far greater amount of its income was derived 
from employer’s contributions.249 The court therefore found that Howey’s profit 
requirement was not met and supported that finding by clarifying that, the 
principled inhibitions to an employee’s realising his  pension benefit was not the 
financial health of the fund, but the employee’s ability to meet the fund’s eligibility 
requirement. So even though the pension benefits were characterised as profits, 
accessing this profit would depend on the employee’s effort at meeting the vesting 
requirement, rather than the fund’s investment success.250 In closing, the court 
addressed a much wider point of the overreaching effect of Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act 1974 the “undercut” the argument that employee’s pension was 
security under the securities Act.251 These views have been corroborated and 
extended by Hardy to cover similar plans in Europe.252 
 
Another example of the use of the judicial functionalist approach is on the 
consideration by the courts of whether there exists any significant participation on 
the part of the buyer in the management of the partnership in which he has 
invested, to the extent that he has sufficient control of the performance of 
investment.253 The expectation of profit is also met where investor or contributor 
contributes an amount of risk capital i.e by subjecting monies belonging to him/her 
to the risk of an enterprise over which he/she exercises no managerial control.254 
This view was advanced in Marine Bank V Weaver255in an attempt to explore the 
concept of managerial control. The court introduced the “Risk and Uniqueness Test” 
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in the characterisation of this prong. A certificate of deposit and an agreement 
between the defendant and one Piccirillos where held not to have met the 
investment contract test because of the absence of risk to the investor256 and the 
presence of control by the same investor which makes the transaction quite 
unique.257 The inclusion of the “Risk and Uniqueness Conditions” to the Howey 
requirement, have thrown up new sets of controversies. These include conflicts258 
among pre-existing and new test requirements,259 the universality of these 
conditions to wider range of instruments and asset classes, the implication for the 
modification of securities law as litigants shop for convenient fora within States’ 
Court Systems and State Laws. The “Risk” and “Uniqueness” Tests have thrown up 
significant controversies between the Howey Test and Commercial Investment Test, 
Risk Capital Test and Literal Interpretation Test on the one hand; and conflicts 
amongst the various tests on the other. These controversies are captured in the 
discussion of “Notes” below.  Even though the “Uniqueness and Risk” Test provide 
significant guide to the court in qualifying borderline instruments, the court in 
Marine Bank v Weavers failed to clarify the standards of compliance with the 
requirements. For example, a comprehensive expose into the concept of “Risk” and 
how the Federal Banking regulations obviated the need for the application of 
Securities Act 1933 was absent. Secondly, the “Uniquely” Test was also left in its 
vagueness. The test of uniqueness was principally ties to the concept of “Control” 
which was never explained in details. The absence of clear guidance to the test of 
uniqueness and failure to identify standards for its application is a major disservice 
by the courts in these cases. It could be recalled that the court in Joiner’s case260 
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alluded to the underlying principles of securities – “security was defined to include 
by name or description, many documents in which there is common trading or 
investment.” 261Also, the Supreme Court in Forman’s case262 underlined the basis for 
the application of the Securities Act as follows: “Securities Act is on the Capital 
Market Enterprise System: the sale of securities to raise capital for profit-making 
purposes, the exchanges on which securities are traded, and the need for regulation 
to prevent fraud and protect investors’ interest.”263 A judicial linkage of the legislative 
purpose of Securities Act to the “Risk” and “Uniqueness” Tests could have provided 
more clarity to the investing public. 
 
The above challenges as was expected, led to massive move towards State courts to 
file actions. This move led to conflicting judgments even on similar facts at the State 
level as litigant tried to apply blue sky laws. The question of flexibility as espoused by 
the Securities Act soon gave way to its policy and legislative purpose of the Act 
around the impact of uncertainty on investors’ protection.264 This dilemma surfaced 
when the US DC Circuit Court of Appeal in SEC v Life Partners265 and the Eleventh 
Circuit in SEC v Mutual Benefit Corp266 applied the same law to almost identical facts 
but got different results.267 Both companies at different times were defendants in 
suits brought against them by SEC for the offering or sale of unregistered securities 
in violation of Section 5(a)(c), 17(a)(1) of 1933 Act and Section 10(b) of 1934 Act. In 
both cases, the district court supported the imposition of injunction against the 
viatical settlement firm prohibiting sales of these securities. However, the US DC 
Court of Appeal reversed the district court’s finding in LPI on the ground that viatical 
settlement is not a security because it is subject to the supervision of insurance 
authority.268 The Eleventh Circuit on the other hand affirmed the US District Court’s 
finding and held that viatical settlement is a security. 
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A side by side analysis of the outcome revealed the inconsistent application of the 
Howey Test, especially on the interpretation of what amounts to “expectation of 
profit.” This unevenness is partly due to the conflict between judicial formalism and 
judicial functionalism. Secondly, it is also a function of contextual application of the 
principles and concepts in a flexible manner. While the courts catalogued the 
promoters’ efforts to be ascertained principally on the basis of “undeniably 
significant”, “essential”, and “managerial effort”;269 two themes emerged. The first 
were the “pre-sale promoters efforts and secondly, the post-sale promoters’ efforts. 
As for the pre-sale efforts, the both court identified and assessed all the activities of 
the viatical companies in relation to the viators and the nature of external help sort. 
It was found that both companies developed policies, engaged the viators in the 
purchase price negotiations, prepared the legal documents, hired doctors to 
evaluate the viators’ life expectancy,270 and signed undertakings to pay the post-
closing premium that would ensure the policy is in full compliance from the point of 
view of operating funds or investors’ funds, where any purchase agreement so 
provide.271 Secondly, after identifying the promoters’ efforts, both courts by 
adopting a relaxed approach to the “solely from the efforts of others” requirement, 
measured them against the Howey requirements. Two themes further emerged 
from this exercise. The first theme looked at those efforts that are “undeniably 
significant” from the point of view of the courts, while the second theme, assessed 
those “essential managerial efforts which affect the failure or success of the 
enterprise.”272  
 
The outcomes of both courts’ interpretation of these standards were different. Both 
courts were faced with the issue of achieving a distinction between promoters’ 
activities prior to resale of fractionalised interests to the investors and post-sale 
activities for the purpose of this test. The defendant’s in SEC v Life Partners Inc273 
argued that the promoter’s pre-sale activities were outside the scope of the Howey 
test and that the test required the investor’s expectation of profit to be derived 
solely from efforts of the promoter’s post sale activities.274 The court agreed with the 
defendant’s contention and on this basis held that the viatical settlements are not 
investment contracts and therefore not protected by the federal securities laws.275 It 
has been argued276 that the policy of flexibility as espoused by securities law 
formation may have informed the DC Circuit’s decision in creating this “bright-line 
                                                          
269
 SEC v Life Partners supra page 737 
270
 SEC v Mutual Benefits supra page 539 
271
 SEC v Life Partners supra  page740; SEC v Mutual Benefit supra page 540 
272
 SEC v  Life Partners supra page 737 quoting SEC V Unique Fin. Concept, Inc. F.3d 1195,1201 (11
th
 Cir. 1999); 
SEC v Mutual Benefit page 545 
273
 SEC v Mutual Benefit supra 
274
 SEC v Mutual Benefit supra page545 
275
 SEC v Mutual supra page 548 
276
 Miriam R. Albert 2011 (supra) 
103 
 
test” to attach time of sale so that some pre-sale activities that are considered 
“undeniably significant and essential managerial efforts” are excluded. They further 
argued that the “bright-line test” is unsupported and in some sense inconsistent 
with the totality of foundational principles on which the Howey test and securities 
laws are built. In fact the 11th Circuit277asserted that the “bright-line test” should be 
discourage in the context of defining securities under the Act, because it creates loop 
hole for dishonest schemes that could put investors at risk.278  
 
The court however was unconvinced that the profits from viatical settlements are 
derived from purely from forces external to the actual date of viator’s death.279 
While the viator’s date of death was important from the profitability standpoint, the 
underlying pricing of the viatical settlement which is based on the company’s effort 
is more significant.280  The court further noted that viator company’s efforts that 
include “prepurchasing, locating and negotiating terms of purchase and calculating a 
probable life expectancy of the viator” are what determine profitability.281 It 
concluded the the investor’s initial reliance on the viatical settlement expertise in 
the pre-sale determination of the above activities does not cease even after the sale. 
Hence there was no need for the dichotomy created by the “bright-line” test.282This 
position is seen to have given impetus to earlier refusal to apply the “bright-line test” 
by some State courts in the country.283 Other State courts on the basis of “bright-line 
test” have held that viatical settlements do not constitute security.284 Despite the 
minority view of the Texas court in favour of the bright-line test, the Arizona Court of 
Appeal285 expressly rejected the application of “bright-line test” by reference to the 
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Arizona Securities Act and the Federal Securities Act 1933. It remarked that “the 
bright-line test is a convenient but inflexible and formalistic approach to the 
application of the 1933 and 1934 Federal Securities Act that does not serve the 
prophylactic and remedial purposes of the Arizona Securities Act.”286  
In a bid to avoid the controversies surrounding the “bright-line test”, States 
Parliaments are now legislating around the Howey Test, so as to achieve some level 
of certainty. It is doubtful if legislation could remove the interpretative requirements 
of words or clauses that ordinarily need clarification for securities to be 
characterised accurately.287 
 
4. Investment of Money in a “Common Enterprise”: This provided an additional layer of 
challenge for investors and courts alike. The conceptualisation of what amounts to a 
common enterprise assumed different interpretations. Common Enterprise was seen 
to mean:288 
 
“Investment in which the fortunes of the investor are interwoven with and dependent 
upon the efforts and success of those seeking the investment of third parties…” 
 
This interpretation has thrown a series of issues and debates with regards to the 
question of ‘interwoven’; ‘dependent upon efforts and success’; ‘seeking the 
investment of 3rd parties’. There are difficulties in drawing the nexus that should 
counterbalance its functional effects on transactions generally. 
 
The courts therefore responded by drawing up three judicial tests for determining 
what constitutes “common enterprise.” These tests essentially look at the directions 
where interests, rights, duties, liability, disabilities etc., meet and converge, in 
relation to investing parties and circularity. They include Horizontal Commonality, 
Broad Vertical Commonality, and Narrow (Strict) Vertical Commonality.289  
 
The Wal v Foxhill case presents a strong reminder of the controversy and inability of 
the courts to agree on this application of the commonality prong.290 The Federal 
Courts of Appeal are divided on this conceptualisation question and the Supreme 
Court seems to have maintained an uneasy silence. This has left the Securities and 
Exchange Commission in limbo and commentators piqued.291 
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The split among the courts go to the question of whether to apply the vertical 
(judicial formalism) or horizontal commonality (judicial functionalism) to all 
transactions. The Third, Sixth and Seventh Circuit Courts support the horizontal 
commonality,292 while the Fifth, Eight, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits, use the vertical 
commonality test.293 The Ninth Circuit however, now accepts either vertical or 
horizontal commonality,294while the First and Fourth Circuits are undecided. The 
Second Circuit has however not expressed this as a requirement although it seems to 
lean towards the horizontal commonality.295 These splits raise the question of what 
constitute or distinguishes vertical from horizontal commonality. 
 
The Vertical Commonality: - this commonality only requires that the “fortunes of the 
investor are interwoven with and dependent upon the effort and success of those 
seeking the investment or third parties.”296 In other words, the balance sheet of 
promoters in terms of a particular transaction must correlate with that of the 
investor. The extent of such correlation or linkage is the subject of further 
controversy.297 The Fifth, Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits believe that vertical 
commonality is the only way to establish common enterprise. Under this method, it 
is only necessary to show a coterminous rise and fall in investors’ fortunes without 
the necessity of providing evidence of pro –rata sharing of profit and losses. This 
view has however been controversial and has been criticised as limited in scope. The 
inputs of promoter in its aggregated and disaggregated forms are not considered in 
the determination of what constitutes common enterprise. This therefore makes it 
impossible to rationalise the essence of commonality or common enterprise. 
 
The above challenge therefore, has led to the development of two distinct kinds of 
vertical commonality, based on the scope of the fortunes of the promoter, investor 
and vice versa. The Narrow Vertical Commonality creates a standard to the effect 
that the success or failure of the manager must correlate with the investor’s profit or 
loss.298 In other words, the “manager’s fortunes must rise and fall with those of the 
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investors.”299 The Broad Vertical Commonality simply requires links between 
fortunes of the investors and the promoters’ efforts. In looking at this, the inquiry 
should be whether the fortuity of the investment is collectively hinged on the 
promoter’s expertise.300 The practicalities of adopting either types of vertical 
commonality to a transaction are in itself not free from controversies. Even though 
both views rely on certain linkages with participants in the transaction to gain 
validity in application, the threshold and standards for such connection in relation to 
specific products are unclear. While the narrow view sees the linkages from the 
point of view of profit and loss with respect to investors/promoters’ fortunes, the 
broad approach, views the linkages of fortunes essentially from the input or 
expertise of promoters. 
 
This broad approach has been criticised as vague. The courts have also posited that it 
eliminates the second and third prong of the Howey Test by merging the prong that 
inquiries into whether the success or failure of investment is dependent on 
promoter’s effort.301 As a follow up to this critique, the Fifth Circuit302 has responded 
in recognition and by so doing relaxed the vertical commonality requirement. It also 
acknowledged that in certain circumstances, the second and third prong of the 
Howey Test may overlap.303 The US Circuit Court held: 
“We are not convinced that it would be desirable to adopt a rigid requirement that 
profits and losses be shared on a pro-rata basis among investors, or that the 
promoter’s fortunes correlate directly to the profits and losses of investors. Howey 
sought to establish a standard which would embody a flexible rather than a static 
principle, one that is capable of adaptation to meet the countless and variable 
schemes devised by those who seek the use of the money of others on the promise of 
profits. It may be that in declining to adopt the rigid formulae of other circuits, our 
standard comports more fully with Howey’s desire to fulfil the remedial purposes of 
the Federal Securities laws.”304 
 
This watered down approach has also not gain wide acceptance especially among 
those courts that lean to the extremes of vertical commonalities.305 The second 
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group of courts however, see the horizontal commonality as the most functional 
approach to address the commonality question. 
 
Horizontal Commonality Approach: This represents the pooling of assets from more 
than one investor in such a way that risks and rewards of a project are shared. It 
focuses on the horizontal legal relationship (where claim rights and duties interact) 
among investors in an enterprise or economic venture where their fortunes are tied 
to one another through a pooling of asset with pro-rata distribution of profits.306 
Several Circuit courts hold the view that the horizontal commonality is the only valid 
approach for the determination of common enterprise. These include the district 
court307 the First Circuit,308 Second Circuit,309 Third Circuit,310 Fourth Circuit,311 Sixth 
Circuit,312 Seventh Circuit313 and  most recently the Eleventh Circuit,314 have 
considered the common enterprise and found that the movant must show the 
pooling of investors’  funds as a result of which individual investors share risks and 
benefits. 
 
This position has been validated even by the Court of Appeal in Wals v Foxhill.315 In 
this case, the plaintiff bought Week 5 Condo and entered a swap agreement with 
developer to swap their week in February with a week in the summer. He also 
agreed not to occupy the apartment during the week in the summer but instead 
allow developer rent it. As part of the agreement, the plaintiff was entitled to $1400 
(less of development fees of 30%) as rental income from his participation in the 4 
Share Programmes of defendant with the said amount paid in an escrow account. 
 
Dispute erupted when the plaintiff maintained that the defendant’s guarantee 
agreement puts them in a position to receive similar amount in subsequent years 
and as such the defendant cannot refuse to pay in subsequent months. Having 
admitted in court that he was inexperienced in financial matters, the plaintiff further 
maintained that they would have invested in the time share units if not for the 
guaranteed rental income and prospects of similar receipt in subsequent years. In 
the determination of whether this was an investment contract, the court was left in 
dilemma since diversity of parties was non-existent and the jurisdiction of the court 
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to entertain the matter was raised on the basis of lack of diversity. The plaintiff 
asserted that the offering and sale of time share, combined with flexible time 
agreement and rental pool agreement was an offering and sale of investment 
contract. 
 
The US District Court held that the purchase and associated agreements do not 
constitute investment contract because horizontal commonality never existed. On 
appeal to the Court of Appeal, Wals further contended that the Condo time share 
purchase and associated rental agreement converted the Condo sale to an 
investment contract sale. Hence he submitted that since developers failed in the 
requirement to register the security, such sale should be rescinded. The Court of 
Appeal also disagreed with plaintiff while affirming the district court’s decision by 
holding that condo timeshare and rental agreement were not investment contract. It 
further noted that the rental agreement connoted a pooling of weeks rather than 
pooling of profit, since Wals chose their summer week swap from a pool of available 
weeks. The court also noted that the Supreme Court had ducked the issue of the 
definition of common enterprise which should have been resolved by holding that 
horizontal commonality best comported with the purpose of Securities Act 1934.316 
 
One of the fundamental achievements of judicial interpretation of legal concept 
within securities is the exposition of its underlying purpose and philosophy. 
Essentially, the central theme that seems to resonate across the spectrum of case 
analysis is the role of economics and economic benefits in the conceptualisation of 
securities. An exposition of this nature informs the logical allocation of legal 
concepts among parties to meet the end of economic growth and value creation. On 
the test of economic benefit, the court was confronted with an argument from 
Securities and Exchange Commission with respect to the SEC Release, to the effect 
that federal securities law is better applied to the condo market to find for 
investment contract if (1) emphasis is placed on the economic benefits to be derived 
from the managerial efforts of the promoter, (2) where a rental pool arrangement is 
included for the purpose of meeting economic ordering and philosophy for the 
purpose of economic benefit only, (3) where the agreement materially restrict the 
ability of the purchase to rent or occupy the unit.317 These elements according to SEC 
are necessary to help in the characterisation of transactions in the Condominium 
market. The court implicitly considered these ingredients in the SEC Release one 
after the other. 
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2.9 Purposive implications by tracing out the philosophies that shape the economic 
or social arrangement and ordering/philosophy 
 
The US courts seem to have applied the economic benefit test rather than the social 
benefit test in the conceptualisation of securities. This was also clearly evident in the 
Wal’s case leading to conflicts in philosophies on the basis of context. On the first 
element that emphasises Economic Emphasis Test, the court reasoned that the 
owner of the Condo does not own the undivided share of the building. Rather, he 
owns only his condo and receives rental income on his unit when rented and not an 
undivided share of the total rental of all. On the question of rental pool which 
constitutes the second element, the court in defining what amount to pooling,318 
addressed what constitute a rental pool. It stated that that the rental arrangement 
did not aggregate all rents received and expenses attributable to all units. Also, 
proceeds were not remitted to investors on a pro-rata basis. For this reason, it did 
not constitute a rental pool that is contemplated by the SEC Release. On the basis of 
this, the Flexible Time and the 4 Share agreements did not prevent Wals from using 
the units. Therefore the economic substance of the transaction shows that 
horizontal commonality was non-existent. 
 
If the test was directly applied in the interpretation of the SEC Release and Wals’ 
transactions, the court would have considered the following to arise at its decision. 
These include (1) the terms of the offer, (2) the distribution plan and (3) the 
economic inducement to the investors.319 In that case, a condo with a rental 
arrangement that guarantees economic benefits to purchaser which is essentially 
derived from the managerial effort of the promoter from rental units could easily be 
struck down as an investment contract. The plaintiff’s attempt however at drawing 
the court’s attention to the defendant’s implicit representation of expected rental 
income was rejected by the Court of Appeal. The basis for such rejection has been 
extremely controversial. 
 
This decision of the Court of Appeal have been criticised by the Miriam Albert who 
questioned the rationale for the non-consideration of the ordinary language of the 
SEC Release.320 He ascribed the non-consideration of the ordinary language of the 
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Release as leading to the court’s findings that were not based on the Economic 
Emphasis Test and in all any event, the affirmation of the District Court’s decision.321  
 
The Miriam Albert further argues that the plaintiff’s position that he received a 
representation from the defendant with regards to the rental income and the 
promise of economic benefit in the purchase and rental agreement should have 
been listened to. As a result of this case and the broad language of the Release, the 
court has restricted the application of the Economic Benefit Test and by extension 
the third prong of Howey.322Hence, the Emphasis Test as used by SEC and Federal 
Courts is one of the many factors to consider when ascertaining whether an offer 
satisfies the last prong of the Howey. 
 
The renewed emphasis on this Economic Test seems to present a direct contest to 
the Howey test to the extent that suggestion points to the possible displacement of 
the latter by the former. This is against the backdrop of the linkage between the 
Economic Test and the Vertical Commonality323 which emphasises pro-rata sharing 
of profit that emanates from promoters’ expertise. This direct attack to the entire 
theory on investment contract, may have contributed to the Court of Appeal’s 
silence and the implicit but hazy application of the Economic Benefit Test in reaching 
a decision in Wal’s case. 
 
Gordon324 bluntly disagrees with both the Economic Test argument and the 
horizontal commonality supremacy by referring to the policy justification of the 1933 
Act. According to him, the 1933 Act was enacted to protect the public by preventing 
dishonest promoters from circumventing securities law provisions through countless 
and variable schemes. This is to ensure that the public are not exploited by the sale 
of “unsound, fraudulent and worthless securities through misrepresentation, and 
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promote honest enterprise, clean up the entire value chain from presentation, 
competition through to promotion. He insists that while unwanted schemes are 
expected to be sifted out, the Act never envisaged these discrepancies between 
theories. 
 
The US Supreme Court in Howey325 while narrowing down the principles in Joiner’s 
case326 also re-echoed this sentiments by noting that “instruments of variable 
character  ... and necessarily designed by more descriptive terms as  ... Investment 
contract, are also known as security.” 
 
Gordon, while emphasising the all-inclusive nature of the term investment contract 
even within the blue sky laws, see no reason for the dichotomy between the vertical 
and horizontal commonalities. In his view, both tests exist side by side in the 
determination of the fourth prong of the Howey Test. He went on to justify this 
position by identifying two sets of cases within six of the seven States he studied and 
came to the conclusion that they are equally matched.327 For the States where 
horizontal commonality is absent, he identified the following cases in support,328and 
for those that presented horizontal commonality included the following.329 
 
Jonathan Shook330completely disagrees with the view that horizontal commonality 
should be considered as comporting with the 1933 Act. He stated that the historical 
backing for the horizontal commonality by the Seventh Circuit is unsupported by the 
1933 Act or Howey. Hence the Court of Appeal should have applied the vertical 
commonality to satisfy common enterprise in Wal’s case. Had it done so, the court 
would have found the purchase and rental agreement as investment contract under 
the 1933 Act. While accepting that the 1933 Act is a disclosure state, he maintained 
that such disclosure will be more apparent where investors obtain the same thing – 
which is an undivided share in the pool of assets and profits. 
 
The Miriam Albert331 also took this view by arguing the Wals’ case rigidly applied the 
horizontal test by focusing on factors that bore no relationship with the test 
requirement. He stated that the Court of Appeal in Wals’ case should have followed 
the Howey prescription of broad protection to investors. Although the court in Wals’ 
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read the Howey Test which requires pooling of investment and receipt of pro-rata, 
an alternative application was presented.332 
You will recall that the court in Howey’s case examined the contract where the seller 
offered investors a tract of citrus groove with an optional ten-year service contract in 
which the seller would jointly cultivate the grove and harvest the fruits.333 However, 
horizontal commonality was not implicated in Howey because each investor 
individually owned specific tract of land. This is why the Court of Appeal in Howey 
noted that it was an outright sale of individual’s definite and indefinite tract of 
land.334But when the Supreme Court considered this, it was of the view that the 
produce was pooled and that the produce might have been put together for 
marketing purposes.335 Gordon argues that this is not the purpose of pooling in the 
horizontal test. Moreover, there was no pro-rata sharing in Howey. In fact the Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeal held though persuasively, that there was a sale of a right to 
share with others in the profit of land held in common with the defendant company 
or others. 
 
In each plantation grove, the cost of care and proceeds of the fruits may be 
distinctively accounted for with respect to the specific property owned by 
individuals.336 Thus, while profits of the entire Howey enterprise were to be divided 
based on the selling of the pooled produce, each individual investor return was 
based on the production from his specific tract of land. This independent return, 
informed the Fifth Circuit’s Court of Appeal decision that it was not a security.337 
However the Supreme Court found the Howey situation to be an investment 
contract. This makes it extremely surprising for the court to find an investment 
contract in a situation where investor’s return depends on the income from its own 
asset as against the requirement for a pro-rata sharing of profit to achieve common 
enterprise. It is unclear how commonality was established in the case of Wals v 
Foxhill.338 
This means that each yield of tract of land was identifiable from the bulk. The 
pooling was only administrative and did not commingle the individuality of the 
structure as created by the apportionment of the tract of land. 
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Figure 8 – Diagrammatical description of the process of pooling 
 
                                         Tract of land produce 
 
 
                                                 
                                                     Pooled 
 
 
                                               Individual investor gets not 
                                              From a common pool, but from 
                                              The individual yield of their respective 
                                              Tract of land 
 
 
The Figure 8 above is a diagrammatic representation of the process of pooling of 
investor funds for the acquisition of land and the creation of distinct structures to 
the effect that the investors’ only benefits from their specific produce from their 
distinct tract of land and not from the common pool of profit from all the land put 
together. This is a unique structure that shows the nature of pooling in all instances. 
It goes to express that the function of specificity and identification in the 
characterisation and conceptualisation of securities is sacrosanct. Therefore the risk 
of commingling could alter the economics and intended outcomes of pooling as 
shown in the comparison between the scenario in Wals v Foxhill and Sec v Howey as 
seen in Table 1 below 
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Figure 9 – Comparison of the Wals v Foxhill and Sec v Howey on the application of 
Investment Contract Test 
 
 Wals  Howey  
1 Investment was on a specific time 
and a slice of a specific apartment 
whose physical and temporal 
characteristics including price was 
different from those of other unit – 
page 1019 
Investment in specific tract in a grove 
2 Pooling of weeks Pooling in produce 
3 No pro-rata sharing or pooling of 
profit 
No pro-rata sharing or pooling of profit 
4 The investor in defendant’s 
timeshare did not receive an 
undivided share of some pool of 
rental profit. They receive the rental 
on a single apartment. 
Investor only received the proceeds from 
his specific tract in the groove and not an 
undivided share in some pool. 
5 Plaintiff lives in distant locality. The 
plaintiff is unsophisticated and 
inexperienced in the ownership and 
operations of income producing 
properties and purchased this 
timeshare as investment for a 
guaranteed return on income for 
1990 and the prospect of similar 
receipt in the future and not to 
occupy the time. 
The grove was offered to persons in 
distant locality who lack the necessary 
equipment and experience to cultivate, 
harvest and market the produce. Hence, 
such persons have no desire to occupy or 
develop it themselves as they are only 
attracted by the prospects of return. 
6 Marketed as part of an enterprise Marketed as part of an enterprise 
 Held: Court of Appeal: Required 
horizontal commonality, but found 
it to be absent. Hence held no 
investment contract (security). 
Held: Supreme Court: there was 
investment contract (security). The court 
adopts flexible formula to capture the 
remedial purport of the Act which is the 
protection of the investing public. 
 
 
Comparison between two notable cases to demonstrate the lack of uniformity in the 
application of prongs could be based on ideological positioning rather than 
functional pragmatism. This is one of the risks of the court centred functionalist 
approach if not properly regulated. 
 
Flowing from the above analysis in Figure 9, it therefore means that Wals’ case could 
easily have been characterised as investment contract without the necessity of 
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identifying any incidence of “pooling”.339 On the basis of this, the Miriam Albert 
argued that vertical commonality could have been applied as was noted by the Court 
of Appeal.340  
The court stated: 
“..The resulting division of rental income makes the developer and the condominium 
owner, coventurers in a profit-making activity impacting on the condominium 
interest itself, the character of an investment for .. those circuits that believe only 
vertical commonality is required to create an investment contract would deem the 
combination of sale and rental agreement in this case an investment contract.” 
 
The implication of a coventurer in this case between the investor and promoter, 
removes the 3rd prong which emphasises a reliance on the professional expertise of 
others in the determination of what constitutes investment contract. The Wals’ 
controversy persisted even up till 2002 when the Supreme Court narrowly escaped 
addressing the commonality question in the case of SEC v Edwards.341 This matter 
was first commenced against ETS at first instance where SEC alleged that the sale 
and leaseback agreement was a security and defendant violated the Anti-fraud 
provision of SEC Act 1933. Edward was the CEO/Chairman of ETS and owner of PSA. 
He also owned Twinleaf Inc (a consulting company). 
 
Investor purchase a payphone from PSA and then lease the telephone back to ETS to 
provide its management services, in return for its $6,750 purchase. In return, the 
investor would receive a monthly fixed fee of 14.1% on investment or $82 a month 
during the 5 years lease period under this agreement. It also provides that investors 
retained little or no control.342 ETS offered these purchase and leaseback agreement 
to the general public through a sale force and distributors who solicited by mail on 
the internet. ETS portrayed the company in its sale literature as experienced and 
successful in the telephone industry and invited investors to watch the profits add 
up. The company went into insolvency. 
 
The US District Court highlighted the relevance of the horizontal commonality but 
stated that it was bound to apply the vertical commonality.343 On application of the 
vertical commonality, the court relied on evidence that the fortunes of all investors 
are tied to the efficacy of the promoter.344 This element was satisfied. On appeal, the 
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court considered a narrower issue as to whether the transactions constituted a 
security under the definition of investment contract? That although time share were 
not specifically mentioned in the 1933 Act, the term investment contract has limited 
purpose for identifying unconventional instruments that have the essential property 
of debt and equity. Within this context, the court noted that share of stock represent 
an undivided interest in an enterprise entitling the owner to pro-rata share of 
profit.345The court further reasoned as in this case that the owner of a condo does 
not own the undivided share of the building. Rather, he owns only his condo and 
receives rental income on his unit when rented and not an undivided share of the 
total rental of all. It follows that the arrangement whereby investors interests are 
made manifest, involves investment contracts regardless of the legal terminology in 
which such contracts are clothed. 
From the above analysis therefore, the United States’ it is clear that judicial functionalism in 
the United States court system has contextually flexible interpretation of the concepts of 
rights and duties through the use of judge-made tests and standards. The essence of such 
interpretation is the furtherance of risk distribution for economic benefits. Therefore the 
capacity to seamlessly generate, cut into slices and transfer pieces of unhedged risks as 
value within the market, is the hallmark of the US conception of securities. This is 
represented in Figure 4 below: 
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Figure 10 – The US Conceptualisation Model of Securities 
 
 
 
The Figure 10 above is a diagrammatic representation of the approach adopted by the US to 
characterise securities by weaving together the component of securities using statutes and 
case law. While the US securities statute have listed the instruments that could constitute 
securities if context permit, the US court have applied the ingredients in the inner circle is 
convergent, exploitative and inward looking. The actual weaving of the components in the 
inner circle is usually done by the court on the basis of empirical data and evidence for the 
determination of the context to guarantee flexibility in achieving the policy basis of the US 
Securities Act. Also from the diagram, it can be seen that the policy basis of securities 
concept and statutory intent have been achieved. The purpose of functional (context 
sensitive) approach of the US Courts and statutes is to “… embody a flexible rather than a 
static principle, one that is capable of adaptation to meet the countless and variable 
schemes devised by those who seek to use the money of others on the promise of profit.”346  
Therefore the internal circle constitutes the engine room where the courts have tried to the 
listed instruments in statutes represented by the outer rectangles into the components 
contained in the inner circle. 
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Chapter Summary 
The research has demonstrated through literature that a court centred functionalist 
approach to securities conceptualisation has the capacity to close the gaps and significantly 
reduce the incoherence in the formalist definition of securities. Securities conceptualisation 
is the process and interaction between the various legal concepts and theories that 
constitute securities. It includes how these shape the construction and application of the 
products in the financial market. This research identifies the different legal systems and 
approaches adopted in the conceptualisation process. The formalist and functionalist 
approaches represent the civil and common law system respectively. 
Formalism strictly applies standard deontic logic while functionalism utilises both 
conditional deontic and dyadic deontic logic. The differences between both philosophies are 
not binary. It is a spectrum that oscillates within different approaches within both 
philosophies. While statutory formalism and statutory functionalism are clearly distinct, the 
judicial formalism and judicial functionalism could coexist in a system with its attendant 
tensions as seen in the US. These differences have significantly exposed the gaps, 
incoherence and contradiction in the understanding of securities. The gaps identified 
include: (a) the intangible nature of the instrument and their legal effect, i.e., whether 
governed by property, contract law or a statutory creation of a special kind specifically for 
the financial market, (b) tension between national laws in terms of cross-border activities 
leading to potent gaps in the understanding of securities. These gaps include: 
i. Lack of understanding and clarity in the meaning of ownership, relationship, 
rights of ownership, negotiability and transferability 
ii. Difficulties in understanding the classification systems that best suit the 
proper characterisation of securities from a host of available criteria that 
comprise currency denomination, ownership rights, maturities, liquidity, 
status, tax treatment and income payment methods. 
iii. The conflict as to whether securities is a property subject to lex situs rules, a 
contractual right subject to the rules of substantive contract law or whether 
it enjoys a special status. Legal authorities across the globe are still divided on 
this question.347 
These have further contributed to failed efforts at international harmonisation of rules for 
cross border transactions.348 Differences in interpretation techniques, language and 
tendencies to preserve historic legal traditions further widens the gaps and stand in the way 
of product development 
                                                          
347
 Benjamin, Joanna supra 
348
 MiFID, Hague Convention, IOSCO Principles. 
119 
 
While acknowledging the court centred functional approach is not full proof in terms of the 
non-uniformity in the application of certain test within the prongs, this research 
demonstrates that those defects do not affect the core utility of the model and its capacity 
to facilitate a flexibly liquid market. This lack of uniformity in the application of the prongs 
created the following interpretative glitches: 
a. The absence of a definition of what constitutes “investment” is controversial. As a 
result, the distinction between an investor and employer was hotly disputed in 
International Brotherhood v Daniel.349 
b. The element of “Profit” that is necessary to establish the second the second element 
of the Investment Contract test was also debated.350 In Tcherepnin v Knight, the 
court was caught between distinguishing income streams and savings from profit. 
Also, the question of how profit is ascertained was problematic especially where the 
courts had to decide whether the criteria should be based on pre-sale or post-sale 
and which part of both is considered significant for this purpose.351 
c. The element of “Effort of Others” needed to establish profit also presented 
problems. The courts applied different interpretative nodes to understand what 
constitute “Effort”. This shows the varieties of contexts that exist with every 
transaction.352 
d. Of all the prongs, the Commonality question seems to be more controversial than 
other elements of the Investment Contract test. The conflict was as a result to 
differences in interpretative prongs and the ununiformed outcomes achieved from 
the manipulation of words/language within those prongs in the interpretation.  
These differences in interpretation reflect the courts’ understanding of variations in 
contexts and their impact on the appreciation of legal texts. This is one unique feature that 
makes its application adequate in developing market and court system where there are 
likely to be institutional gaps. The tendency for courts in these markets to abuse an 
unbridled discretion in securities conceptualisation is circumscribed by these judge-made 
principles and tests while providing a base for the elucidation of the concepts. For instance, 
while the definition of common enterprise created the opportunity to explore the nature of 
securities deeply so as to appreciate to role of context; it also delineates the contours of 
judicial discretion. This has helped galvanise deeper insights into the inner workings of 
securities and the different commercial contexts under which they operate.353 Secondly, 
while the controversies between the vertical and horizontal commonalities with regards the 
characterisation of investors’ fortunes may create a window for judges to arm twist in 
developing markets, the US has shown otherwise. The US courts have been able use the 
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tests as a tool to interrogate the concepts of securities in line with underlying philosophy of 
the society.354 Thirdly, the power of judicial context-sensitivity as shown in the acquiescence 
of the US Supreme Court is viewed from two distinct lenses. First, the court’s silence may be 
interpreted as a deliberate and implicit admission of the failure of precedence (doctrine of 
stare decisis) to further the idea of contextual flexibility.355  Second and most importantly, it 
could mean recognition of the importance of flexibility at achieving context based decision 
making at the lower courts. Therefore, through the provision of a coherent jurisprudence 
for the conceptualisation of securities as shown in Figure 4, this review demonstrates that 
the inbuilt flexibilities of the US Model could be useful in achieving definitional coherence of 
securities. 
 
Conclusion 
Inconsistencies in application of approaches to the conceptualisation of securities are its 
major drawback. The judicial formalist and judicial functionalist approaches are two parallel 
approaches operating through the courts. This raises questions about the impact of statute 
at delineating the contour of judicial discretion at the same time maintaining some level of 
flexibility in language to enhance innovation. The dilemma therein created from the gaps in 
legal frameworks facilitates the preponderance of ideological positioning that obstructs 
contemporary transactional flexibility. As the analyses show, the key developments that are 
currently shaping the understanding of securities are changing. For instance, formalism is a 
product of language constructed and interpreted through standard deontic connections. 
This is implemented through a system of stare decisis.  In addition, the functionalist 
approach which emphasises context adopts a mix of dyadic deontic and conditional deontic 
and implemented through a system of stare decisis and judicial activism. The tensions 
resulting from conflict between both approaches further places constraints on the proper 
conceptualisation of these instruments. The meaning of concepts like proprietariness, 
negotiability and transferability can no longer enjoy its illusive and fragmented 
characterisation simply on the basis of their statutory inclusion. Its true meaning as it relates 
to the context of every transaction must be clarified. Consequently, a context sensitive 
judicial functionalist legal conceptualisation has the capacity to develop a coherent 
jurisprudence for the conceptualisation of securities by harnessing and weaving together all 
contexts including the physical and human stories. It can as a result, define a framework for 
the characterisation of the components that make up securities by developing standards to 
regulate their deployment and implementation within any given contexts. This will help 
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create uniformity in the application of these components and clarify the scope and meaning 
of specific instruments that are warehoused within these components. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
122 
 
 
Chapter 3                           Research Methodology 
A research of this kind interrogates various legal approaches to identify the ontological and 
epistemological positions that shape the interrelationships of securities concepts. These approaches 
are important, not because they possess any normative value, but they help to clarify assumptions, 
perspectives and notions that shape the realities of this research objective. 
In terms of assumptions, perspectives and notions, the researcher’s bias must be clarified so as to 
reduce incidence of unreliability. Becher identifies the importance of extricating bias to uphold 
objectivity and reliability.356 Chynoweth strengthens this view when he maintains that the measure 
of objectivity is not in the choice of research design, but in ability to integrate the research design to 
the objective and research questions.357 Schwandt identify the connections between normative legal 
principles and the philosophical approaches.358 They posit that clarity in the application and 
enforcement of norms is a function of the level of philosophical understanding of their scope and 
operations. This according to them extends beyond the mere legal provision to the very effect in 
legal relationships. As such Hart359 and Savigny360 relate the above position to the need for research 
to construct legal philosophical approach so as to expose the nominal essence of legal provisions. 
This study examines the paradigms briefly to elicit the best approach to the research into the legal 
conceptualisation of securities. 
 
3.1 Ontology 
Capon and Visser361 explain the importance of ontology in legal research. They describe is as a 
science of ‘self’ as it relates to the basic constituent of self and its relationship with other 
phenomena. This is important because of the position of the researcher in relation to the research. 
Ability to discover reality (truth) in normative principles by distinguishing subjective (experiential and 
self) from objective (independent self) in the choices of participants and data is critical to 
reliability.362 The question of how legal language and structure shape legal relations within legal 
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concepts in securities, goes to the core of construction, perception and effect.363 Therefore, there is 
the need to clarify assumptions and remove inhibitions to the objective assessment of these 
concepts in relation to securities rules/law. While the ontological perspective looks at concepts 
themselves and inconsistencies in their operation, it lacks the tools to ascertain the level of 
inconsistencies and how these stand in the way of a coherent and contextual conceptualisation of 
securities. This is a problem the epistemology attempts to resolve. 
 
3.2 Epistemology 
This philosophy looks at the processes and method of ascertaining the right context that confirms 
the appropriate reality suitable for the operation of phenomena. In other words, it is interested in 
knowing how things are known, the origin of a particular state of affairs and the criteria for arriving 
at them.364 It also seeks to understand the underlying basis for those criteria. Epistemology seeks to 
know the state of current reality when confronted with varied set of unrelated state of affairs. This is 
apparently where its usefulness lies in establishing linkages between ontology and epistemology. 
The relationship between ontology and epistemology implicates the subjectivity of the researcher in 
his ontological viewpoint. This invariably exposes the objectivity or otherwise in his epistemological 
choices. Also, both ontological and epistemological viewpoint are a function of objectivities and 
subjectivities. Whithead365 posit that objective epistemology sees a state of affairs as externally 
determined and not a product of theories. Subjective epistemology however, sees a state of affairs 
as a subjective construct which means that actual state of affairs represent the researcher 
perception. This is why reliability of data is hinged on the test as to whether such data are insulated 
from researcher’s bias. It is argued therefore that participant-led approach in eliciting and 
presenting normative legal principles extricates researcher’s perspectives as much as possible.366 
However Saunders et al argue that the choice of data presented and analysis cannot be free from 
the subjectivity of the researcher.367 Such influence is perhaps the reason why true objectivity can 
only be at best imagined. But in terms of normative legal principles, their certainty lies in the 
language and effective application of legal approaches. This approach to a large extent removes the 
focus from the researcher and places it squarely within the purview of legal interpretative approach 
which is influenced by theory and adopted by the system. 
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Krannich et al368 define legal approaches as the framework that clarifies the beliefs and 
interpretative philosophies that inform the understanding and application of legal concepts. They 
help explain the relationships between the concepts within legal provisions, theories and 
methodologies. In terms of language, they are linguistic materials which inform the mutual choices 
in particular syntax. According to Habermas,369 there are two main types of legal approaches which 
inform several sub-paradigms. These are Formalism (conventionalism, textualism, and positivism) 
and Functionalism (pragmatism, contextualism and legal realism). 
 
3.3 Legal Research Approaches 
3.3.1 Formalism 
This is an approach that applies inductive and deductive legal reasoning in legal interpretation. 
General rules, standards and principles which Hart370 describes as a means of social control are given 
rigid interpretation to eliminate room for judicial discretion. The quest for truth is objective, 
external, logical and scientific. This is why it is a useful tool within the positivist school. Posner371 
suggests that law must be certain where it refers to classes of persons, acts, things, circumstances 
and their qualification. Therefore its principal devices which are legislation and precedent must 
ensure they are adequately structured to ensure this. As for legislation, certainty in language as it 
relates to classes of acts, things and circumstances must provide a basis to reduce broad 
classifications into a single item which the law seeks to achieve. With regards to precedent, the 
presence of standards and principles of behaviour that discourages the introduction of new ones, 
guarantees transfer of rigid behaviours from superior courts to lower courts. This is the argument of 
formalism as it seeks to disguise and minimise the need for choices once the general rule has been 
laid down Hart.372 It does this by freeing the meaning of rules so that the general terms have the 
same meaning in every case where its application is in question.373 
Formalism further fastens certain features in legal provisions and rules to bring anything which has 
those features within the scope of those rules and social aims.374 This is to ensure certainty, 
determinacy and predictability.375 It is also to obviate the need to blindly anticipate the future swings 
in state of affairs. “No effort in the form of judicial enquiry is required to interpret terms in the light 
of different issues at stake in its various reoccurrence”.376 
While this approach may ensure some level of certainty in the short term, it is fraught with 
assumptions and inaccuracies which have the capacity to constrain interpretation and construction 
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to arrive at the truth. Given the fluidity, dynamics, extensiveness and complexity of securities, 
formalism is unlikely to be appropriate in capturing its nominal essence. Therefore, functionalist 
approach within the realist school is recommended to apply deductive reasoning to elicit the 
concept of securities by exploring the application of existing theories in a contextual manner 
towards developing new theories and frameworks. 
3.3.2 Functionalism 
This approach emerged from serious critique of the flows in the formalist approach. It combines 
legal contextualism (Ronald Dworkin) and legal realism (Oliver Wendell Holmes 1841-1935 Harris) in 
the construction of legal concepts for the purpose of eradicating the flaws in formalism.377 For 
example, while legal formalism (positivism) takes the view that interpretation of rights and 
obligations are rigidly limited to institutional practice, contextualism appropriate both institutional 
practices and other moral considerations in deriving the truth in legal concept. According to 
Dworkin, this helps to elicit the normative significance of right and obligation. Contextualism also 
explores the legal impact of its principles and moral fact on the institutional practices that lead to 
certain characters in rights and obligations. 
The idea of fairness and justice within the interaction of rights and obligation is a product of 
interpretation. This underscores the division between its approach and that of formalism in giving 
the law a contextual application. While formalism operate legal language as it is without reference 
to whether it is fair or just, contextualism considers moral influences in legal principles. Given the 
vagueness and lack of clarity in the concept of fairness and justice, legal certainty will be 
compromised with so much discretion in the courts. This weakness in contextualism led to the 
emergence of realism. The realist school believes that the truth is outside the logic of science or the 
subjective views of contextualism, but on the underlying phenomena that shapes the observable 
events within the objective science and subjective insights of interpretation. This underlying 
phenomenon is what Holmes refers to as state of affairs (contexts).378 
Therefore, functionalism as a realist tool seeks to understand this state of affairs that regulate the 
objectivity of positivism and subjectivity of interpretivism. It draws from the interaction between the 
concepts, theories and philosophies as it seeks to make meaning from them within prevailing state 
of affairs. By so doing, varied contexts are catered for in legal interpretations. In terms of the 
conceptualisation problems with securities, functionalism is likely useful in helping to clarify the 
underlying phenomena by amalgamating the standards and principles of formalism and subjective 
interpretation of rights and obligations. 
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3.4 Chosen research Approach 
This study adopts the functionalist legal approach and deploys contextualism as a tool for this 
analysis. Figure 11 below captures the main thrust of this study. Apart from the literature review 
which examines the legal approaches to the legal conceptualisation of securities, this research aims 
to identify the best approach for the conceptualisation of securities in Nigeria (under Nigerian law). 
Even though literature has been influential in this research, the intention is not to explore the issues 
through quantitative analysis. The research seeks to utilise interview data obtained through 
structured, unstructured interviews and personal observation of market operators, participants and 
regulators to understand the application of securities as a concept and its rules in the market. it is an 
internal participant-led qualitative research into legal rules, their interpretation, application and 
effect in the market. Given the normative nature of legal rules, there is simply no room for 
generalisation. This is the case especially where the research discusses the legal effect of rules 
through the use of case study. Therefore, the inability of market participants to interact due to the 
rigid nature of legal rules is the main shortcoming of formalist nature of Nigeria’s securities. This has 
led to lack of flexibility in the market and inability to innovate in terms of investment products 
development. This research consider these legal barriers created by language, language construction 
and interpretative approach adopted within the Nigerian legal system as pertaining to securities law 
with a view to proffering solutions. 
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Figure 11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Aim:  
How can context sensitive 
judicial functionalism improve 
legal conceptualisation of 
securities to stimulate product 
development in the market to 
meet diverse investment needs. 
Theoretical Perspective: 
Challenges to developing a legal 
conceptualisation of securities in the 
Nigerian Capital Market to enable 
product development and market 
deepening 
Research Design: 
(1) Observation (structured & disguised) 
(2) Focused group and target individuals 
using structured and unstructured 
survey questions 
Research Questions 
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3.5 Research Strategy 
There are broad research strategies in operation. Arthur identifies four types to include legal theory 
research, expository research, law reform research and fundamental research. The choice of a 
strategy is determined by the research aims, objectives, theoretical/conceptual framework and 
approach. With the chosen philosophy for this study, the researcher adopts single case study 
strategy given the contextual nature of the research and its specific focus on legal conceptualisation 
of securities within the law in Nigeria as they relate to the Nigeria securities market. 
The real life context which is expressed in the effect created by the interaction between legal 
concepts within securities also informs the choice. More specifically, two distinct views justify this 
research strategy. Those in favour of action research support the active engagement of market 
participants to capture contexts by exploring subjective impressions. The innate reactions to legal 
language and effect on behaviour, informs attitudes of participants in the market. Although this view 
is resisted by authors who think legal rules are normative and ethnographical studies seek to dilute 
its effect and reduce it to social sciences. Even where their view holds some validity, it is insufficient 
to erode the advantages of research study into how legal language, structure and application affect 
the way participants and market function. 
On the choice of case study, the research is able to make methodological inquiries into specific 
context of the law in relation to the Nigerian Capital Market. This doctrinal methodological inquiry 
has the advantage of achieving expository research in law and its relationship with legal theories, 
concepts and philosophy. It also helps researchers elicit inductive and deductive answers to the how, 
what and why questions they relate to the language and structure of legal provision and their 
application within the market. This is able to achieve through the combined effect observation, 
interviews and secondary data. The above strategy is different from others in the following ways. 
Figure 12 – Navigating the methodology 
Legal reform research This is social-legal research into for the purpose of achieving socio-legal 
context. It is an applied research about law as it explores the law from 
interdisciplinary standpoint. The Experimental Strategy is suited under 
the legal reform research because it places contextual variable within 
control. Time constraints make the experimental strategy unsuitable for 
this research. 
Fundamental research This is the study of the sociology of law. It is a pure and fundamental 
research about law from an interdisciplinary position. The questionnaire 
strategy is appropriate here to restrict the variability of data for the 
purpose of limiting any contextual voyage into the legal concepts, 
theories and philosophies underpinning securities. 
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3.6 Research Methodology 
The object of the functionalist approach in utilising the choice research strategy is to achieve 
triangulation. This means therefore that the strength of ethnography (research in action) which 
encourages participant-led contextual inquiries into the state of the law and responses from market 
participants will triangulate the weaknesses of rigidity of case study. The depth of clarity that the 
participant-led case study method can achieve on the specific context of legal provisions in the ISA 
2007, CSCS Rules, SEC Rule, CAMA with respect to their practical application in the market is able to 
triangulate the broad descriptive data obtained from the ethnographic (research in action) strategy. 
Also since both strategies are participant led, subjectivity of every participant is a regular feature. In 
order to achieve triangulation, promote some level of objectivity, the highly subjective and 
descriptive ethnographic research is triangulated with a real case study and doctrinal application of 
the rules to elicit their application in practice. This helps define the limits of descriptive data and 
streamline the basis for their existence. It also helps enrich the quality of the research as a whole by 
providing a human perspective to practical legal application of rules by situating their nominal effect. 
 
3.7 Research Methods 
3.7.1 To further triangulate data, the researcher adopts the structured, unstructured interviews and 
personal observation methods. This is to ensure that the rigidity of structured method is 
triangulated by the flexibility of unstructured method is a question of depth, clarity and validity of 
data. The structured survey presents open-ended direct and indirect questions requiring 
personalised answers to direct to direct questions and personal views to indirect questions. The 
unstructured survey present probing questions based on the answers provided to previous 
questions. While the structured data keeps the unstructured data in check and within research 
objectives, the unstructured method is able to achieve depth by clarifying assumptions and 
inaccuracies of the structured method. 
3.7.2 The non-participant disguised observation is simply to validate the structured and unstructured 
survey by looking at surrounding environmental contexts to identify the role of people, their action 
and circumstances under which they operate. As a useful tool in behavioural science, this method 
helps to elicit data that interviewees are unwilling to furnish or omitted during the interviews. It is 
useful in this research to tease out the non-legal factors that underlie and shape legal rules, their 
application, enforcement and the place of participants in the pyramid. Therefore, within the context 
of this study, the researcher puts the structured and unstructured survey questions to participants 
to elicit their interpretation of relevant provisions of the law, their views on the interpretation and 
their effect on participants and market functioning. This is with the view to identifying both the 
structural problems with the rules, their application and effect on participants and market as a 
whole. 
These methods cannot be effective at achieving reliability and validity if the views captured are not 
representative of the perspectives shared by majority of market participants. This therefore 
necessitated the choice of the sample size. 
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3.7.3 Sample Size 
To test representionality of views canvassed in research, the research sample size was chosen 
carefully. The table below shows the sample size from the approximate number of participants in 
the Nigerian securities market. Sample Size - Figure 13 
Market Participant Population  Sample  Sampling 
Technique 
Survey  Observation  
CSCS 9 4 Stratified 
random 
probability 
(SRP) 
Unstructured 
and 
Structured 
Interview 
(USI) 
Observed  
Custodian 11 5 SRP USI Observed  
SEC 6 4 SRP USI Observed  
NSE 7 4 SRP USI Observed  
Investors 23 15 SRP USI Observed  
Sub-
custodian/Nominee 
5 4 SRP USI Observed 
Stockbrokers/Banks 27 18 SRP USI Observed  
 
 
3.7.4 Justification of Sample, Sampling Technique and Triangulation 
It is important to justify the choice of sample size, sampling technique and triangulation strategy to 
ensure internal validity and reliability. 
a. Sample Size and Sampling Technique:  
The need to achieve representationality informed the choice of sample size and stratified random 
probability technique. The difficulties encountered in listing the actual population of lawyers and 
investors within the institutions that constitute market participants informed the adoption of 
stratification on the basis of legal experience in securities law practice. The major inhibitions were 
privacy policies of various companies operating in the market and overlap of roles and 
responsibilities in the various specialisms within the market and the varying degrees of experiences. 
Therefore, this research lists the population on the basis of stratification and thereafter extracts the 
sample size and on the basis percentage points scored against stratification criteria. These criteria 
include the level of legal experience in securities law practice as judged by years of practice and 
levels of duties assigned. Based on the above criteria, each participant was rated on a scale of 1 to 
10 to indicate their level of compliance with (10) as highest rating and (1) as lowest. To derive the 
proportionate stratification, the research divided the number with the highest score on criteria by 
the sample population and converted result to percentages. The outcomes are as follows CSCS 
(44.3%); Custodian (45.4%); SEC (66.6%); NSE (57.1%); Investor (65.2%); Sub-Custodian/Nominee 
(80%); Stockbrokers/Banks (66.6%). The research thereafter selects the sample using simple 
sampling to minimise likely bias after the highly representative sample obtained through stratified 
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random sampling. The sample figures obtained through this technique as seen in Table above also 
ensure that no strata were over represented. The possibility of comparing strata and quality of data 
from participants within different rating also provided a basis to assess the quality of the rating 
system. 
b. Triangulation  
The need to ensure accuracy, consistency, reliability and internal validity informed these 
triangulation methods of personal observation, repetitive questioning and re-contacting 
interviewees. To validate data from the different strata of participants, the researcher adopted 
repetitive questioning of the participants by re-contacting them within each stratum chosen 
randomly until it was clear that no new information were emerging. The researcher also observed 
some randomly selected participants to re-validate data. 
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Chapter 4                  Securities in Nigeria: Fashioning a Framework Part 1 
Securities in Nigeria is one of the most important aspects of law but least studied. Every aspect of 
business transaction is characterised by one form of interest or the other. Within these interests lie 
definitive rights that carry monetary values. As a result, security is perceived by operators and 
investors as a form of collateral and a trading capital of companies from which investors make profit. 
Given the economic nature of these instruments and their perception as a demonstration of 
society’s capacity to store value, its creation and maintenance are regulated by agreement between 
economic actors. The management of the structure and proceeds of such value is the basis of shared 
interpretative divergence. 
Drawing on the Nigerian context, this chapter addresses this interpretative disagreement. First, it 
argues that the whole contradictions in the ‘form versus function’ debate provide a basis for conflict 
within the laws themselves and their application. This chapter also shows how market participants 
are unable to leverage the potentials of the laws to create investment products in the Nigerian 
Capital Market. While highlighting the importance of laws in this regard, it goes further to reveal the 
impact of poor understanding of these products and lack of studies in this area have on their 
development. Therefore, drawing on interview data from market participants and regulators in the 
Nigerian market, this chapter shows a relationship between the interpretative incoherence in the 
definition and poor development of products in the market. Rather than explore this from a 
unilateral causality point of view or a single source, this research highlights the network of 
causalities that draw inspiration from structural incoherence, language or etymological incoherence 
and transactional incoherence. By contrasting the interview data from market participants from 
different levels of competence, this research demonstrates how conflict in the structure of a 
definition can radically inhibit its interpretation and by extension its utilisation for the purpose of 
product development and market liquidity. Second, this chapter uses a combination of research 
tools to show how the adoption of a formalist approach to the conceptualisation of securities and 
under-development of the Nigerian Capital Market. By bringing this often ignored area to light, an 
opportunity is created for a proper engagement with its impact and contributions to the poor 
understanding of securities. 
To achieve these, this research is divided into three sections. The first presents the conceptual 
framework from whence the definition of securities under Nigerian law is examined. It traces the 
history of securities development in the Nigerian Capital Market and evaluates the philosophical 
themes that underscore the chosen approaches and interpretation. It examines the formal approach 
to the definition of securities under the ISA 2007 and loopholes created. The second section explores 
the structure and content of the definition and how it contributes to the incoherence in the 
conceptualisation of securities under Nigerian law. It shows that understanding securities as an 
economic instrument goes beyond their labels. The third section explores the lack of proper 
qualification of instruments identified, lack of coherent definitional structure and lack of context as 
three elements that principally drive the incoherence in conceptualisation. It argues that these 
elements are not so much a feature that cannot be addressed by exploring the language and 
statutory connection, but the presence of formalistic template prevents such contextual 
interference. It relies on interview data to justify these positions and by so doing elucidate clearly 
the impact of the formal approach to poor product development and liquidity in the Nigerian Capital 
Market. 
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4.1                              The Regulatory Model Applicable in Nigeria 
The history of securities in the Nigerian Capital Market is an intricate mix of political interference in 
legislation with its attendant effect on the evolution of several contradictory set of social formations 
that impacts legal rules and their application. At the heart of this unholy alliance is the increasing 
tensions between the objectives of a market and incentives the laws are capable of providing. These 
constraints place significant burden on markets and investors to fashion ways of navigating the 
potent disempowerment that results from weak structural situation of legislation to guide market 
activities. A critical part of this dilemma is the understanding of conflict between form and function 
in relation to the essential ingredients that constitute securities (negotiability). The limited subtlety 
in understanding has left a muse on the question of their relationship. This section addresses the 
conceptual framework of securities by explaining the conflict between the functional and formalistic 
interpretation of legislation through the entire history of securities in Nigeria. 
4.1.1 Statutory Formalism in Nigeria 
The regulatory model and concept applicable in Nigeria is Statutory Formalism. This is explored 
within the context of the language of the definition and structure of the definition in the Investment 
and Securities Act 2007. The legal structure of Nigeria’s definition of securities remains one of the 
inhibiting factors to its effectiveness. The absence of clarity with respect to the operating word 
‘Means’ and components of the definition are key disincentives to the provisions and a vital source 
of incoherence. This has therefore made the definition extremely cumbersome especially when 
construed against the word ‘means’ which envisages certainty and exactitude. The section argues 
and goes further to show that the absence of definition for these operating words makes definition 
meaningless and difficult to interpret. Therefore, the structure of the Section 315 ISA provision and 
its practical application within the market in relation to practices in other advanced markets, show a 
significant disconnect in conceptual approach. This is evident by the following: 
(1) The confusion with respect to the practical use of the definition’s operating words “issue”, 
“transfer”, “holding” and their justification within the market. On the basis of this justification, the 
comparison of their practicality with other advanced markets.  
(2) Through the analyses above, the identification of commonalities and differences. As a result the 
concepts as used in the definition are considered to be insufficient and confusing at qualifying the 
nature and scope of securities. Therefore, has resulted in significant incoherence in the 
conceptualisation of securities.  
(3) Consequently, drawing on the above aspects, there is the need to create clarity in concepts to 
support the development of a new model for Nigeria and West Africa.  
(4) Section 315 does not incorporate Section 304 Part 2 of ISA 2007 
It must be noted that the approach and definitional structure adopted in Nigeria has no replica 
anywhere else other than its slight semblance with the United Kingdom model.379 This presents 
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 The United Kingdom has done a lot more to introduce some level flexibility to its model by cross-
referencing other statutes and introducing flexible rules. The UK has also been able to create several interfaces 
between the FSMA 2000 and other  Laws and Directives 
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significant problems for useful comparisons and precedent. Therefore this section identifies the 
operating components of the Section 315 ISA 2007 definition and addresses them distinctly on the 
basis of how other jurisdictions have utilised their effects to drive functional models.380  
The definition of ‘issue’ above means the concept of issue is effective on the basis of transfer of 
value. This clearly fits the intendment of the economic function of securities. However, reference to 
‘Proposed Issue’ in the Act seems to present difficulties in interpretation. Although the Act has 
nowhere defined what amounts to ‘proposed’, it could be inferred that it may relate to intention to 
issue which could be ascertained from the circumstance of particular cases. Where this is the case, 
the modicum of context is activated. Such activity renders nugatory the effect of any formalistic 
approach which the structure of the definition seems to elevate. These contradictory nuances in the 
definition contribute to the incoherence in the definition. 
“Proposed” in this sense may refer to a point between the Cum Right and the Ex-Right for the issue 
of securities this has not been made clear in the Act. What is certain however is a proposal to issue 
securities to transfer economic value in the form of tradable rights within a security. Those rights are 
however silent in this case of “proposed”. Where this is the case, the Act through that definition may 
be accused of having altered the legal nature of the concept of transfer which is generally seen a 
movement of value or notional value. 
The question of ‘transfer’ which has nowhere been defined by the ISA 2007 is usually measured by 
assessing the interactions between positions and flows.381 This has been useful in gauging liquidity in 
the market. Liquidity measurement (which is a way of assessing the effectiveness of a security in the 
performance of its economic function is usually ascertained through positions and flows. Position 
refers to the level of asset and liability at any point in time. In accounting terms, this shows the 
transformation of instruments on the basis of “issuer” and “investor” actions. This is also the case of 
parties in a trading arrangement of listed securities. The position of the parties may be categorised 
as assets and liabilities on the basis of their investment decisions and legal interpretation of those 
decisions in relation to the structure of the financial instruments.382 Flow on the other hand, is the 
economic action and effect of events within the accounting period.383 In general economic flows are 
described as transactions or interactions between the institutional units that occur by mutual 
agreement and involve exchange of value. In other words, flow is a series of positions over a given 
time or changes of a series of positions over time. We must be careful not to confuse transactions 
emanating from issues flow with re-evaluation of existing issue.384 This therefore means an issue 
must be a new transfer and not subsequent transfer. The difficulties with this definition would arise 
where an issue is achieved for the purpose of redemption of instrument or done in fulfilment of 
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 Even the operating words in the definition of securities (Issue, Holding) when explored deeply neither 
clarifies nor advances the universally known concept of securities (negotiability, transferability). Rather it 
merely leads one to certain conclusion that the definition of security is with reference to certain instruments 
for the purpose of one-off payment 
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 Bank of International Settlement Handbook on Securities 
382
 Scott T. FitzGibbon, ‘What is a Security’: A Redefinition Based on Eligibility to Participate in the Financial 
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conditions for redemption of pre-existing issue.385 This makes the demarcation between issue and 
holding extremely important. 
The concept of ‘holding’ has also not been defined in the Act. The closest mention is where it is 
referred to in relation to a recognised exchange. The basic questions therefore are (1) what is the 
legal entitlement of the holder? Is the holder a trustee of the securities held or a buyer of the said 
instruments from the issuer on behalf of the investors? If the transaction is a sale, can it qualify as a 
true sale? 
These questions strengthen the need to seek further clarifications from the Act on the relationship 
between the issuer and the holder. Since issue can be effective only on the basis of transfer as in this 
case, it raises questions about the nature of the said transfers. The wider point could then be the 
nature of legal relationship between the issuer and holder of which the Nigerian law has not 
provided answers. Therefore the solutions to the above questions could go a long way in validating 
the effectiveness of an issue in relation to the definition or conceptualisation of securities. It could 
also have implications on the changes in the composition of the financial assets held (increase or 
decrease in value as a result of changes in interest rate or exchange rate). For example, the upward 
or downward movements of interest rate could increase or decrease the value and in some cases 
the profitability of debt instrument that have either fixed or variable rates.386 Therefore the holding 
company is in a position to revalue its holding for gains or losses in relation to prices of securities.387 
In the case of foreign currency denominated assets, the holding company is better placed to do this 
re-evaluation against the foreign exchange situation of a particular country.388 This raises the need 
for clarity within the definition of securities in the area of residency of issuer, place of issue or 
holding in relation to the nature of asset held. 
Changes in physical characteristics of securities resulting from political events, destruction of 
ownership evidence, uncompensated seizures (where government or other institutional units take 
possession of the assets of other institutional units including non-resident units) without full 
compensation, for reasons other than the payment of taxes, fines or similar levels” may alter the 
holding structure. In the case of debt securities, changes in financial claims resulting from write-offs 
or unilateral debt repudiation may rupture the character of instruments held by the holder. These 
have not been catered for by the Section 315 ISA definition. Also, changes in sectorial structure and 
classification of securities as a result of changes in the legal status of institutional 
units,389reclassification involving the movement of institutional units from one sector to another, or 
changes in the structure of institutional units themselves, giving rise to the reallocation of assets 
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(which may cause the appearance and disappearance of certain financial assets); have not been 
catered for by the definition. When a Corporation ceases to be independent legal entities because 
one or more other corporation absorb it, all of that corporation’s position in terms of securities vis-à-
vis the corporation(s) that absorbed it disappears. Its position in relation to third parties remain 
contentious especially where corporation’s price changes becomes another issue for 
recharacterisation. The question therefore remains as to the nature of relationship between the 
holder, issuer and investor. 
One other clarity not provided in the definition which has implications for accounting is the failure to 
state the type of holding. There are several types of holding390 where assets are held to maturity and 
those where they are not. Both scenarios have legal and accounting implications. There are also 
valuation implications, especially where valuation at the point of issue is different from valuation at 
the point of holding. This also differs significantly when viewed against the type of product. 
The above issues make it imperative for the definition in Section 315 ISA 2007 to clarify whether the 
‘Issue’ referred to there are for newly issued shares or subsequently issued shares. This is especially 
important when viewed against product issue. For instance, the existence of scrip issue makes such 
character of Section 315 even more opaque. It raises the question of whether this issue is with 
regards to issue of new issue of new shares or reissue of existing shares by way of earning 
capitalisation (scrip issue). 
The confusion inherent is the lack of clear definition on the concept ‘issue’ also plays out within the 
dynamics of products that are created through a series of ‘issuances’, technical redemption and 
holdings.. These include structures like covered bonds, reverse transactions and stripped 
instruments. (a) The reverse transactions for instance, are arrangements that involve the sale or 
change of legal ownership of instruments, with a commitment to repurchase same or similar 
securities either on a specified date or with open maturity at pre-agreed price. Reverse transactions 
have two common characteristics: 
1. A commitment to reverse the transaction on a specified future date or on demand 
2. Although legal ownership is transferred to the purchaser, all risks and benefits of ownership 
remain with the original owner. 
The problem here now results from the question of whether there is actual transfer of ownership 
and the place of redemption in this arrangement. This is important when characterising the 
relationship between “issue”, “transfer” and “holding” of instruments. 
Reverse transactions include securities repurchase agreement (Repos), securities lending and 
sell/buyback transactions. 
It is however noted that commitment to reverse the change in legal ownership in the future at a 
fixed price means that the original owner retains the risks and benefits of changes in the price of the 
asset. The lender or investor still receives the income yielded by the security coupon payments and 
dividends are passed on in the form of manufactured dividend. Accordingly, the economic 
ownership of securities provided under reverse transactions does not change because legal title and 
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economic ownership are distinguished. This approach is only possible in the United States because 
of its functional legal structure that is flexible and context sensitive. 
4.1.2 The Origin/History and Reason for Statutory Formalism in Nigeria  
The development of the Capital Market in Nigeria has gone through several chequered stages 
commencing with the highly formalistic colonial government and culminating in this present stage of 
the process which adopts a mix system, although still heavily weighted towards form rather than 
substance391. Each stage has been punctuated by various institutional challenges brought about by 
various internal 392and external influences.393 It has been argued394 that its creation in the 1940s was 
to assuage the perceived liquidity challenges experienced at that time in the colonial administration 
of their new conquest395. This was against the backdrop of the paucity of revenue derived from the 
sale of agricultural products and the need to stimulate revenue mobility from public sector to fill 
funding gaps noticed from the lull in the performance of the private sector396 (which was largely 
unorganised). Both views however well-articulated, captures the implicit economic benefits derived 
from the colonialist and the people. At least, Nigeria presided over the first legal instrument of loan 
issuance to fund infrastructure within the country which created the framework for the 
development of other stages. 
Stage 1 (1946 – 1956) 
To achieve a burgeoning market that the government craved for, there was the need at first instance 
to secure funding for the development of key infrastructure necessary to run it.  This required 
funding and technical know-how that was not readily available in Nigeria. The colonial government 
developed a 10 year plan pursuant to a highly formalistic Local Loan Ordinance (1946)397 to issue five 
year tenure Government Stock of N300, 000 at 3% to be managed by the Accountant General (1956 
to 1961).398 The ordinance399 empowered the Governor of the colony to issue 8 million pound loan in 
England and 1 million pound loan in Nigeria with repayment secured on Nigeria’s assets and 
revenue. This also included provisions empowering him to set up Loan Development Board (LDB)400 
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subject to approval of funds by the Nigerian Legislative Council. These loans were used to finance 
infrastructures401 within industries in the regions. 
The planning as envisaged by the Ordinance fell below expectations due to multiplicity of agencies 
occasioned by the highly formalist command and control structure with limited flexibility built in. 
This created institutional overlaps, uncoordinated efforts and increased cost of project execution402. 
Excessive top-down bureaucratic bottlenecks, impacted timely access to quality data to facilitate 
project success. This meant every action needed the setting up of agencies to administer them, since 
cross sectorial harmonisation was technically absent in a highly formalist structure. 
Stage 2 (1957 – 1959) 
Despite the failure of the first stage, the Ordinance supported a successful flotation of issued 
government stocks which gave impetus to expansion of the market.  Management of the said stocks 
however had its challenges, especially as it bothered on conflict of interest emanating from duplicity 
in the role of the Accountant General, transparency flowing from non-disclosures of management 
failings with respect to the values of stocks and accountability issues403. This led to the enactment of 
the 1957 Government and Other Securities (Local Trustees Powers) Act which created the position of 
Trustees for the purpose of managing securities. The Act specifically delineated the roles and 
responsibilities of the Trustee including funds which they are allowed to invest in. As a further 
measure, the government inaugurated a Market Development Committee chaired by Professor 
Barback. This committee was vested with specific objectives which included the expansion of the 
products within the market to especially infrastructure that can facilitate dealing in shares, a 
regulatory framework for share transfer and issuance of securities. 
As part of the Professor Barback recommendation, a legislative enactment to regulate the activities 
of the Central Bank was necessary to complement the establishment of a robust securities/capital 
market and strengthen corporate governance. This led to the enactment of the CBN Act 1958, Loan 
Stock Act 1957 and the Statutory Corporation (Guarantee of Loans) Act 1959. All the enactment 
provided the necessary infrastructural framework for the capital market404.  These framework led to 
confidence in the market and increased issuance of securities therein (issuance of N2M 
Development Loan Stock 1959; Government issuance of treasury bills to guarantee short term 
liquidity and plug shortfalls in cash flows pending the receipt of funds accrued. It must be noted that 
all the legislation also had a formal structure that placed heavy reliance on the letters of the law and 
not so much about the function and context. Application was essential. 
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Stage 3 (1960 – 1962) 
In furtherance of the increased confidence in the capacity of the Capital Market to unlock 
investments potentials, the government encouraged the registration of the Lagos Stock Exchange 
under the Lagos Stock Exchange Act 1960. By this Act, members of the Exchange and the Central 
Bank of Nigeria were empowered to deal in financial asset. This led to the 1961 development of 19 
different securities, 3 equities, 6 Federal government bonds and 10 industrial loans. 
Issues around corporate governance and the need to create investment funds to support the market 
led to the development of the National Provident Fund which represented a type of pension scheme 
to act as guarantees towards retirement, cessation or loss of employment due to ill 
health/incapacity. This legislation also empowers the fund managers to only invest surplus funds on 
securities as provided by the Trustee Investment Act 1957. This led to significant problems with the 
demarcations of these securities when housed within mixed funds. There were challenges around 
delineation of funds for the purpose of compliance with the Act.405 The significant cost of 
compliance, potential loss of private sectors’ investment coupled with risk of commingling assets 
that fit or do not fit into the criteria as spelt out by the Trust Act, led to the 1962 restriction of 
securities within the ambit of the Trust Act to those issued on behalf of the government. This 
restriction reduced the market capitalisation and number of products that could be generated in the 
market. With the reduced participation came decrease in regulatory scope; hence the need to unify 
the regulators and the regulatory process. 
Stage 4 (1962 – 1975) 
In 1962, the Exchange Control Act and Trustee Investment Act which addressed the above also 
provided for the creation of a single regulatory body for the capital market. The advent of the single 
regulator led to a consolidation of the entire industry through the enactment of various Acts of 
parliament (The Borrowing by Public Bodies Act, The Companies Decree of 1968 and the Banking 
Decree of 1969). This was followed by the Nigerian Enterprise Promotion Decree 1972. The reason 
for these enactments was basically to create a formidable pricing system and timing in the issuance 
of securities (offer for sale or subscription) and creation of a single regular form of capital market. A 
move from Colonial legislation to Military Decrees may seem significant departure in governance 
approach, but the retention of the highly formalistic legislative language remained a key feature. The 
Military’s ‘Command and Control’ strategy introduced a stronger element and inflexibility. 
Stage 5 (1976 – 1978) 
A sudden change of government in 1976, led to significant shift in policy towards indigenisation as 
part of the recommendations of the Adeosun Industrial Enterprise Panel of 1975. The Lagos Stock 
Exchange was one of the first casualty as it was renamed the Nigerian Stock Exchange. From the 
development of the Nigerian Stock Exchange, 6 additional trading floors emerged. These include 
(Nigerian Stock Exchange, Kaduna 1978, Port Harcourt 1980, Kano 1989, Onitsha 1990, Yola 2002). 
Further to this development, 1978 saw the emergence of the Securities and Exchange Degree which 
took over the role of capital issues commission on the recommendation of the Okadigbo Financial 
System Review Committee of 1976. This panel also recommended more than one exchange and 
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share allotment by SEC. This led to the issuance of the Bendel State revenue bond (7%, N20 million 
in 1978). 
Stage 6 (1985 – 1988) 
As a follow up to this expansion, the second tier securities market was set up on the 15th of April 
1985 to cater for the SME sector. This helps improve the market especially with the flexibility in 
listing requirement and improved enterprise. The responses received led to the promulgation of the 
Nigerian Enterprise Promotion Decree 34 (known as Issue of Non-Voting Equity Shares). 
The above development now empowered public companies in the NSE to issue non-voting paid up 
shares for subscription to portfolio investors whether in or outside Nigeria. The success of the above 
led to the extension of the remit of SEC by Decree No. 29 of 1988406 to review and approve the 
mergers and acquisition activities by companies in the market. This reform however, necessitated 
the strategy of structural adjustment and increase in private participation in the capital market. To 
this end, government embarked on mass privatisation of enterprise the Federal government had 
equity interest in. Increased private sector investment created the need to develop systems to 
safeguard investment, improve monitoring of the financial system and insulate investors against 
default of banks. This led to the establishment of the Nigerian Deposit Insurance Scheme. 
Stage 7 (1990 -1991) 
This provision of safeguards also meant increased regulation of companies operating in the capital 
market. The Companies and Allied Matters Decree (now Act) was promulgated in 1990 to regulate 
the activities of companies from incorporation, management to winding up. Sections 541 – 623 were 
specifically inserted to cater for the administration of securities by the Corporate Affairs 
Commission. These provisions principally dealt with IPOS, securities registration, prospectuses, 
allotment, unit trust, mergers,, acquisitions, takeovers and restructuring. The highly formalistic 
nature and application of these legislations stifled markets, discouraged innovation and engendered 
sharp practices. Regulators were not empowered to sufficiently apply contexts in legal language and 
as such incapable of capturing these evolving sharp practices of operators. 
Barely six months after the promulgation of the Companies and Allied Matters Decree, had it 
become evident that the current legal framework in the market was insufficient to sustain the 
liquidity. The increasing number of distress cases witnessed during this period407 was testament to 
that fact. In swift response the government promulgated the Banks and Other Financial Institution 
Decree (BOFID) No 25 of 1991 to cater for the banks and the entire financial sector generally. This 
was meant to insulate the banks from any possible distress contagion. 
As a follow up to the above, the capital market was further urged by a committee of ministers to halt 
the establishment of more Stock Exchanges and official pegging of securities prices. This was coupled 
with the fact that it became obvious that the Central Bank was ill equipped to carry out regulation of 
the financial market alongside monetary policy and fiscal stability duties. Consequently, the CBN 
1958 Act was replaced by the CBN Decree of 1991. This created greater confidence in the market 
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and led to the issuance of municipal bond (N100 million at 24%) by the Lagos Island Council. While 
confidence returned to the market, investors were not happy with the quality of practitioners and 
transparency of their respective roles.  Capacity of operators was clearly an issue that needed to be 
addressed for the sake of investor confidence. 
Stage 8 (1992 – 1993) 
In 1992, there was the need to regulate the practitioners in the capital market to ensure their 
transparency and confidence. This led to the promulgation of the Chartered Institute of Stock 
Brokers Decree that made it mandatory for brokers to be screened, tested and certified fit to 
practice in the capital market. The entrenchment of capacity building within the market needed 
increased investment in infrastructure to support its activities. This led to the creation of a computer 
enhanced Central Securities Clearing System (implemented through Stock Exchange Management 
System) that supported immobilisation of share certificate. 
The government in accordance with the recommendation of the panel finally unbundled the capital 
market and ended its pegged pricing of securities. As a result, issuing houses were vested with the 
timing and allotment of securities issuance (1993).  Also in the year and as a function of increased 
confidence in the market, States began creating Trust Funds to improve the capacity of the market 
and shore up investments in their respective State.408 Expectedly, these legal developments 
happened under extremely regimented and formalistic structure. 
Stage 9 (1995 – 1999) 
To further boost the market and prevent systemic shocks due to sudden capital flights and allay 
fears of portfolio investors with regards to safety of their investments, there was a need to 
guarantee ease of fund transfer into and out of the country through authorised channels. This led to 
the promulgation of the Nigerian Investment Promotion Decree No 16 of 1995 which empowered 
foreign investors to transfer dividends and net profits in respect of investments, payments of loans 
obtained in foreign financial institutions, remittance of net proceeds of investments in the event of 
liquidation of the company.409 The lack of flexibility discouraged investment transfers within the 
market. 
The weak momentum witnessed in the market despite huge investment in legal reforms led the 
Federal Government to constitute the Odife Panel (19th March 1996) to understudy the market and 
recommend to government the best way to improve its performance.410 Members of the panel 
included Chief Dennis Odife as Chairman, Otunba Ogunde, Dr Ahmed Abdullahi, Alhaji Baba 
Danbappa, Prince Lekan Fadina, Mr O. Abiose and Mrs A Lashmann {secretary}. This committee was 
tasked with terms of reference which included  
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1. A review of the capital market in its current state at that time and advice government on its 
contributions to economic growth.  
2. Assess the objectives of the capital market with a view to identifying its continued relevance 
to the future needs of the country; suggest ways the capital market can contribute to the 
anticipated growth trajectory of the country.  
3. Study the current performance of the capital market and recommend the best possible 
structure that can guarantee it organically comfortable growth.  
4. Assess the adequacy of current structures in place side by side the current economic growth 
trajectory and recommend ways forward.  
5. Review the relevance of all current laws and regulations in place, suggest ways of 
strengthening and incorporate them into a single document applicable to every transaction 
in the market.  
6. Recommend ways of improving the institutions and frameworks that run the capital market 
to make them relevant to the needs of the governance units within the country.  
7. Review the current structure of the Nigerian Stock Exchange and their relevance to the 
privatisation programme of the government.  
8. Assess the current regulatory framework, systems and process to understand their fitness of 
purpose, to recommend ways the capital market can be structured to boost performance 
and meet the demands of all investors.  
9. Advice on the best method to develop an adjudicatory system within the market to 
determine disputes arising therefrom (inter-se or among operators).  
10. Recommend the best method and sequencing of support by government to the capital 
market to guarantee optimum performance.  
11. To make other recommendations they consider expedient to ensure effective alignment 
with the development thrust of government. 
Stage 10 (1999 – 2009) 
The final report of the panel was submitted to government on the 24th of September 1996. This led 
to the enactment of the Investment and Securities Act 1999.411  This Act became the single 
document for the regulation of the entire Nigerian Capital Market and its products.412 It created a 
governance structure with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as the apex regulatory 
body of the market. The Act also empowered SEC to register securities, prevent the issuance of 
unregistered securities 413 and make rules to further its objectives. The language of the Act however 
simple, gave an indication of flexibility and opportunity for the exercise of wide discretion. There 
were challenges inherent in these broad responsibilities of SEC. This included limited human and 
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143 
 
financial resources to provide sufficient protection within their areas of responsibility, the cost 
implications arising from complying with the enormous registration requirements and the perceived 
dangers inherent in the uncertainties or lack of clarity of these registration requirements.414 
These uncertainties emanated from the inconclusiveness of the parameters for delineating what or 
what does not constitute securities within the meaning of the Act.415 There were no clear guidelines 
in the determination of liabilities and responsibilities on the part of investors especially as it pertains 
to Sections 62 and 63 of the Act.416 Apart from securities expressly excluded from the provisions of 
the Act, it also emerged that there were securities within its reach but excluded by omission because 
of their relationship with expressly exempt transactions. The inability of the Act to envisage the 
myriads of products which fell outside its regulatory web culminated in the systemic crisis that 
disrupted the market especially within the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) in this era.417 Even more 
problematic was the fact that SEC Rules lacked the capacity to insert or make non- registrable 
securities within the Act automatically registrable.418 Hence the structure of the Capital Market 
which included the NSE and other Exchanges419 engaged in all sorts of complex transactions (mostly 
by banks) outside the regulatory watch of SEC. The reform of the banking sector in 2000s led to 
fewer banks and increase in their size financially. Their strong balance sheets led to more 
capitalisations of the equity and federal government’s debt market by banks amounting to over 
60%.420 This was further exacerbated by the perception that the NSE head421 was an appointee of the 
SEC Director General,422 increase in insider dealings and share price manipulation. 
The reform of the market to promote collective investment schemes and corporate governance code 
were jettisoned, leading to systemic collapse of the market during the 2008 global crisis. A total of 
260 persons and companies were prosecuted for insider trading and share price manipulation. This 
led to the resignation of the SEC Director General (Alhaji Al-Faki) in 2009 and replacement by Miss 
Arumah Oteh. 
Within this period, the 2007 Investment and Securities Act repealed and replaced the 1999 Act423 in 
an attempt to correct some of the errors highlighted above. While majority of the provision existed 
with slight adjustments, the technical definition of securities was completely overhauled.424 These 
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changes were brought about by shifting dynamics in the Nigerian economy and the need for 
realignment with the capital market.425 
The 1999 Act had presided over a catalogue of structural problems which included difficulties in 
intermediation and capital mobilisation owing to poor product availability in the market. The lack of 
diversified funding, mismatch of risks, made risk management and price discovery extremely 
difficult. Poor product availability was traced to disjointed macroeconomic variables and weak 
regulatory structure which in some sense impacted clarity in product categorisation. This led to 
disproportionate representation of sectors in the market despite the presence of a list of plain 
traditional instruments in the market.426 Whilst the non-availability of sophisticated products 
inhibited risk management, price discovery and transactional efficiency,427little attention was paid to 
the contribution of definitional structure of securities in this regard. Understanding the letters and 
structure of the law is one thing, others include the nature and scale of the market, the level of 
government intervention, market structure and practices, the level of awareness by operators and 
the sophistication of market infrastructure. Therefore, an exploration of the language of the law 
must be contextual in nature to accommodate these internal and external influences. 
This may have informed the use of ‘context’ in the definition of securities under the Investment and 
Securities Act 1999. Although Nnona428 strongly argued against its use on the basis that it promotes 
uncertainty in the legal characterisation of securities, its usefulness cannot be underestimated. The 
basis for such loose definition was actuated by a deliberate policy to leave the field of 
characterisation of these instruments unencumbered so that all sorts of instruments could emerge. 
The ability to review the nature of any instrument by considering the intention of parties and other 
surrounding circumstances promote the development of a robust jurisprudence in the area of 
product development, encourage the creation of a knowledge base in capital market activities, and 
guarantee investors’ confidence because are seen to be what they truly are. 
The Section 264 Investment and Securities Act 1999429 only make an instrument registrable if it 
qualifies as a security. It defines securities as follows: 
‘In this Act unless the context otherwise requires … Securities mean: 
a. Debenture, stocks or bonds issued or proposed to be issued by a government; 
b. Debentures, stocks, shares, bonds or notes issued or proposed to be issued by a body 
corporate or incorporated; 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Other Financial Institutions Act, Nigeria Investment Promotion Act, Foreign Exchange (Monitoring and 
Miscellaneous) Act, Chartered Institute of Stock Brokers Act; Section 312(2)(3) ISA 2007 specifically makes the 
Investment and Securities Act 2007 supreme to all of the above named legislation on capital market matters, 
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c. Any right or option in respect or any such debenture, stocks, shares, bonds or notes; or 
d. Any interest as defined in Section 106 of CAMA 1990; 
e. Futures contracts; 
f. Bills of exchange; 
g. Promissory notes or certificate of deposit issued by a bank which has tenure of not less than 
9 months. 
The functional approach adopted in the Investment and Securities Act 1999 was cleverly interwoven 
with the Companies and Allied Matters Act 1990 which also defined Securities in Section 567(1) as 
follows: 
“In this PART , that is PART A of this Act, unless the context otherwise requires, securities include 
shares, debentures, debenture stock, bonds, notes (other than promissory notes) and units under a 
unit trust scheme”.430 
These definitions had the advantage of placing the enumerated documents within a system that 
required further validation for the instruments to be certified as truly what they are and not merely 
addressed the basis of labels by contracting parties. It had a second advantage of enumerating those 
items that qualify to be considered as securities, subject to context. The presence of context opens 
the doors to the courts to explore the true nature of the instruments and set their yardstick for 
categorisation. The obvious absence of a clarifying yardstick on the face of this provision and dearth 
of case law on the issue opened the door for a myriad of criticisms. The definition was criticised as 
omitting note issued by government and could have not been read mutatis mutandis with notes 
generally.431 Although he tried to justify this omission by stating that notes may have been omitted 
because, they are considered as short term instruments. This did not prevent a wholesale reform of 
the definition in the 2007 version of Investment and Securities Act. 
Section 315 of the Investment and Securities Act 2007 made drastic changes to the definition of 
securities by removing the phrase ‘unless the context otherwise admit’, changing the structure of 
the definition and including more instruments.432 Security is therefore defined as follows: 
“Securities means:433 
a. Debentures, stocks or bonds issued or proposed to be issued by a government; 
b. Debenture, stocks, shares, bonds or notes issued or proposed to be issued by a body 
corporate; 
c. Any right or option in respect of any such debentures stocks; shares, bonds or notes; or 
d. Commodities futures, contracts, options and other derivatives, and the term securities in 
this Act includes those securities in the category of the securities listed in (a) – (b) above 
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which may be transferred by means of any electronic mode approved by the commission 
and which may be deposited, kept or stored with any licensed depository or custodian 
company as provided under the Act. 
This definition could be easily broken down into three subsets. First set looks at the instruments 
themselves that have been identified. These are debentures, stocks, bond issued or proposed by 
government and body corporate. Note that the difference between paragraphs (a) and (b) is with 
reference to government and body corporate. The only distinction between both seems to be the 
mention of ‘share’ in respect to body corporate. The second set of instrument refers to ‘any right or 
option with respect to instruments mentioned in paragraph (a) and (b). The third and final category 
refers to commodities futures, contract option and other derivatives with respect to items in 
paragraphs (a) and (b) above which may be transferred by electronic mode approved by Securities 
and Exchange Commission and which may be deposited, kept or stored with any licensed depository 
or Custodian Company as provided by the Act. The use of ‘or’ between paragraph (c) and (d) is 
instructive. 
For the first category which highlights the instrument, the Act has not defined debentures, notes, 
bonds. It is unclear if this was deliberate. Reference to the Companies and Allied Matters Act further 
accentuates the incoherence in the definition for these products. Although the Companies and Allied 
Matters Act tries to define debentures are generally known as instrument that acknowledges 
indebtedness (debt instruments), their very nature as different from bonds and other instruments is 
very unclear within statute. The reasons for the omission to define bonds, notes, debentures in the 
Act could be deliberate because debt instruments are very dynamic and frequently overlap with 
equity products especially convertible instruments. Debt securities have some close affinity with 
money market instrument and there is a tendency to confuse one for the other. These are potential 
areas of conflict that require legislative and judicial clarity. Therefore defining these instruments 
expressly without set criteria create significant strains in market activities and innovation by market 
participants. It could also be argued that not categorising these instruments may have been done to 
create vagueness and flexibility required to provide sufficient dragnet to capture exoteric schemes 
and at the same time create the needed allowance for product innovation. However these 
contradictions as currently experience may inadvertently contributes somewhat to the definitional 
incoherence of securities. Even where ‘Shares’ have been defined in Section 315 of ISA 2007 to 
‘mean a proprietary interest in the share capital of a body corporate and except where a distinction 
between stocks and shares is expressed or implied, includes stock’, such attempt may invoke greater 
controversy on the conceptual meaning of shares, nature of share capital and the capacity to own 
proprietary interest in company. Therefore, the definition of securities under Nigerian law is fraught 
with structural and conceptual problems militating against the opportunities inherent in these 
instruments to stimulate economic growth. 
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4.2 Identify and Discuss how the contradictions in ISA 2007 creates confusion and limits 
products development and invariably the expansion of Securities Market in Nigeria  
This section explores the structure and content of the definition of securities and how they 
contribute to the incoherence in its conceptualisation. It shows that the understanding of securities 
should move beyond its labels.  This requires a thorough appreciation of their contexts and 
qualifications to ensure optimal usage. There is a tendency to assume that combination of words in a 
definition has no direct impact on the overall meaning and message conveyed. Evidence however 
proves to the contrary; it now settled that a coherent definitional structure is a sine qua non for 
comprehension and practical application. Therefore, this section examines interview data from 
issuers, staff and solicitors of issuing houses, registrar, reporting accountants, bank employees, 
stockbrokers, trustees and trustees’ solicitors against data and information obtained from personal 
observation. This is to show that the formal approach adopted in the definition of securities 
contribute to its incoherence, irrespective of differences in the background of interviewees. 
The Investment and Securities Act 2007434 as a legislation covers various aspects of securities and the 
market. This law is administered by the Securities and Exchange Commission through its rules and 
regulations435. It gives meaning to the Act and advances the objective of ISA. 
The fundamental function of SEC essentially is registration of securities offered by issuers to the 
public. In essence, the combined effect of Sections 54, 55, 315, 75 and 303 ISA create a control 
system that manages public issue of securities in respect of which a proper prospectuses or allied 
document has not been filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission and registered by it.436  
Prohibitions437 captured in the above sections are broad and appears to create a blanket ban on 
public issue of unregistered securities. There should be a justification for the creation of necessary 
guidelines for delineating securities and achieving restrictions on these broad prohibitions. This is 
true given the limited capacity and resources of SEC and the need to galvanise same towards more 
productive specialised uses. There is also the need to ensure that requisite flexibility exist with 
respect to certain securities in terms of requirement for registration. There must exist therefore a 
business case for such exemption as is required in the usual dealing in securities within these spaces. 
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With respect to limiting the scope of registrable securities, this can only be achieved where there are 
clear guidelines for the delineating registrable securities from those not registrable.438 The question 
now rests on what those criteria are for distinguishing registrable securities from other forms of 
instruments within Section 315 ISA definition.439 A further question could be whether the fact of 
qualifying as security so-called, obviates any need to inquire about its registrability or registration 
status? There has always been the added challenge of what constitute registrable securities within 
the meaning of Section 315 ISA 2007 and especially when drafting prospectuses and other 
documents for the registration of securities. There is also the fear of liability for wrongful, misleading 
or erroneous content of prospectus and the risk of re-characterisation of non-registrable ones are 
registrable (Sections 85, 86, 87 of ISA 2007 and other Anti-fraud legislation). One wonders if the 
specific label of parties is sufficient to characterise these instruments without the necessity of 
context. Given the huge negative implications of getting it wrong, it has become imperative that 
clear guidelines be present in the Act to delineate the boundaries for securities and provide better 
guidance about products within and outside these purviews for the purpose of registration. This is 
also true with respect to exempt securities erroneously registered as non-exempt and vice versa. To 
reduce the complexities and narrow the scope of such critical part of this research, this section 
explores the above inadequacies within the purview of ISA 2007 by: 
 Highlighting the challenges with the definition in terms of content and structure 
 Clarifying possible boundaries anticipated by the Act and the difficulties in disclosing these 
delineation succinctly 
 By looking at these instruments that are possibly included and excluded to identify areas 
that could potentially expose them to re-characterisation risks. This is with a view to 
highlighting transactions that could be considered securities when in fact they are not or 
products which have the character of securities but whose transaction disqualifies them as 
securities or where they are, it excludes them from registration. 
 The conclusion 
The approach to this debate first of all addresses the question of delineating the boundaries through 
a strategy of identifying what is generally excluded and narrowing down systematically to the least 
robust of the exclusions (i.e  looking at fully registrable securities but with exemption only with 
certain types of transactions). This paper attempts to explore all the angles captured within the ISA 
2007. 
Mr A. Inyang, a Capital Market Lawyer based in Nigeria and born into a family of stock brokers, 
traders, capital lawyers and investors leads the researcher on an ethnographic voyage into the 
intricate world of securities market, and its pockets of discordant socio-economic and political 
influences. With his twenty-three years’ experience in the Nigerian market, both as a lawyer and an 
active policy-maker, he has a firm grasp of the legal, political, social, cultural, historical and structural 
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issues with the market. He addressed the question of the inchoate nature of the definition by stating 
as follow: 
“The definition of securities under the Nigerian ISA 2007 is influenced by factors that are essentially 
non-legal. The focus on the definition itself from the point of view of international best practice, 
takes away the cultural and religious differences in Nigeria. Certain instruments are undefined 
because of religious sensibilities. The politics of resource allocation and concentration of energies on 
the oil economy are at the expense of legal innovation and development. Politicisation of laws and 
rules making means the agents of enforcement remain subject to political influences. Jurisprudence 
suffers as a result.” 
The rules and laws as it seems, are not the only victims in the politicisation and contradictory 
cultural emasculation of the legal process. Specific language of the Act with regards to the 
conceptualisation of securities is also very vague. This stems from the commencement of the 
definition with the word ‘means’, which clearly has etymological and cultural connotations. Even 
though that was intended to suggest some level of certainty, such expectation is illusive when 
weighed against the entire definition. The first incoherence stems from the reading of the word 
‘means’ against a catalogue of instruments within the definition that were not expressly defined in 
the Act. Apart from shares that were defined in both the ISA 2007 and CAMA, the ISA has not 
expressly defined the debt instruments which were mentioned to include debentures, notes and 
bonds. Also omitted are derivative products like options, commodities futures and other derivatives. 
The definition captures what it terms ‘contracts’ without providing further details.440 
These instruments from a conceptual standpoint are not only meaningless,441 but also confusing.442 
Significant overlaps currently exist among instruments that make them difficult to categorise 
especially on the basis of a single set criteria or what parties intended as distilled from labels. 
Therefore failure to create a framework from which these instruments can be properly delineated is 
both a transactional and conceptual risk. 
The first point to note from the omission occasioned by the above is that the failure by the Act to 
properly define debt instruments within the ambit of the Act. This is a major source of incoherence 
and it goes further to question the legitimacy of agreements that are not catered for within the Act 
in view of absence of judicial interpretation. The important role debt instruments play in financing 
investments for instance; have wide implications for equity market and even money market. 
Investors are particularly interested in knowing the nature of rights created and the possibility of 
issuing subsequent rights on those instruments. The lack of identification and proper qualification of 
the rights warehoused in these products are inimical to the perceptions and desire to deal in them. It 
is important to clarify the sorts of rights that are acceptable with specific classes of instruments. 
Although domestic rules may vary this according to need, there is the need to have an overarching 
framework for identifying what is deemed acceptable in every circumstance.  
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Debt instruments, for instance (notes, debentures, bonds) which have not been defined within the 
Investment and Securities Act 2007 should be explored to understand their true nature to assess and 
contribution to the incoherence in the definition of securities. The lack of classification of these 
instruments carries both real and potential risks. The real risks include limited clarity in their 
issuance and holding activities for data analysis purposes that is critical for fiscal and monetary 
policy formulation and implementation. Also the idea of qualitative categorisation invokes those 
rights of debt securities issuers which are in the form of indentures and covenants (i.e the default 
risk attached to debt securities) which represent credit worthiness assessed against ratings by Credit 
Agencies. 
For the purpose of examining the rights conveyed through debt instrument, it has been argued that 
interest receivables constitute a property income for debt instruments. This raises the question as to 
which rights of this receivable interest is proprietary in nature. There is also a question as to whether 
such rights operate within the realms of property law? This absence of clarifications within the Acts 
or definition of securities raises potential risks for investors. It must be noted that even if receivable 
is seen as proprietary, can the interest rate on receivables also constitute a property or seen as 
having proprietary rights? Now looking at the instruments specifically, does the fact that interest 
rate are fixed or varied alter the proprietary character of debt receivables? These questions formed 
the basis of interaction with two groups of capital market lawyers. They were divided on the 
conceptual nature of interest housed within securities. Mr Adeboye and his group, who have an 
average of eighteen years practice experience in capital market activities, stated that:  
“There were proprietary interests in these instruments. For debts, both the right principal and 
proceeds from interest rate are distinct proprietary rights in a debt investment. The character of 
interest rate does not affect its nature. ’’. “For shares, the right to dividend, residual rights and 
ancillary rights are distinct and separate from the proprietary rights warehoused within the 
instrument. However the nature of these rights is better assessed at the level of application. The 
various types of shares carry varied rights and exercise of these rights is contractual and dependent 
on the companies’ articles of association.” 
While these views may represent the practical position with a lot of lawyers in the market, Mr 
Onochie and his group who are specialists and work as a solicitor to the Issuing Houses for thirteen 
years argue that even where the ISA and CAMA defines shares as proprietary, the incidence of that 
classification in practice is debatable. They say:  
“In as much as the rules governing the rights of investors as well as obligation are provided for by 
contract and to an extent dependent on the type of instrument in issue, the laws do have a role to 
play. Even though ISA 2007 for instance defines shares as proprietary interest, such definition is not 
consistent in practice. The doctrine of specificity alters the very proprietary nature of these assets in 
several ways (1) the incidence of proprietary right is ownership. Ownership cannot be effective 
unless the actual item can be clearly identified and delineated. The absence of specificity leaves the 
rights or interests exposed to the vagaries of multiple claims in the event of solvency. (2) The 
unrestricted exercise of possession, withdrawal, tracing or creation of successive rights is incidences 
of proprietary right which can only be effective when asset is clearly identified. (3) The right to take 
legal action in respect of asset and be entitled to damages are incidences of this. The practical 
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fallouts have not been catered for by statutes defining these rights to property. Differences in the 
nature of securities do not change the character of property rights.” 
The views held by both sets of interviewees seem to paint diametrically opposite categorisation of 
the concept of proprietary right. It is even more worrisome that the Act or even the courts have 
been unable to clarify the exact meaning of this term.443 
Mr A. Inyang gave a good example of when an equity product was developed and the regulatory 
agency approached for registration. “The question of proprietary nature of the instrument was not 
part of the issues I was engaged about during my visits. The concern was more about the name we 
gave to the instrument, rather than their interpretation of it.” 
The Act only defines shares and ascribes same as carrying proprietary interest. Abugu444 identified 
securities as proprietary intangibles. For bonds, a line ought to be drawn between these instruments 
and other types of debts outside the labels that parties place on them. Sometimes the distinction 
between a loan and a bond becomes so blurred that context becomes extremely useful to 
demarcate them for regulatory purposes. 
4.2.1 Bonds:445  
Although not expressly defined in the Investment and Securities Act 2007, bonds generally represent 
long term debt securities that confer on holders the unconditional rights to fixed sum payments or 
contractually determined variable payments on agreed dates at interest specified interest rate. The 
absence of a statutory definition of a bond carries significant risks. Firstly, it prevents or discourages 
a conceptual enquiry into its nature thereby limiting the understanding. As a result, investors are 
weary of its use. Secondly, because of the existence of different types of bonds and the absence of 
statutory demarcation, little opportunity is presented to interrogate its differences, nature and use. 
The question on the nature and use of bonds put to a set of interviewees revealed some of the 
problems of formalistic approach to the definition of securities. Mr Abel Usman a staff of the apex 
regulator views bonds as “negotiable loans”. Mrs Nneka Obi holds an opposing view. She describes 
bonds “as negotiable debt instruments traded in an authorised exchange.” The difference in the 
views held by both parties is one of function rather than form. This explains the basis on which the 
researcher argues that a more towards functionalism is the right step toward understanding the 
components of securities. 
4.2.2 Debentures:  
Despite the statutory definition of debentures by the Companies and Allied Matter Act,446 the 
researcher’s interaction and observation of a team of investment lawyers, stockbrokers, registrar 
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and regulators were quite revealing. Their views of debentures were quite basic and formalistic. 
Everything seemed to point to the statutory definition and nothing more. The level of engagement 
with the interviewees continuously revealed that lawyers are strictly bound to the statutory 
categories and what it provided. Views on debenture are so strait-jacketed excessively procedural 
and points to the instruments as acknowledgment of indebtedness. In an interview with Mrs 
Osemede Aigbokhian explored the substance of a debenture “as a debt instrument is one foot away 
from money market instrument. The nature of specific instruments and the effect it creates is critical 
to this understanding.” On the question of how this plays out in practice, she stated that most of it 
does not really find expression in practical terms because of the regimented legal guidelines on what 
debentures must contain. The critical question therefore is whether the interests or rights created 
by debenture are similar or different from those of bonds, notes and other debt instruments? If not, 
why? If yes, what is/are the basis? 
Section 304 of the ISA 2007 and Part 1(2) of the Second Schedule to the ISA 2007 defines debentures 
as including debenture stock, loan stock, bond, other instruments rating or acknowledging 
indebtedness, not being instruments falling within paragraph 3 of the Schedule being loan stock, 
bonds and other instruments creating or acknowledging indebtedness issued by or on behalf of 
government, local authority or public authority.447 Government and public securities is further 
defined as loan stock, bond and other instruments creating or acknowledging indebtedness issued 
by or on behalf of a government, local authority or public authority.448 
The provision above is very vague. It has not defined debenture specifically or disclose any criteria 
for its delineation. It also refers to ‘other instruments creating and acknowledging indebtedness 
without clarifying whether they are ejusdem generis or separate from the specifically mentioned 
instruments. The use of the word ‘OR’ makes this definition extremely unclear. This leaves investors 
wondering whether ‘OR’ in the definition should be applied conjunctively or disjunctively. Nothing in 
the entire provision of Section 304 ISA gives any indication of the strategic objectives of the 
provision. It is even more confusing where the said Section 304 ISA makes no specific reference to 
Section 315 ISA which is the definition section of the Act. A critical look at the preamble of the Act of 
the various definition sections within the Act make no provision(s) indicating that these Sections be 
read together. Also the continuous use of the word ‘MEANS’ equally makes it extremely difficult to 
input the application of other sections to Section 315 ISA 2007. The absence of court decisions in this 
area, even make matters worse. For instance, Part 2 of Section 304 ISA 2007 itemise activities 
constituting investment business.  These include (1) dealing in securities, (2) arranging deals in 
investment, (3) managing investment, (4) establishing a Collective Investment Scheme, (5) engaging 
in other activities constituting investment business. Nothing in this section makes reference to 
‘Issue’ of securities. Although ‘Offering’, ‘Buying’ ‘Selling’ were used, it may not have issuance. Also, 
there is no reference within the Act linking these provisions to Section 315 ISA 2007. Even where 
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Section 315 ISA 2007 defines ‘dealing in securities’, this provision is not coterminous with that of 
Section 304 ISA 2007.449 
4.2.3 Other Debt: 
This is nowhere defined or clarified in the Act. For a definition that intends to maintain certainty 
especially with the use of the word “Means”, this presents significant conceptual difficulties. The use 
of the word “Other Debt”, cannot be interpreted to mean anything that has the character of debt 
because Section 18(3) of the Interpretations Act450 provides that “the word ‘OTHER’ shall in any 
enactment be construed disjunctively and not implying similarity.” This even raises more confusion 
with respect to instruments that are linked to existing debt instrument or recharacterised as debt. 
As hinted earlier, innovations within the debt market has significantly altered the traditional nature 
of bonds, debentures and notes, to the extent that any formalist interpretation of these instruments 
may lead to regulatory and structural challenges. For instance, some debt instruments now have 
‘Linked’ characteristics. They could be linked to equities or money market instruments. In such cases, 
clarity in their characterisation is extremely necessary. There are also cases where portfolios of loans 
passed through securitised structures assume the cloak of both debt and derivatives. It becomes 
difficult to untangle for legal, regulatory, accounting and tax purposes. These demarcations have not 
been provided in the Act as a market practitioner Mr John Nwaonu, an employee of an issuing house 
in Lagos, hinted in an interview. 
“The traditional criteria for delineating debt instruments from others are changing but our laws are 
yet to take account of these. Before now, a bond is labelled and registered as such if the following 
characteristics are met (1) agreed and ascertainable sum to be issued, (2) board approval for bond 
issuance, (3) the coupon rate, and market to float all agreed. These make it a bond”. 
Mr Amarachi Oyewole of the Securities and Exchange Commission presented a view that seemed to 
capture the mood of his colleagues in the office by stating that ‘we are guided by law as to what 
constitute a debenture whether secured or not. CAMA has always been a reference point …’’ “But 
for bonds, notes we will simply rely on what the parties have agreed in the prospectus but are 
guided by the general nature of debt which is that they must have interest rate tied to a desire to 
obtain investors’ funds for specific project”. 
The views presented by the interview seem to capture the simplistic aspects of debt instruments, 
but neglect the exoteric part of them. Debt instrument have the capacity to comingle. Therefore 
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delineating all securities instruments without identifying specifically the categories they belong to, 
create the risk of incoherence and ambiguity.  
A staff of one of the foremost investment firms in Lagos states that 
“We structure bonds, notes or debenture to carry the following features:  
1. There must be coupon basis with a stipulated periodic interest or coupon payment regime 
during the life of instruments and principal, whether amortised or not, either at par value or 
deeply discounted or even index basis. 
2. Intend that the product is to be issued in the market. 
Once the product is developed in the offer document and presented for issuance and accepted by 
the registration. It is a security to us”. 
Mr A. Inyang contributes to this point when he stated as follows “It should be noted however that 
legislative form may only serve to delineate mono-line instruments. Characterisation of hybrid 
instruments requires functional approach that is flexible and contextual.”451 
The data obtained from the interviewees reveal the dilemma confronting market practitioners in 
delineating the contours of these instruments. Apart from thr issues of proper identification and 
delineation of these instruments, the personal interaction and observation of market participants 
reveal. (1) Limited clarity on the nature of rights conveyed by these instruments. (2) Limited clarity 
as to whether these rights can be created successively and whether the rights exist independent of 
one another. (3) Whether the rights created are all of similar character and transferability. (4) Where 
to draw the line between an equity interests and a debt especially where clarity is needed on the 
difference between a preference share and a debt. 
4.2.4 Share: 
Section 304 Second Schedule Part 1 (1) ISA 2007, defines shares as shares and stock in the share 
capital of a company. Section 315 ISA 2007 takes the definition even further and states the “Share 
means a proprietary interest in the share capital of a body corporate and except where a distinction 
between stock and shares is expressed or implied, includes stock.”452 
On the equity side, the Act only recognises shares. The nature and character of shares has not 
enjoyed the level of qualification that is desired other than an attempt to define what it means in 
the same section. Share under the Act means ‘a proprietary interest in the share capital of a body 
corporate and except where a distinction between stocks and shares is expressed or implied to 
include stock’. Firstly, the use of the word ‘mean’ also runs afoul of the definition that attempts to 
capture some level of certainty at the expense of clarity. To state that shares means ‘proprietary 
interest’ is an admission of certitude to the exclusion of other interpretative possibilities. Secondly, 
by ascribing shares to mean proprietary interest in the share capital of a company raises the 
following issues which to a large extent further compound the incoherence in the conceptualisation 
of securities under the Act. 
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1. What type of proprietary interest?453 Is it with respect to tangible or intangible assets? What 
is its nature and legal effect? At what point do these rights or interests attach to the assets 
and how do they pass from one party to another? 
2. By ascribing the features of property to shares, does that invoke the incidence of property 
law? 
3. If property law therefore does not apply, where is the place of contract and company law in 
determining the legal nature and effect of distinctly different slices of legal rights? 
4. Where is the place of CAMA (statute) in all of this? 
5. Can a shareholder or an investor in shares within the capital market acquire proprietary 
interest in the share capital of a company by virtue of purchase of shares in an authorised 
exchange? 
6. Are shares fungible? Can individual investors acquire an identifiable piece of the share 
capital of a company by virtue of share purchase in an authorised exchange? 
7. Does shares in this category extend to other equity types or merely restricted to company 
share? 
These sources of confusion further heighten the possibility incoherence in the legal characterisation 
under the ISA 2007 and reinforce the need to tackle the conflict between form and function. Mr 
Enoch Oziegbe aptly captures the controversies when he stated his position as is unique to the 
Nigerian legal environment as follows: “The concept of property law has over the years been tied to 
land and physical assets; however CAMA and the ISA seen to have introduced the idea of property in 
intangibles. How this would play out in court is still unclear…”454 
The point raised by Mr Oziegbe above led to a series of disagreements in a group interaction with 
lawyers. Two prominent diametrically opposite views where held by distinct groups on the question 
of where true ownership (proprietary right) lies in a intangible dematerialised shares? The consensus 
was although CAMA and ISA say it exists, but the mechanics for identifying it is unclear. The same is 
true for other instruments, rights and options as captured in the Section 315 ISA definition.  
 
4.2.5 Rights or Options in respect of Shares, Bonds, Debentures, Stocks and Notes: 
Section 304455 defines Options as ‘options to acquire or dispose of (a) investment falling within other 
paragraphs in the schedule; (b) currency of the Federal Republic of Nigeria or any other currency 
traded on the exchange and capital points; (c) gold or silver or (d) an option to acquire or dispose of 
an investment falling within this paragraph and by virtue of sub-paragraph (a) (b) or (c) of this 
schedule. Pursuant to Paragraph 7(a), the paragraphs of this second schedule are (1) shares: shares 
ad stocks in the share capital of a company, (2) debentures: including debenture stock, loan stock, 
bond and other instruments rating or acknowledging indebtedness, not being instruments falling 
within Paragraph 3 of this Schedule – (Paragraph 3 of this schedule being loan stock, bonds and other 
instruments creating or acknowledging indebtedness issued by or on behalf of a government, loan 
authority or public authority), (3) government and public securities: loan stock, bond and other 
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instruments creating or acknowledging indebtedness issued by or on behalf of a government, local 
authority or public authority, (4) instrument entitling to share or securities: warrants or other 
instruments entitling the holder to subscribe for investment falling within paragraph 1, 2, 3 of the 
Schedule, (5)certificate representing securities: certificate or other instruments which confers 
(a)proprietary right in respect of any investment falling within paragraph 1,2,3 or 4 of this schedule 
acquire, (b)any right to dispose of, underwrite or convert investment, being a right to which the 
holder would be entitled if he held any such investment to which the certificate or investment relates; 
or (c) a contractual right (other than an option) to acquire any such investment otherwise than by 
subscription, (6) units or shares in collective investment scheme: units in a collective investment 
scheme, including shares in or securities of an open-ended investment company456 or real estate 
investment company or trust, (8)rights under contract for the sale of a commodity or property of any 
other description under which delivery is to be made at a future date at a price agreed upon when 
the contract is made, (9) or any other forms of investment or capital investment within the meaning 
of investment generally.” 
Even though the provision above seems to cover instruments identified in the Section 315 ISA 
definition of securities, they are however described as ‘Investments and Investment Businesses’ and 
not securities. Secondly, there is no visible linkage or cross referencing between Section 304 and 
Section 315 sufficient to draw useful connections. These are major gaps and a source of incoherence 
in the definition of securities I the Securities and Investment Act 2007. 
Paragraph (c) of Section 315 ISA 2007 specifically provides or includes any right or option in respect 
of shares, bonds, debentures, stocks and notes as securities. A literal reading of this paragraph 
presents an attempt by the legislature to capture all associated trading rights, beneficial rights, 
underlying rights, contractual rights tied to the above named instruments under the definition. 
While this presents a piece of drafting ingenuity, it still carries similar defects of over formalisation of 
statutory definition of securities at the expense of clarity. First, it may be difficult to determine with 
sufficient certainty the rights that are tied to the above named instruments when the nature of 
these instruments is unclear and incoherent. For instance, the ISA 2007 is effectively unclear on the 
position of linked notes especially where such instruments rest on borderline between a debt and 
what the Act seems to refer to as shares (which is still very much inconclusive). Where trading rights 
or beneficial rights attached to these instruments are intended to be issued or traded, does that in 
any way affect the characterisation of the principal instruments as security under the ISA? A 
derivative overlay on any of these instruments in the form of an option seems to have been 
captured here; it is unclear why it was further repeated in paragraph (d) of the definition. 
The risk of asset commingling under this circumstance is not only apparent, but real. This has the 
potentials to limit the level of confidence, reduce trust and lead to a run on the market. As Mrs Audu 
Ibrahim (a stockbroker) puts it, “A share as it is defined in CAMA and ISA is what markets follow. 
There is no need to seek public opinion when we have been told what it is.” 
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Secondly, and on the question of structure in relation to statutory language, the controlling element 
that connects instruments to the issuers is the word ‘Issue’. This happens to be the basis for which 
the legislator attempts to characterise securities under Nigerian law. In other words, these 
instruments are securities until they are issued or there is a proposal to issue them. Two key terms 
have been left undefined. The first is what constitutes a ‘Proposed Issue’ and secondly, when is a 
security deemed to be issued? These questions constitute a vital source of incoherence. The impact 
therefore of this legislative inadvertence or oversight is felt throughout the entire definition of 
securities under the ISA 2007. 
In terms of structure this study attempts to examine the operating words on which the entire 
definition rests. This is with a view to understanding the basis and criteria for categorising these 
instruments as securities. 
Firstly, the use of the term ‘Issue’ is a major source of controversy.457 This terms is not defined 
anywhere in the Act and court decisions. There is also a lack of basic distinction between the term 
‘issue’ and ‘reissue’ which is essential in categorising instruments used in Open-ended Investment 
Schemes.458 The Act seems to have mentioned two issues, the first being ‘government’ in paragraph 
(a) and the second ‘body corporate’ in paragraph (b). These issuers have not been defined with 
sufficient clarity.459 On the first issuer, the type of government referred to in this case is largely 
unclear.460 We have local, state, national, regional and global governments on the one part and 
companies, partnership, trustee on the other part. It also fails to state whether the companies 
mentioned here include regional and global companies’ issue. There is the tendency to assume that 
Section 315 ISA reference to ‘companies’ is with respect to those incorporated in Nigeria under 
CAMA, however what is unclear is the status of subsidiaries of Nigerian companies and partnerships 
arrangements in other jurisdictions. 
Secondly, the use of the word ‘OR’ is another subject of controversy. The statutory and literal use of 
this word has been conjunctive and on the basis of choice between two connected variables. 
However its categorisation and use under Nigeria statute is disjunctive. This is because the Section 
18(3) of the Interpretation Act461 provides that “The word ‘OR’ in any enactment, be construed 
disjunctively and not as implying similarity.” The implications of such disjunctive interpretation are 
discussed below.462 
Thirdly, the question of rights as mentioned in the definition does not clarify if such rights also 
include obligation. The general attitude towards assignability of rights as distinct from obligation 
raises questions whether the distinction is worthy to warrant any differentiation. It is likely that any 
question of right could mean those legal rights that exist within and between these instruments. 
Even if one where to assume that to be useful in examining the provision to see the nature of rights 
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envisaged, the nature of these rights themselves are controversial. This was a subject of debate 
during an interactive session with interviewees. Two prominent but opposite views emanated from 
the discussions. The first was on the question of rights with regards to all instruments identified and 
whether it is possible to conclude that this right is by nature one and the same thread running across 
all instruments. This issue could not be resolved by interviewees as they could not provide any 
statutory or legal basis for their answers. The second question was with respect to the creation of 
successive rights and the capacity to maintain coterminous right on the same instruments cited in 
Section 315 ISA 2007. Both issues where left unresolved. 
Fourthly, the reference made to ‘other derivatives’ is simply unclear. Derivatives in their character 
are a mix of rights and obligations. The mention of option seems to cater for derivatives generally 
and a school of thought holds the view that the entire gamut of derivative transaction is simply a 
series of options contract.  
It is surprising that property that characterise securities are not found in the instruments 
themselves, but seems to be tied to what the instrument is to be used for or the use to which the 
instrument is being put. Micheler463 distinguished ordinary securities from registrable securities. The 
basis for achieving registration is not extricated from the very fundamental characteristics that make 
it security. Registration may be for the purpose of accountability. The instruments, as it may seem, 
should satisfy the characteristics of securities because the need for registration is triggered. In other 
words, registration is not one of the ingredients that make a product qualify as securities. As 
Guillani464 maintained, the ingredients of securities are negotiability, transferability for the purpose 
of investment, what is however unclear is with regards to where such negotiability ought to be 
applied on these products in order to qualify as security. In other words, does it suffice to situate this 
ingredient within the primary market or both primary and secondary markets? Is it about the 
location of transfer or more about the inherent capacity of the instrument to be transferable? 
In Nigeria therefore, an instrument seems to be securities only when it is issued. The question as to 
what constitutes an issue is not prescribed in the definition. Although Micheler465 seems to hold that 
it demonstrates an intention to trade or make the instrument available to circulate in the market. 
Such intention however is not conclusive, as can be seen from various issued instruments that exist 
within captive frameworks. The non-availability of a precise definition as to what constitute issue or 
proposed issue is a source of confusion in defining securities because an issue could be done for 
various purposes (i.e to raise funds to finance business undertaking). Secondly, the lack of clarity on 
the question of ‘issue’ does seem to demarcate between new or initial issue and seasoned or 
successive issues.466 An examination of the statutory meaning of the term issue throws up 
requirements in the prospectus. The absence of a special technique to clarify the nature and extent 
of information that it should entail therefore, is a source of worry. An isolated reading of the term 
would lead to manifest absurdity because of the various forms of issue identified above. These 
include ‘issue’, ‘proposed issue’ and initial and subsequent issue. There are structural difficulties in 
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the inability to untie issues for the purpose trading and one which exist to pay for business 
undertakings. Nothing in the section seems to distinguish ‘issue’ from ‘listing’. It refers to ‘issue’ as 
the only doorway to securities.467 This is different in the United Kingdom as instruments in the 
Official List are registrable as securities irrespective of whether they were issued.468 
The process of issue is different from listing and both have their rules.469 The group interview could 
not come to the basic difference. These practical understanding was to the effect that the purpose 
of bringing products to the market, a securities cannot be listed without first going through the 
issuance process. Mr A. Inyang threw some light into the debate by stating that listing is for the 
purpose of trading, while issuance is for capital raising purpose. All the parties could not confirm 
whether securities could exist and be listed without first going through that issuance process. 
Generally, ‘issue’ is for the purpose of raising capital. The basis for such decision to raise capital and 
the use, for which such capital will be put, becomes relevant. Clearly the Section 315 definition does 
not clarify the purpose of issuance for which approval must be granted to characterise an instrument 
as securities for the purpose of investment. A chat with a member of staff of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission was quite revealing. 
“We generally do not have guidelines on this particular question. Essentially, we look at the nature of 
instrument(s) created and what the capital is to be used for and the borrower”. “We also rely on the 
decision of the Corporate Affairs Commission if shares are to be issued. This is done by looking at the 
Articles and Memoranda of Association, and Board Resolutions”. 
It was found that exploring the nature of the instruments themselves does not go far enough. The 
distinction between issue for the purpose of trading within a market and that for payment as part of 
business operation, raises a fundamental perspective on the delineation of the two types of 
securities. 
“The basic difference as it seems between listing and issue is predicated on the market in which the 
instrument functions. Listing is for the purpose of trading in the secondary market. These are 
governed by listing rules. Issue is for primary market to enable public companies approach the public 
to seek funding. The law has not unified both methods, but practice seems to merge them for 
convenience. A practice which is unsupported by law is a source of worry to investors”.470 
Fifthly, the use of the word ‘transfer’ seems to appear as a verb rather than a noun or adjective. It is 
not whether both terms are mutually exclusive. This has serious implications for the interpretation 
of the term ‘issue’. One wonders if it is all about an action, or the capacity to carry it out.  Secondly, 
there is an ‘Or’ in between paragraph (b) and (c) of the definition.471 This raises two issues and 
produces many possible interpretations outside the contemplation of the provision which seeks to 
achieve certainty by the use of ‘means’. The first context is whether instruments issued 
automatically become securities by virtue of such issue. Views on this very question are divergent. 
Mr A. Inyang thinks that “once instruments are issued, they become securities automatically”. Mr 
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Esele (a staff of Securities and Exchange Commission) takes a different view: “They are securities 
before the actual issuance. This is because the ISA 2007 says so.” Mr Oluniyi, Mrs Odofin and Mr 
Theodore Onu who are staff of Issuing Houses seem to support Mr Esele’s position on this issue. 
They stated “The disagreement over the question of when an instrument is a security, to some, may 
be academic given that the Act already say so. However, a careful examination of the provisions of 
Section 315 ISA 2007 raises several possibilities. But the view from position is that the ISA referred to 
the instruments as securities and we cannot change that position.” If this is the case, a possible 
question would be, where lies the distinction between instruments of payment and that meant for 
investment?472  
The second context is whether the ‘Or’ in the end of Paragraph (c) should be read conjunctively or 
disjunctively from Paragraph (d) of the definition? Section 18(3) of the Interpretation Act473 provides 
that “OR” in any statute shall be read “disjunctively and will not be under any circumstance 
construed as similar. This throws up even more contradiction and implications as stated above. They 
include:  
(1) Instruments specifically mentioned in paragraphs (a),(b) and (c) of the definition are securities 
irrespective of elements in paragraph (d). if this is the case, it therefore means the said Paragraph 
(a),(b) and (c) of Section 315 definition of securities present a confusing picture when read against 
Section 304 of ISA 2007 which referred to the same products as “Financial Instruments.”  
(2) Since paragraphs (a) – (d) instruments are specifically mentioned in paragraph (d) but only where 
such instruments are transferred by means of any electronic mode, deposited and stored with a 
licensed depositary or custodian, it therefore means that instruments that do not satisfy the 
electronic mode requirement are not securities.474  
(3) It also means that instrument not transferred in electronic mode does not qualify within the 
definition of securities under paragraph (d). 
(4) It means the “issue” as applied in paragraph (a), (b) does not apply to paragraph (d) this 
therefore means that instruments can be transferred, deposited and stored with the custodian 
without going through the process of issuance. 
The effect of these implications is that no coherent definition of securities as distinguished from 
financial instruments and no coherent conceptual framework for the delineation of securities across 
the entire definition.475 
Even where it is meant to be read conjunctively,476 how much help does the verb ‘Transfer’ provide 
to the definition in clarifying the very nature of the instruments and providing a coherent framework 
for their characterisation? To what extent an action word ‘Transfer’ that seems to indicate a one-off 
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operation support a descriptive colouration that words used in a definition ought to carry? The 
verbal connotation of Paragraph (d) seems to suggest that instruments become securities during the 
process of transfer. The policy basis for the choice is unsupported in the provision itself. Recourse to 
other paragraphs within the Act and Rules do not seem to provide clarity. The basis for this question 
and its practical importance is seen when a distinction is drawn between ‘transfer’, ‘transferability’ 
and ‘negotiability’. This confusion is further heightened when an attempt is made at distinguishing 
between ‘trading’ and ‘transfer’. 
Transfer of instrument can be achieved within the primary and secondary markets through the use 
of different techniques and vehicles.477 It could be achieved by assignment, trust, novation, or 
through a more complex more of securities entitlement depending on the nature of contract. The 
one-off nature and verbal description of the word ‘transfer’ seems to suggest one of payment, 
rather than the circularity of these instruments which tend to promote and in very many respect 
distinguish instruments of payment from instruments of investment.478 In addition, the lack of clear 
definition of the term within the Act and Rules has created difficulties in appreciating their practical 
and theoretical usages. This is especially the case when weighed against the tendency to treat 
physical movement as constituting transfer.479  
The understanding of the nature of securities laws means that words used loosely, radically alters 
the purpose of the entire provision by creating conflicting signals. Within the context of the 
provision, the transfer of instrument is intended to be achieved through the instrumentality of the 
capital market rules and the ISA 2007. Where this is the case, several issues could emanate. The first 
is ‘Transfer’ is distinct from ‘Transferability’ and nothing in the Act seems to suggest that both are 
similar. If the argument on transferability remains hazy, it will be difficult to draw its close 
association with negotiability. Secondly, the purpose of the said transfer is also not disclosed. 
Clearly, there are distinctions between transfer for the purpose of payment and one for investment. 
Thirdly, the thresholds for such transfer, the nature of transfer, the vehicle used for the said transfer 
have not been disclosed. This shows the inchoate nature of this provision. Lack of clarity on the 
question of purpose, seems to have pervaded the entire provision and paled it into insignificance. 
This question of transfer led general discussion with about sixty-seven interviewees on different 
occasions to sample their views on the legal entitlement of the custodian in relation to the investor 
with respect to the securities. Thirty-four interviewees were of the view that custodian is a trustee 
to the investors with respect to those asset, while investors are beneficiary. The other thirty-three 
see the custodian as mere agent for the owner with respect to dematerialised securities. From 
observation, the nature and structuring of this relationship under Nigerian law remains extremely 
unclear. Mr Haruna posits that “One of the problems we have with understanding the legal 
entitlement of the custodian is with respect to lack of clarity as to the model currently adopted by 
                                                          
477
 Egon Guttman; Thomas P. Lemke, The Transfer of Securities in Organised Markets: A Comparative Study of 
Clearing Agencies in the United States, Britain and Canada 19 Osgoode Hall Osgoode Hall L.J 400 (1981) 
478
 One-off payment indicates a single payment for items purchased or services rendered. This has the 
regulatory effect categorising such transaction as payment and therefore outside the regulatory ambit of the 
Investment and Securities Act. In other words, the ISA 2007 was enacted to regulate securities as investment. 
Therefore any such transaction does not qualify as securities are automatically excluded for purposes of 
registration. The incidence of securities is that it must be structured in such a way that it is made to circulate 
continuously in the market for liquidity enhancement, capital formation and price discovery. 
479
 Such omission in the definition of the term “Transfer” has the capacity to blur the distinction between 
transfer for the purpose of payment and one which is intended for investment. 
162 
 
Nigeria. It is unclear if Nigeria has moved away from the English Trust Model”.480  Such difficulties 
now leads to challenges in the third contextual interpretation that may arise on the question of 
whether such transfer must be held by a custodian known to the exchange for it to qualify as 
securities. In other words, whether holding by a custodian known to the exchange is a material 
condition in all cases for an instrument to qualify as security? The lack of certainty and clarity in this 
interpretation throws up several practical and regulatory issues. These include: 
a.  Does it take a custodian to hold these instruments for them to be characterised as 
securities? 
b. Does it matter that the custodian is a 3rd Party to the transaction? 
c. What is the legal relationship between the issuer and the custodian? 
d. Does it matter what the custodian does with these assets being held? 
e. Does the activities of the custodian with respect to the asset contribute or factored into the 
characterisation of instruments held? 
f. Does the provision attempt to reduce the position of a custodian to one of intermediary or 
promoters akin to the United States’ Investment Contract Test?481 
The fact that no clear answers have been provided to these questions, every attempt to conceptually 
and practically delineate instruments of payment from those intended as investment have been 
difficult. This lack of demarcation has created significant risk aversion to the market as the head of 
an issuing house in Nigeria aptly put it. 
“The lack of clarity in this area has constrained operators to seek only those products that are simple 
and similar to those already known and approved”. 
 “We try not to be too ambitious in designing these products because the risk of getting it wrong far 
outweighs the benefits one may get from being innovative”. 
“Investors are extremely sensitive in this clime. We try not to overstretch their appetite to engage us 
in the market”. “Investor education might help to increase participation. Trust is also a factor here 
especially given several market failures due to infractions.” 
“There are greater incentives to operate outside the market than being in it. The decision to invest 
through the market must not be taken lightly”. 
Apart from the views of operators in the market, personal observation revealed that even though 
there are incentives outside the market sufficient to discourage investment through products in the 
market. A sizeable proportion of investors in the market are those who are either well known 
international brands, or those companies in the oil and gas sectors, or those close to the 
government of the day and uses the market as a vehicle to access government patronage. This 
handicap has far wider implication for the capital market and the economy as a whole. The capital 
market should be a market place for investors to meet their investment objectives. It should support 
the economy with its intermediation role by allocating long term capital efficiently and effectively as 
Mr A. Inyang puts it in the interview – 
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“The Nigerian Capital Market has not been very prominent in playing its role in our economy because 
it is stuck to traditional practices, weak and politically weighty regulation, government patronage 
and mono-products like plain vanilla equities and government treasuries. These do not cater for the 
broad requirements of investors. We have been in situations where we have been constrained to 
realign investors need to what is available in the market rather than push the envelope for new 
products.” 
 
4.3                         The practicalities of the language structural incoherence 
This section specifically discusses and in some compares the statutory structure of the 2007 Act and 
the 1999 Act to understand the implications of the word “Meaning” as used in the latter. Also an 
attempt is made to explore the nature of “Meaning” in the 2007 Act and how its impact shapes 
relationship between Section 315 of the Securities and Investment Act and Section 304 ISA 2007. 
The experiences of Mr A. Inyang are the prism through which the author navigates the legal terrain 
of law and language in the securities market. It forms a pivot to both explore the thought, process of 
lawyers and other market practitioners and at the same time validate or contradict the personal 
views held about the operations of language and characterisation in legal interpretation and 
application. 
4.3.1 Language:  
This study looks at the practicalities of language of the law and its effect, the combination and 
interpretation of language and their effect, the way language influences the structure of institutions 
and levels of legal compliance, and how the language of the law filters through into contracts that 
securities represent. An understanding of this effect would open a window to proper 
contextualisation of the formalist and functionalist approach to legal interpretation. 
There seems to be no clear demarcation between ‘Securities’ and ‘Registrable Securities’ for 
practical purposes. Nnona482 examined the registration of securities from the point of view of section 
264 of the 1999 ISA. While he attempted to demarcate the contours of instruments for the purpose 
of registration, the very ingredients that make them, securities were ignored. 
In as much as registration still remains the control measure483 exercised by ISA to regulate securities 
there must exist requirements expressly or by implication to delineate what constitute securities 
from what is not. ISA Sections 75484 expressly prohibits the transfer, issuance, sale, offering for 
subscription or sale of securities as defined by the Act. This raises the vital question of what 
constitute securities. Section 315 ISA 2007 provides a blanket rather than a specific definition of 
securities by simply listing what it means. This definition will be explored keenly to identify its scope 
and limitations. 
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Paragraphs (a) (b) (c) of this definition were directly lifted from Sec 264 of the ISA 1999 with slight 
modifications.485 There were also difficulties associated with the interpretation of the section in the 
1999 Act because of the absence of guidelines as to what creates or regulates the various context 
and frameworks used in the identification of context.486 
The removal of the phrase (unless the context admits) in the 2007 Act, even though leaves the 
definition with some measured certainty; there are obvious problems with the use of the word 
‘meaning’ as replacement. It is unclear therefore whether ‘meaning’ within the provision means that 
no context is admitted or whether where it exists, it lacks criteria for rationalisation. In other words, 
could such limitations or restrictions placed by the word ‘meaning,’487 absorb no extension to the 
definition that the Section gives to the definition of securities? It is however worthy to note that the 
nature of securities resist compartmentalised approach in the understanding of its scope and 
operations. There are potential challenges in this method as it runs the risk of excluding vital 
components of a security instrument by the mere fact of a crystallised definition.488 The practical 
challenges are herein explored in numbered paragraphs and in line with the manner the definition 
has been structured. 
Paragraph (A) – Debentures, stocks, bonds issued or proposed to be issued by a government 
Although this paragraph does not give full details of the government in question, Section 315 of ISA 
2007 has defined government security to mean ‘security which are direct obligation of and 
guaranteed as to principal and interest repayment by the Federal Government of Nigeria or a State 
government’. While one might read the definition of government security as constituting or 
explaining this paragraph, reference was however not made to this paragraph in that section 
especially where it seems to have used the word ‘…issued by a government’, which could include 
government of Nigeria or outside Nigeria. The question of clarity in this area was a subject of 
disagreement amongst interviewees. While majority of opinion agreed that this question has never 
arisen within the context of work, given the size and non-sophistication practices in the market, this 
is a potential problem that could affect investors and operators as market begins to develop. Mr 
Onose agreed with Mr Inyang when he called this “An inconsistency time bomb that is self-limiting” 
“Who says we cannot open up our laws to accommodate a variety of issuers? Why is our law so 
limiting and closing the door to participation? Why is it so undemocratic? These statements explain 
the nature and capacity of legal language to create inactivity and curtail market participation. Such 
limitation extends from the issuers to the instrument themselves. 
This paragraph, even though identifying debentures, stocks, bonds, has omitted notes.  It is not clear 
why stocks are included and Notes omitted. There are uncertainties as to whether this suggests an 
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express exclusion of notes issued by government from registration.489 Nnona490 suggested that the 
Act might have read bonds loosely to include Notes. There is however no evidence to suggest this is 
the case because in paragraph (b), ‘bonds or notes’ was expressly mentioned. Even if wanting to 
suggest interchange-ability of both instruments, they were all the same captured in the paragraph. 
A basic question could therefore be whether such omission might be attributed to the general 
feeling by the review panel of ISA that governments have limited appetite for notes issuance and 
therefore may have decided to exclude them all the same? Another suggestion is whether it was a 
deliberate exclusion as a quid pro quo to the government’s regulatory support in other areas of 
enforcement? The basis for highlighting this anomaly is in the challenge and inability to differentiate 
a bond from a note for purpose of registration. The discussion of Mr Aaron Ihide, a staff of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission is quite revealing – 
“Notes generally seen as short term instrument and this reason, do not factor strongly on 
government investment horizon”491 
Exploring Mr Onose’s view in relation to that of Mr Inyang reveals a subtle disagreement. Apart from 
the fact that SEC seems to have no direct powers over instruments issued by government, the 
silence about notes with respect to governments is unexplained in the Act. Instead, the researcher 
observed that government places heavy reliance on government bonds and treasury bills to fund 
Nigeria’s current account deficit. This raises the question of whether the government could by this 
omission in the Act be underestimating the importance and potentials of notes. Again, could the law 
by such omission be inadvertently curtailing the development and growth of notes in the Nigerian 
market? These questions had no answers from the interviewees; however personal observation 
shows limited understanding of notes and their potentials within the Nigerian market. 
Paragraph B – Debentures, stocks, shares, bonds or notes issued or proposed to be issued by a body 
corporate 
This section deliberately includes notes issued or proposed to be issued by body corporate. It 
removed the word ‘unincorporated’ used in Section 264 of the ISA 1999. This thus suggests that the 
omission of note in paragraph (a) was deliberate and intended to be excluded from registration 
requirement. It also suggests that notes issued by government are distinct from notes issued by 
body corporate. It also shows that notes issued by unincorporated entities are also expressly 
excluded by the ISA 2007. This omission is further elucidated by absence of promissory notes, 
certificate of deposits and other interests defined by Section 106 of the Companies and Allied 
Matters Act 1990 as was the case in the ISA 1999. 
It is clear that notes in this regard refer to those issued by corporate bodies. This therefore means 
that notes of unincorporated bodies are excluded but does not state what would happen in 
circumstances where the notes are issued by unincorporated entities with significant exposures to 
corporate bodies or vice versa. Section 315 of ISA 2007 has not defined incorporated or 
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unincorporated bodies. CAMA lays out the procedure for incorporation of companies and 
incorporated trustees in Part B and C respectively. What is however unclear is what unincorporated 
bodies entail. It is not certain if a partnership as incorporation where it is created to facilitate 
investments between two incorporated entities. 
It is unclear if notes generally would include promissory notes. If it is the case, then one would 
further question the logic of its inclusion in paragraph (g) of the ISA 1999, despite the inclusion of 
note in paragraph (b) of the same Act and outright exclusion altogether from the 2007 Act. It is also 
not certain whether to draw a distinction between promissory note and government note since both 
are short term obligations and backed by either government revenue or banks with strict guidelines 
especially for the purpose of determining what is included or excluded from registration. These are 
the uncertainties that pose significant challenge to a regular determination of what is registrable as 
securities. It also appears that the parties issuing the securities under the 2007 Act technically 
determines whether such securities are excluded from registration requirements or not. This is 
especially true of paragraphs (a) and (b). This position is slightly different with respect to paragraphs 
(c) and (d). In other words, individual issuances are more likely to be excluded more than corporate 
and certain governments. It is unclear the policy justification for this. Nnona492 attempts to provide a 
policy explanation thus: 
‘Since promissory notes and government notes are short term debt obligations issued by entities with 
the highest credit rating, government because they are backed by the credit of public revenue and 
banks because they are subjected to strict guidelines and supervision of the Central Bank, it thus 
makes sense to permanently exempt these securities from ISA registration by not including them ab 
initio in the definition of securities. In deed Central Bank supervision and prudential guidelines 
provide a regulatory regime for banks parallel to the regulatory regime for the securities 
administered by SEC. The supervision is aimed at ensuring the financial soundness of banks and thus 
provides some assurance to the investing public that the banks whose securities they purchased are 
not fundamentally impaired’. 
Nnona493 should have at this point drawn a clear demarcation between exemptions as provided 
under Rule 8 of SEC Rules494 and outright exclusions. The lack of clarity in this area creates 
uncertainties that affect investment decisions. 
There are difficulties in the wholesale admittance of individual/corporate criteria as the determinant 
of inclusion or exclusion from registration. This is because every corporate entity has individual 
components as its constituent and beneficiary.495 This exposes the fallibility inherent in hinging 
registration of securities on the balance sheet status of corporate entities alone. The several 
possibilities that exist with regards to the application and management of securities make a binary 
categorisation ineffective. Therefore, securities are an amalgam and conceptual embodiment of title 
and transactions existing side by side. 
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Figure 14 - Multifaceted Framework for the Categorisation of Securities 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Figure 14 above shows the fundamental questions and problems that could arise when an attempt is 
made to categorise securities on a binary basis. This problem could be practical and conceptual. For 
the practical issues as observed in the field, (a) there is lack of technical clarity between transaction 
and security. This has accounting, tax and regulatory implications where an attempt is made to 
separate securities and non-securities proceeds and profits. (b) There are no delineating factors to 
separate exclusions from inclusions in the determination of transactions as distinct from securities. 
For the excluded securities, it is unclear the impact an included transaction would have on its 
excluded nature. (c) On the conceptual and more practical front, there is also uncertainty as to the 
exclusion nature where a duly authorised operator on a particular excluded security engage in an 
included transaction or unauthorised operator engages in excluded securities participate in included 
transactions. (d) There are also issues with respect to product not considered as security now used 
by either authorised or unauthorised operator in a non-exempt transaction. (e) For the non-exempt 
securities, the basis of the non-exemption should be clarified. There should also be clarity as to its 
nature where it includes either excluded or included transactions. (f) Finally, the issues around a 
comingling of non-exempt securities with exempt transactions carried out by either an authorised or 
unauthorised operator also needs exploring. In order to clarify these anomalies, it is important to 
put the concept of securities in perspective. 
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Paragraph C – Any right or option in respect of any such debenture stocks, share, bonds or notes or 
This category does not seem to disclose the category of issuing party. It therefore means that it 
could be a segment that caters for individual issuance. The word ‘any right or option’ seem to have 
been omitted from paragraph (a) and (b).496 This was however captured in paragraph (d) that made 
reference to paragraph (a) and (b). Interestingly, such reference was not to securities as standalone 
but one transferred in electronic mode so approve by SEC and stored with licensed depositary or 
Custodian Company provided under the Act. It therefore becomes doubtful whether paragraph (d) 
only applies to (a) and (b) by reference to it being in electronic form only or inclusive of the form 
indicated in paragraph (c). 
If the discussion above is anything to go by, there is then however, insufficient evidence to suggest 
that paragraph (c) refers to all categories of issuers. It is also unclear whether the provision applies 
to other paragraph specifically or collectively. What creates the level of confusion however, is the 
use of the word ‘or’ after paragraph (c). It is unclear if this used conjunctively or disjunctively. It must 
be noted that ‘or’ was not used in the preceding paragraphs. In the case of conjunctive construction, 
this could mean that the effect of paragraph (c) must be read into the meaning of paragraph (d) with 
the attendant confusion as to the absence of supportive linkage to justify a combined reading of 
both paragraphs.  Given the unique nature of most securities, there is the temptation to read both 
paragraphs together in order to achieve scope and wider coverage of all securities, but such 
wholesale construction could potentially run the risk non-registration or over registration with all its 
enforcement difficulties. Also, if they are to be read disjunctively as the Interpretation Act seems to 
suggest, it will lead to even greater confusion because both segments of the provision run the risk of 
dismemberment. This means both segments of the provision will then be made to stand on their 
own weight. 
Equally disturbing is the non-definition or description of the term ‘other derivatives’ as captured in 
paragraph (d). There is however no obvious explanation for such definitive omission. A possible 
inference could be the creation of a window for numerous guess work or assumptions as to what 
constitutes ‘other derivatives’ in order to cover the field. The problem seems exacerbated by the 
absence of securities specifically listed in paragraph (d) within the definition in paragraph (c). This is 
even where the nature of those described in (d) seems to differ considerably from the securities 
captured in paragraph (c). The result of such omission has led to two conflicting scenarios. The first 
one is whether paragraph (c) if read disjunctively is meant to exempt individuals from 
registration?497 If this is the case, it is therefore unclear whether such position is tenable when read 
conjunctively with paragraph (d). That is, would individual issue still enjoy exemption status where 
such securities satisfy the requirement of paragraph (d)? If this is the case, does it not bring 
individual exemption within the registrable category by virtue of the connection between paragraph 
(d) and paragraphs (a) and (b)? How can connections between paragraph (a), (b) and (c) justify the 
character of securities when “OR” is read disjunctively? All interviewees simply did not know the 
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likely effect of this lack of certainty in registration and exemption. Mr Adelaja’s comment stood out 
“In all honesty, I have never thought about this in my seventeen years as a lawyer in the capital 
market. The courts are yet to visit this area. This is a potential problem.”498 
Apart the obvious admissions by Mr Adelaja and colleagues, there are manifest practical problems 
with the confusion as to conjunctive and disjunctive interpretation of paragraphs (c) and (d). They 
include: 
 Lack of clear determination of a coherent framework for the characterisation of securities 
under Section 315 ISA 2007. 
 A shift from the functional to formal categorisation of securities issues especially where such 
securities are somewhat separate from the rights or options appertaining to them. This may 
result in confusion in terms of product and proceeds therefrom.499  
 The above regulatory distinction increases the understanding of the nature of securities but 
limits ones comprehension of the character and capacity of the issuers to manage them. 
 The nature of registration and the status of successive rights that are subject of the 
instruments mentioned within the Act and where they arise are not clear 
 The formalist approach adopted in the Act now makes the exempt or non-exempt nature of 
individual securities even more confusing. 
As stated above, the interpretive difficulties associated with the entire provision have registration 
and enforcement implications. This has therefore heightened the need to encourage robust 
characterisation of instruments to ascertain their true status to allay investors’ concerns.  
The desire to achieve a well-rounded definition of securities and the perceived difficulties at 
sustaining an all-embracing definition within statute has necessitated judicial explanation of the 
concept. Investors, regulators and operators in the market have however shouldered the pains of 
lack of an all-embracing definition of securities especially given the heightened risk derived from the 
nature of securities.  The potency of such dangers is made manifest where they seek access to funds 
of others in situations where the fund owners exercise no control over where their funds are 
committed. 
The Nigerian court have not had the opportunity of attempting a definition of securities for the 
purpose of determining a framework of what is registrable from what is not. Even foreign decisions 
that enjoy persuasion status in Nigerian legal jurisprudence seem to be at crossroads over the same 
issue. The Supreme Court of the United States in SEC v W.J. Howey &Co500 attempts to clarify this 
point when confronted with the determination of whether a sale of plots of citrus groves to 
investors coupled with a servicer agreement between the purchaser and seller, amounts to a sale of 
an investment contract and whether such sale infringed Section 5 of SEC Act 1933 – which prohibits 
such sale without registration. The court defined an investment contract as ‘a transaction or scheme 
where money invested leads to expectation of profit solely from the effort of promoter or 3rd party’. 
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However, a later decision by the same court Landreth Timber v Landreth501, watered down its effect 
as merely a characterisation of investment contract and not securities. 
From the foregoing, it is unclear how both cases clarify the unique nature of securities.502 This is true 
especially where a wholesale application of Howey’s case has the likelihood of different outcomes 
(while it has a tendency to include some product, others could be excluded). A mixed result from the 
application of this rule increases the level of uncertainty currently experienced. What is the likely 
outcome in situations where products encapsulated in Sec 315 meet the specification of Howey test 
but are excluded by virtue of the fact that the Act considers it not a security? What happens in 
situations where the Act considers a security as registrable but not covered by Howey test (as in the 
case of Notes)? Can SEC rules as subordinate legislation overreach the ISA on what amounts to 
securities for purpose of registration? These questions raise the issue of context which was present 
in the 1999 Act but removed in the 2007 ISA to relieve the provision of its restrictiveness (as was 
criticised). However, even with such removal, issues of context still surfaces especially where the 
determination of what is securities from what is not for the purpose of registration is clouded in 
uncertainty. 
Nnona503 suggests that the usefulness of context as an interpretative factor given the unique nature 
of securities is to ‘provide a subsidiary mechanism for capturing items which though not formally 
qualifying as securities but implicate the very investment dangers for which securities are regulated’. 
In other words, Howey test would instinctively strike down a transaction as registrable even when 
not captured by the Act. Such an action has the potential of not just further tightening the regulation 
around securities (product), but also increasing the level of uncertainty with respect to what they 
court could likely strike down as registrable. Further difficulty essentially is with respect to the 
uncertainty and lack of clarity the Howey test criteria present. It would therefore be absurd that any 
contract which potentially has a third party benefit is automatically struck down as registrable. Also, 
Howey test did not draw the distinction between the types of issuers in the determination of what is 
registrable. This seems to have been left to the context of such transactions and discretion of the 
court. 
With the emphasis on context by the court, it seems that statute merely abandoned the 
determination of context to the court. One wonders the benefit achieved from such abandonment. 
From the analysis therefore, the removal of the term ‘context’ has not simplified the definition of 
securities within the Act. It has only abdicated terms that should ordinarily secure a restrictive 
definition for a broader one while increasing the level of uncertainty within the statute and the 
courts. 
So therefore, does taking us back to the definition of securities as those listed instruments and their 
derivatives issued by either corporate or government in paper or electronic form satisfy the 
intendment of the Howey test? In other words, are the courts free to re-characterise transactions as 
constituting securities under ISA notwithstanding they are unlisted or fall outside those listed in ISA 
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2007? Does the wholesale interpretative discretion granted to the court represent the usefulness or 
importance of context? Has the removal of the phrase from the 2007 Act achieved the purpose 
intended? 
Nnona504 argues that issue of context is not just about the underlying reality of the transaction or 
investment in terms of the Howey test criteria, it also must be interpreted to take account of the 
relationship between investment, transaction and others elements not specifically mentioned in Sec 
315 ISA 2007. If this is the case, there is therefore a logical case to assume that those other elements 
not mentioned in the Act as constituting securities are excluded for the purpose of the court. It is 
unclear if the courts will be willing to exclude simpliciter, even though the intention of the legislature 
in expressly mentioning some securities in the Act, discloses on their part, the desire to exclude 
those not mentioned from the definition of others. It is now becoming clear that context is material 
in determining securities especially where an extraordinary case has to be made for any novel 
securities that may be dissimilar to well established ones. 
If the above is true, one wonders how paragraphs (a) are (b) are catered for within this scheme. 
Whether they can be read conjunctively to include this principle or disjunctively to achieve an 
acceptable premise? This raises further issues as to the nature of legal treatment especially where 
there is the absence of certain features and the court is called upon to expunge an aspect of a 
security as not conforming to the Howey’s Test. How then will the court accommodate semantic 
errors in its determination of items that constitute securities for the purpose of the Howey’s Test? 
Does the label that issuers place on the securities represent its true nature? What other guideline(s) 
is/are available to the court in making this determination? These are questions that came up during 
the interview session with recognition that the ISA 2007 cannot be of much help especially when it is 
far more recent and out of sync with CAMA 1990. Mr A. Inyang also recognised this challenge when 
he stated “I am not so sure of how the courts will interpret concepts, words, phrases and the entire 
language of the Section 315 ISA definition of securities provision. The opportunities opened to 
explore deeply what various concepts are about, seems to be unsupported by the provisions within 
the Act and other enactments. Mr Olawuyin, while agreeing with Inyang, made the suggestion that 
“At least reform is needed because investors want to see CAMA complement ISA to ensure market 
certainty and clarity.” Mr Ihide further posits that “It may be difficult to adopt a test at this stage. 
The system in operation will determine whether the Howey Test is suitable for the Nigeria 
investment environment. The basic requirement for registration and exemption are followed 
religiously and on instrument by instrument basis.” 
It must be noted that such lackadaisical approach to managing the process reduces the level of 
understanding of the nature and capacities of these instruments, it limits the regulators opportunity 
to carry out effective regulation and oversight and in some sense understand the nature of exposure 
of these instruments. A look at certain products and transactions for instance, would give an idea of 
their legal implication when before a court. 
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‘A house developer’s sale of property interests in a housing project to purchaser, with the expectation 
of financial returns to the purchaser through the active management of the project by the seller 
would not involve securities, given what has been sold are not stocks, shares, bonds, notes, future 
contracts or others as enumerated in Sec 315’.505 
What is however unclear is how the court would characterise a situation where consideration for the 
servicing agreement is in the form of equity in the housing project or a release on a prior debt 
obligation or a setoff of pre-existing obligation. Would the case be different if the exercise of the 
above servicing agreement is contingent on options tied to the housing project? This raises serious 
legal arguments. The graph below represents the nature of response received. 
 
Figure 15 – Graphical representation of responses to practical application of Section 315 ISA 2007 
 
 
Key to Figure 15 above 
Series 1 – represents stockbrokers and staff of CSCS in the Nigerian Market 
Series 2 – represents regulators of the Nigerian Market 
Series 3 – staff of Issuing Houses, Trustees and Lawyers 
Series 1 which is coloured blue represents 
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Figure 16 – Analysis of Figure 15 
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This data shows in Figure 16 that the variability in views when it comes to interpreting the language 
of the Section 315 ISA definition is more pronounced with practical scenarios. 
Considering the definition of securities and the view canvassed in data above, the court might have 
issues contending with interpretation especially where notes and other instruments issued by 
government or corporates are not covered or defined by the Act. This difficulty operates on the 
presumption that paragraphs (a) and (b) are read disjunctively. 
There is another scenario ‘where a property company sells unit of stocks to investors with the stock 
being expressly stated to entitle the purchaser to no more than a right to personally occupy the 
allotted apartment, with the investor having no right to let the apartment to 3rd parties. The number 
of stock purchased by each investor is important in determining the size of the apartment to be 
assigned to him’. This circumstance has the same effect as the former where the Act is not so explicit 
about the characterisation of these instruments. Nnona506 argues that ‘’notwithstanding the use of 
the term ‘stock’ here, the reality of the transaction is that it is no more than a consumer transaction 
in which the investors have no expectation of profit from the managerial efforts of another, but 
rather an expectation of use and enjoyment of a definite consumer item –an apartment. Therefore, 
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the use of the term ‘stock’ in these circumstances would be a semantic error and the court might 
want to strike it down as security under the Howey Test’’. 
From the above scenario, it is difficult to rationalise how expectation of use and enjoyment of 
premises cannot be quantified in monetary terms to sufficiently fall within the reach of the ISA’s 
registration requirement of items expressly listed as securities in paragraph (a) to (d) of the 
definition in Sec 315 ISA 2007.507  Indeed, the prospect of this happening seems less than the 
prospect of an item not included in the list being adjudged to be amenable to inclusion by virtue of 
the Howey test. 
 
Excluded Securities 
Even when it is established that an instrument is a security does not mean it is automatically 
registrable. This is because the ISA impliedly exclude certain types of securities, either by virtue of 
the issue or the very nature of the instrument itself. Other instruments may be exempted. It is 
important to understand the difference between exclusion and exemption. The differences are 
relevant because they go to the heart of what is a security and what is not. 
The 1999 Act categorised the issuer for the basis of determining exempt status. A community 
reading of Sections 264, 31 and 32 of ISA 1999 clearly exempts securities issued by unincorporated 
persons by reference to ‘persons’ as in the case of prohibitions in Sections 31 and 32. Nnona 
(2006)508 argues that ‘persons’ referred to in those provisions excludes incorporated persons. 
The 2007 Act seems to have omitted these dichotomies, but rather remain silent over securities 
issued by bodies other than governments and corporate bodies. The express mention of these 
however should lead to the conclusion that others are excluded. This implied exclusion raises the 
following problems or questions: 
1. Is there a difference between securities issued by individuals, partnerships and other 
unincorporated bodies and is this distinction relevant in the determination of the 
dichotomies between registrable instrument and registrable transactions? This question is 
important in the determination of context. 
2. How can the exemption of securities issued by unincorporated entities or individuals be 
justified? 
3. What is the nature of protection available to potential or current investors who have 
exposures to securities and transactions issued by unincorporated entities and/or 
individuals? Even if in such circumstances the anti-fraud provision takes effect, to what 
extent does the Nigerian anti-fraud law protect investors and provide for civil recovery? 
4. Although CAMA limits the number of partners to maximum of 20, is there any legislation 
that limits the value of investment or exposures they are allowed to undertake or guarantee. 
In other words, when used as investment vehicles in structured deals, are there express 
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limits to the value of business they can undertake? How effective are the anti-assignment (of 
partnership interest) clauses? Does this extend to other clauses that tend to prohibit the 
placing of such interests under trust, charge or lien? 
5. The mere fact that partnership does not possess shares that are fungible or transferable 
does not preclude the sale of partnership interest or issuance of guarantee over and above 
threshold backed by interests in the partnership. In the above situation, where are the 
inbuilt legal safeguards to prevent abuse of exempt status by unincorporated entities 
especially when used as investment vehicles? 
6. What about circumstances where the interests generated from an unincorporated issuer 
form the underlying security for further issuance by a corporate body or the corporate body 
acquires an exposure to this pool of asset? Even though one might think that their unlimited 
liability nature increases the due diligence threshold on their personal and joint financial 
muscle, however these days most vehicles are secured on the receivables of obligor and as 
such, the financial capacity of the partnership is never relevant. The absence of limited 
liability does not prevent the sale of partnership rights and interests. It also does not stop 
exposures to other assets through security, trust, guarantees, purchase of options and 
assignment. An attempt to limit the capacity to which partnership can accept value could 
disrupt the concept of overcollateralization of the Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) in financing 
and risk management. 
7. If these risks still exist, what then is the policy justification for allowing a sizable chunk of 
issuers escape the registration requirement?  
8. Why is this low level of protection with ISA 2007 accorded to investors given the significant 
risk posed by the industry? This even becomes more dangerous where corporate or 
government investors hold securities of unincorporated entities. Does ISA 2007 provide 
protection and recourse to corporate or government issuers who have exposures to 
securities issued by one partner and confer them rights to claim from others if the first 
partner fails? Is the right and recourse to personal asset of partners automatic? Does it 
include commingled assets of partners and non-partners? To what extent then does Section 
19 of CAMA protect investors?509 
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4.4 Political Economy and Impact on Nigerian Securities Law 
The Structure of the Nigerian ISA 2007 and Factors that contribute to the Formalist Structure: 
An examination of the language of the law and the character of jurisprudence is embedded in the 
history that shaped its experiences. A discussion of these contextual issues that have contributed to 
the incoherence of definition of securities within the ISA 2007 cannot be had without exploring the 
political, social, economic and historical factors that have shape legislation in Nigeria (with securities 
law inclusive) and how the law function within this mix. Therefore, this section argues that language 
of the law is partly shaped by the historical context which has influenced and impacted both legal 
and non-legal theme. Generally, there are four main factors that have influence Nigeria’s legal 
structure, compliance and development. These include colonial experience, military incursion, 
ethno-rivalry/class competition, and religious sentiments. This section therefore assesses the impact 
of these factors on legal compliance and argues that formalism in legal design is a creation of the 
political class to facilitate and perpetuate its perchance for personal accumulation of national 
resources. This strategy has historical and political nexus. 
4.4.1 Colonial experience: Political class and the Law 
Historically, the area now called Nigeria was littered with empires of varied sizes and degrees of 
successes. The social economic and political institutions were unique and predominantly traditional. 
Each entity had distinct political systems in terms of structure and composition. A common theme of 
monarchy ran through all the systems that gave face to their cultural and socio-economic practices. 
Inter-trade (predominantly by barter), marriages and festivals, formed the core of their activities.510 
The advent of colonialism altered these social-economic colourations and replaced it with an 
established economic system.511 With the creation of these economic entities dominated and 
controlled by the colonialist, the adoption of a new system soon gave way to conflict. A new system 
with radically different social formations filtered existing traditional nuances. This meant the 
collapse of pre-existing political structures, economic relations and production patterns.512 It also 
evinced a conversion of population towards production to meet the cash crops/export needs of 
colonialists while at the same time dismantling the indigenous trade networks. A new form of social 
structure emerged that took the form of new governments, new rules/regulations, new justice 
system, class differentials, spatial inequalities, and new patterns and modes of accumulation.513  
The fallout of the search for new identity by competing forces in the new formation, gave rise to the 
politics of domination and accumulation.514 The perchance for personal wealth was a sign of 
‘masculinity’ and ‘becoming’ with which individuals gain acceptance into groups recognised as local 
elite. The new local bourgeoisie armed with little or no location in the productive base of the 
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economy emerged on the back of political patrimony and struggle for foreign capital. This group 
includes the intelligential who on the basis of shaky statistics, reel out policies without planning, 
prescribe economic priorities without including the concept of socio-rural development, recommend 
domestic production without strategy and maintenance culture.515 Development of institutions and 
industries were far from the template, as these components were outsourced and externalised. This 
meant that laws, rules and regulations were either undeveloped or hastily built on a top-down and 
highly formalistic framework so as to make compliance seamless and enforcement expeditious.516 
Such power in its narrowly defined form was kept and concentrated in the hands of political elites 
who make laws and appoint officers of the law. Despite ideological differences that existed, a 
greater proportion of political opportunism was rife. Excessive corruption by the political elite soon 
gave rise to internal unease and resistance. As a result, the military successively overthrew civil 
governments, established military decrees and all together altered Nigeria’s legal and social 
experiences. 
4.4.2 The Military regime and the law 
The military bifurcation of Nigeria’s political economy and social experience threw a different mix 
into her legal culture and created a far greater formalistic monster out of the laws. This was made 
possible through the enactment of draconian Decrees. Legislation were based on ‘command and 
control’,517 and highly regimented. Even the language of the laws, diction, their interpretation and 
enforcement were militarised and subject to subversive politics. Almost every appointee within the 
legal hierarchy performed in a certain way to ensure continuous access to resources and retention of 
allegiance to the ‘client’. Decisions of courts and sometimes enforcement of clear breaches are 
wallowed over by all sorts of legal rationalisation. Dudley518 clearly identified the role of dominant 
politics in all aspects of Nigerian institutions, especially as its strength seems tailored towards 
individual accumulation rather than for the collective good. This is what may have informed the 
seeming shift from military in ‘Khaki’ to military rule disguised as democratic civil rule which is the 
prevailing state of affairs till date.519 Such change in nomenclature is not surprising considering how 
highly lucrative politics has become. The continuous appetite by the political class within the military 
to usurp democratic institutions and leadership constantly haunted the capacity to fashion out a 
pure legal culture founded on creativity and institutional independence. This meant that Nigeria 
remains a rentier state without the capacity to generate wealth. The fallout of this therefore is a 
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country that merely relies on commodity income, neglect productive sectors, ignore calls for human 
capital development, outsource productive capacities and rely on inflows of foreign capital. Such 
structure means that all sectors are locked into a political and economic cycle that is self-
perpetuating and internally injurious to the development of credible institutions.520 The weakness of 
these institutions exacerbated the tenuous hegemony of local bourgeois of which law enforcers 
form a vital part.521 This has created limited capacities for social and economic advancement 
because low capacities within these institutions mean continuous reliance on foreign capital and 
consolidation of control by foreign expertise. Apart from this external dimension to the twist in 
political economy, the social sphere is plagued by internal wrangling and jostle for limited resources. 
The whaling pursuits of opportunities have given rise to all forms of internal competition for 
space.522 
4.4.3 Ethno-rivalry and the Law 
The continuous competition for foreign capital, increase division in the ethnic rivalry, political 
intolerance, nepotism, resource wastage and class competition. All these challenges meant no 
attention was paid to the productive activities and development of institutions. Instead, the political 
class saw government institutions as vehicles for patronage and personal enrichment. The local 
political elite so content with the status quo has sustained this unequal alliance and made laws both 
during the military and civil rule to protect themselves and gain superior access to petro-dollar and 
foreign capital. This therefore meant that the Nigerian capital market became a conduit through 
which the political elite access government patronage.523 Despite the ethnicity, religious affiliation 
also presented a vehicle upon which the political elite and their followers negotiated support and 
control of state apparatus in the internal struggle for resources. 
4.4.4 Religious incursion, a new Political class and the Law 
The introduction of religion into the mix further created a dislocation and widened the path created 
by formalistic history and military bifurcation; an approach that meant that laws can no longer be 
passed in Nigeria without considering religious sensitivities. This was especially so given that a 
sizeable chunk of political elite are Muslims from Northern Nigeria and there was a need to guide 
the law painstakingly and safeguard its provision sensitive imputations. Investment and Securities 
Act is one of the greatest casualties of this formalistic influence. The idea that interest yielding 
instrument could offend sharia was a great consideration in the formulation of a definition of 
securities and by extension, product development within the capital market. Therefore, the capital 
market seems to be a victim of the political power play of intensely divisive political elite in Nigeria. 
Even the social agents like churches, mosques, traditional institution and Non-governmental bodies 
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that were once regarded as the bastion of purity are now conduit for personal accumulation. This is 
why Ihonvbere524 describes Nigeria as: 
“A great promise and massive expenditure but disproportionately slim delivery and reliability; Nigeria 
a larger than life, but smaller than self-image; perhaps the analogy which best captures the country’s 
illusion is that of a masquerade: a traditional yet modernised public celebration involving disguised 
dancers and noisy musicians which frequently become coercive… it is called the Nigerian Halloween. 
Likewise the political culture and economy as a whole; the apparent masquerade of development, 
democracy and direction is a façade hiding real stagnation with consumerism, corporatism and 
arbitrariness: dreams rather than plans. The traditional structure of Nigeria, like its dance, has been 
fundamentally modified since independence without any widespread or sustained agreement on 
basic values and goals, despite years of military rule and then adjustment and reform… Therefore, 
development is undirected, sporadic and uneven. The masquerade has to be orchestrated if it is to be 
transcended and superseded, giving way to a less disorganised and more directed political economy 
in the twenty-first century.” 
This call is not only apt, but extremely relevant, given the need to ensure laws put in place are 
sufficiently coherent to galvanise economic growth. The failure of Nigeria’s conceptualisation of 
security is not so much about the structure of the definition alone, but the absence of strategic fit 
between the definition and non-legal themes that supports its design and implementation. 
Therefore, the adoption of law on the basis of historical nexus does not guarantee it workability. It is 
also the case the sameness or similarity of legal provision does not mean similar outcomes. 
Therefore, the adoption of law on the basis of historical nexus does not guarantee its workability. It 
is also the case that sameness or similarity in legal provision The UK’s definition of securities bears 
some semblance with the Nigerian structure. Although not budged down by similar challenges 
plaguing the Nigerian model, the country has been able to develop and modify its model even 
further within the European Union regulatory structure to stimulate market development.525 Armed 
with a raft of EU Directives, Statute and Rules, the United Kingdom has been able to navigate the 
ocean of formalism in the EU to develop its own specie of formalism. The FSMA RAO has carefully 
harmonised provisions within the EU Directives and the UK Companies Act of 2006 to create some 
level of flexibility 
From the foregoing, several gaps and inconsistencies can be identified. These include: 
1. There are inconsistencies and conflicts between the ISA 2007 definition of securities and the 
categories excluded from registration requirement. 
2. The distinction between securities and financial instruments within the Act is unclear. 
3. There are inconsistencies in categorising shares of partnership outside the Howey’s test and 
the interpretation of stocks within the ISA 2007. The basis for such exclusion is unclear.526 
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4. The legal uncertainty inherent in the overreaching nature of SEC rules with regards to 
registration or non-registration and registration under the ISA 2007 and Howey’s Test. This 
has the effect of: 
a.  Creating extremely elaborate disclosure obligations on trading and distribution 
activities with prohibitive compliance/documentation costs. 
b. Increases uncertainties in legal provisions on categorisation, exemptions from 
disclosure requirements with confusing overlaps, gaps and inconsistencies. 
c. It creates uncertainty in the relationship between disclosure requirements and anti-
fraud legislation with attendant enforcement difficulties. 
d. Causes serious challenge in cross border application and enforcement of Nigerian 
securities law/rules that makes the capital market very unattractive to investors. 
 
 Summary 
This chapter has presented the central arguments and identified the critical gaps created by the 
formalist legal design of securities law in Nigeria. This research commenced with a central argument 
around the question of why operators and issuers in the market are unable to leverage the 
potentials of the law to create investment products in the Nigerian Capital Market. It sought for 
answers by exploring the concepts that constitute securities universally in relation to how it sits 
within the Nigerian framework. The research found it inchoate. While searching for the extent of the 
incompleteness, the research embarked on a voyage into the history of securities law in Nigeria. It 
found that lack of uniformity and coherence in its underlying framework is inextricably linked to its 
formalistic structure. Therefore, drawing on interview data from issuers and market operators, the 
paper was able to demonstrate the connection between interpretative incoherence of the definition 
and conceptualisation of securities, and poor product development which has resulted in lack of 
market development. 
By contrasting interview data from a number of operators and practitioners,527this study explored 
the network of causalities528to demonstrate how conflict in the structure and language of a 
definition of securities can radically inhibit its interpretation and by extension its utilisation for the 
purpose of product development. 
The exploration of the structure and content of the definition, the following crucial data points 
revealed and supports the argument that formalistic approach to the definition of securities 
contribute to the incoherence in its conceptualisation under Nigerian law. They include: 
1. What type of proprietary interest is warehoused within shares, bonds, debentures, notes 
and other debt instruments? What is their common nature and legal effect? At what point 
do these rights or interests attach to these assets? How do these interests pass from one 
party to another? 
2. By ascribing the features of property to shares, does this invoke the incidence of property 
law? 
                                                          
527
 The interviewees are from diverse backgrounds and different levels of competences within the market 
528
 The causalities include: (1) structural incoherence, (2) language and etymological incoherence (3) 
transactional and practical incoherence 
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3. If property law therefore does not apply, where is the place of contract and company law in 
determining the legal nature and effect of distinctly different slices of legal rights 
4. Can a shareholder or an investor in shares within the capital market acquire proprietary 
interest in the share capital of a company by virtue of purchase of shares in an authorised 
exchange? 
5. Are shares fungible? Can individual investors acquire an identifiable piece of the share 
capital of a company by virtue of share purchase in an authorised exchange? 
6. Does shares in this category extend to other equity types or merely restricted to company 
share? 
7. The increasing disagreement on whether more emphasis should be placed on function 
rather than form; especially given the lack of inter-connectedness between and within 
provisions in the ISA 2007. 
8. What is the meaning of “Issue” and the purpose of the said issuance under this definition? 
How does this meaning explain or support an understanding of the mentioned instrument? 
What is the place of listing within the context of issuance? What is the place and purpose of 
the verb “Transfer” in the mix? 
9. Does it take a custodian to hold these instruments for them to be characterised as 
securities? 
10. Does it matter that the custodian is a 3rd party to the transaction? 
11. What is the legal relationship between the issuer and the custodian? 
12. Does it matter what the custodian do with assets in its custody? 
13. Are the activities of the custodian on the asset in its custody factored into the 
characterisation of instrument as security? 
14. Does the Section 315 ISA 2007 provision attempt to reduce the position of a custodian to 
one of intermediary or promoter akin to the United States’ Investment Contract Test Model 
(Howey Test). 
Apart from the connection that has been drawn above between the formalistic languages of the 
definitional incoherence, this research also used a combination of personal observation, structured 
and semi-structured interview to support the argument that lack of conceptual coherence in the 
definition of securities contributes to low understanding of the products which in effect discourages 
their innovation. By exploring the practical application of securities in transactions, this study 
demonstrated through data, the tensions that exist between the practicalities of statutory language 
and the impact language structures have on institutional structures and legal compliance. 
These stresses were unequivocally demonstrated in crucial data points that revealed the following: 
1. Lack of clarity and demarcation between excluded securities and registrable securities 
2. Uncertainty in the differences between excluded transactions and excluded securities 
3. Lack of clarity between excluded securities and included transactions 
4. Lack of certainty between included and excluded transaction 
5. The incoherence in the conceptualisation of financial instruments themselves and the 
absence of nexus between the instruments identified in the definition and incoherent 
conceptual framework for their characterisation as security also made evident. 
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Conclusion 
It is no longer in doubt that the legal philosophy of a country impacts its legal design and 
interpretative structure. This chapter demonstrates the inhibitions placed by formalism on the 
capacity of regulators to leverage the instrumentality of statutory language to galvanise product 
development in Nigeria’s capital market. It shows the effect a lack of conceptual or jurisprudential 
foundation has on the ability of market participants to generate investment momentum needed for 
economic growth. Apart from the lack of agreement on the basic components that constitute 
securities in the definition, the poor understanding of the operating words and language of the 
definition, prevent proper understanding of the concept. 
To address these concerns, this research argues for a functionalist court-centred context-sensitive 
model for the conceptualisation of securities in the Nigerian capital market. Such an approach is not 
only capable of utilising the court system to harness empirical data for the purpose of understanding 
the unique contexts of every transaction and market; it also has the capacity to weave together 
other related legal and non-legal contexts to deepen the understanding of these products. This 
provides greater opportunity for the regulators to work with the market on a continuous basis so as 
to achieve effective regulation. 
Furthermore, this research argues that uncertainties created by the definitional incoherence of 
Section 315 ISA with regards to securities, place significant constraints on their understanding which 
in turn limits the capacity of market participants to develop products in the market. 
Finally, the effect of non-legal themes in the characterisation of securities is eloquent. The research 
found that apart from language/structural contradictions in the Investment and Securities Act, the 
absence of a strategic fit between the structure of securities laws in Nigeria and the non-legal 
themes529 are a major source of its definitional incoherence. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
529
 The non-legal themes include history, politics, economics, socio-cultural and technology 
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Chapter 5 – Securities in Nigeria: Fashioning a Framework Part 2 
5.0 Further digging into data 
In continuation of Chapter 4, this chapter looks specifically into data generated from the internal 
participants’-led discussions, legal arguments and personal observation of contending views for and 
against the legal questions asked. Unlike the previous chapter which essentially relied on data to 
describe the inconsistencies, loopholes and difficulties created by definitional incoherence of 
securities, this chapter drills down to the normative arguments and legal technicalities that either 
stand in the way or promote transferability and circularity. Firstly, it commences by looking at four 
principal legal issues put forward to the participants based on a UK case of Secure Finance v Credit 
Suisse,530 and from where several questions emanate. The choice of a UK case is informed by the 
following: (a) the absence of Nigeria case law on this issue due to the current statutory formalist 
adopted by the Nigerian system, (b) the persuasive effect of UK case law in Nigeria given her 
historical linkages and similarities between UK law and Nigerian law, (c) more specifically the 
similarities between the definitions of securities in UK law and Nigerian law.  
The choice of UK case law is followed by detailed discussion on the basis of data obtained from 
interviews and personal observation. Secondly, the result is then analysed with literature review and 
objectives to arrive at a framework for the conceptualisation of securities in the Nigerian capital 
market. The interpretation of data obtained from group interviews conducted in March 2014, June 
2015 and October 2016 where all the interviewees attended ultimately at different sessions, is 
achieved through analysis of direct quotes drawn from treatment of the hypothetical case. The 
attendees were lawyers and non-lawyers with different levels of expertise within the market. 
Researcher’s choice of group interviews was to provide opportunity for debates so as to effectively 
tease out the real issues and problems. 
5.1 Summary of questions and response rate  
Questions and responses received from the hypothetical case relates to issues about: 
a. Specificity of instruments in the face of multi-layered intermediation and its legal effect on 
transferability and circularity 
b. The legal effect of capacity within the purview of Agency and/or Trust relationships in the 
quest to ensure clean break (clean transfer or sale), transferability and circularity. The legal 
effect of Agency contract and Trust Deed in the market. 
c. The legal effect of holder in due course within the context of transfer and circularity 
d. Identification of borderline instruments and how their respective legal treatment constrains 
transferability and circularity. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
530
 (2015) EWHC 388 (comm); (2017) EWCA Civ 1486 
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The Figures below represent a cross-section of interviewees: 
Figure 17 – Cross-Section of Interviewees 
Category  Group  Number of Interviewees 
CSCS  3 lawyers + 1 non-lawyer 
Stock brokers  3 lawyers + 11 non-lawyers 
SEC / NSE  7 lawyers + 1 non-lawyer 
Custodian  5 lawyers 
Sub-Custodian / Nominee  2 lawyers 
Investor  10 lawyers 
Banks   3 lawyers 
 
Category  Group  Number of Interviewees 
CSCS  1 lawyer + 3 non-lawyers 
Settlement  3 lawyers + 10 non-lawyers 
SEC / NSE  5 lawyers + 4 non-lawyers 
Investors  1 lawyer + 10 non-lawyers 
Registrar  4 lawyers + 1 non-lawyer 
 
Category  Group  Number of Interviewees 
CSCS  3 lawyers + 2 non-lawyers 
Sub-Custodian  1 lawyer + 7 non-lawyers 
Settlement Bank  6 lawyers + 3 non-lawyers 
Custodian  6 lawyers + 1 non-lawyer 
SEC / NSE  4 lawyers + 3 non-lawyers 
 
 
5.2 Case Law 
Secure Capital v Credit Suisse (2015) EWHC 388 (Comm); (2017) EWCA Civ 1486 
Facts: 
Credit Suisse issued two sets of Notes [Coupon Notes on the 21st July 2008] and [Zero Coupon Notes 
on the 25th August 2008] and deemed both Notes as materially on similar terms for the purpose of 
the court application. Each of the Note is also represented by a Permanent Global Security 
document (PGS) which makes the said Notes ‘bearer documents and negotiable’. The PGS further 
provides that the Notes are freely transferable by delivery ‘and such transfer shall operate to confer 
upon the transferee all rights and benefits appertaining hereto’. The PGS provisions were made 
subject to pre-existing conditions in the Programme Memorandum (PM), the Product Supplement 
and Pricing Supplement. The PGS was to be governed and construed in accordance with English Law. 
The Programme Memorandum (PM) provides standard terms upon which Credit Suisse can rely in 
issuing Notes of various specifications and tranches. On this occasion, the Programme Memorandum 
made reference to possible existence of different tranches which together forms a series. With 
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respect to this series however, each Note as in one tranche equal to the total amount of the Note. 
The Programme Memorandum also provides as follows: 
i. PGS must be warehoused with the Euclear (like the Nigerian CSCS) where account of each 
purchase of the Note is credited with a nominal amount for such purchase 
ii. Securities are fungible 
iii. Title is to pass by delivery to the bearer of the bearer security and holder of such security to 
be deemed and treated as absolute owner for all purposes 
iv. Transaction to be governed by English law and jurisdiction of English courts 
v. The Euclear should be the sole medium for the sharing of payments from the Bank in 
relation to rights emanating from Global Security. This however must be subject to the 
express procedures and rules of the Euroclear. This provision is what is called ‘No Look 
Through’ provision. This provision means that the PGS and the Global Securities itself is 
subject to the rules and procedure of Euroclear. (This raises legal issues of lex situs – which 
brings to the fore the controversies whether securities is under property law, contract law or 
whether it exists as instrument of a special kind), (issues of conflict of laws, and (problem of 
intermediation). 
vi. Subject to express permission of Euroclear rules, the notes are tradable up to a limit 
specified. 
vii. Where the Euclear is closed for a continuous period of 14 days or shut in perpetuity, the PGS 
is to be exchangeable as a definitive security which is to be enforceable as such and interests 
in the said Notes must be settled through the Euroclear. 
viii. The PGS is also exchangeable for definitive security where principal in respect of any Notes is 
left unpaid as at when due by holder giving notice to the fiscal agent for such exchange. 
The CSCS the Clearing House in Nigeria and based in Lagos, which was established in 1992, was set 
up to enable transferability and circularity of instruments in the market. For the purpose of this 
study, the researcher has developed a diagrammatic representation of flows within the market and 
the place of CSCS as captured in CSCS rules. The nature of flows in the market and the role of CSCS 
are herein described in diagram below: 
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Figure 18 Activity Flows of Securities within the Nigerian Capital Market 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Euclear Rule provides as follows: 
i. Rights within securities are electronically traded between members/account holders with 
Euroclear, rather than the securities themselves. 
ii. Members/account holder can act for themselves or hold interests for clients who either hold 
the said interests for themselves or for their clients. So in this, Secure Capital (plaintiff in this 
case) as a member of Euroclear holds the interest for JP Morgan Chase Bank NA London. 
iii. Given that these bearer note issuance are represented by PGS, issuer is expected to deposit 
same in depository for Euroclear as provided within the Notes themselves and the Agency 
Agreement, so that all interests within these Notes are managed within the Euroclear.531 So 
that the physical PGS stays with the common depository in an immobilised form in 
perpetuity.532 
                                                          
531
 Similar to Article 27 and Article 17 of CSCS Rules in Nigeria 
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 Similar to Article 27, 28, 29 of CSCS Rules in Nigeria 
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iv. Issuer therefore makes payment towards the Notes directly to the Euroclear. Then the 
Euroclear thereafter makes payments from the received funds to members and payments by 
dealing members are paid to Euroclear. The Euroclear in turn pays the issuer.533 
v. The purchaser of interest in Notes must have an account directly or indirectly with the 
Euroclear through its dealing member. Such dealing member’s account must be governed by 
Euroclear General Terms and Conditions and Handbook which provides inter-alia that it sees 
all securities as fungible. This therefore means that effective transfer to and from member is 
achieved through book entry on dealing members’ account. In this case, dealing members 
have no right to specific securities, but a right to demand from Euroclear a delivery of 
securities of equivalent status to that entered in the books.534 
vi. The common depository is to support this process by receiving, holding the PGS in safe 
custody and servicing same on behalf of Euroclear. 
NB: It is unclear what law in Nigeria applies to circularity and transferability of securities within 
Euroclear. Each note had a Price Supplement that clarified the life settlements and risks that formed 
the basis of investment. Although it set out the terms of the Note and general information, the Price 
Supplement did not provide details. 
Both Notes were supported by a prior Agency Agreement between Credit Suisse and JP Morgan 
Chase Bank NA London and a Deed of Covenant done on the 2nd of August 2006. The Deed of the 
Covenant provided direct rights in favour of the ‘Relevant Account Holder’ against Credit Suisse.535 
The Relevant Account Holder in this case is an entity holding a security account with the Euroclear in 
which there is an entry relating to the security. The Agency Agreement between Credit Suisse and JP 
Morgan Chase NA London (fiscal agent) and JP Morgan Luxembourg SA is to the effect that agents 
are expected to preside as paying agent over matters of issuance and administration of the Notes for 
Credit Suisse and deal with any payments, interests and generally report back to Credit Suisse. The 
fiscal agent’s duties536 are clearly spelt out in the agency agreement to include: 
- Preparing the PGS and depositing it with the common depository with clear mandate to 
Euclear to ‘credit underlying securities represented by the Global Security to the securities 
account at Euroclear on a delivery against payment basis’. 
- In addition, the fiscal agent is authorised to ‘instruct the Euroclear to hold Notes to its order 
pending transfer to Euroclear account’. When it eventually receives payments towards the 
Note, it can then pay Credit Suisse. 
The Deed which is governed by English law empowers Euroclear to acquire all rights of the security 
interest holder (both actual and prospective) if Credit Suisse failed to pay principal due on the Notes 
and the Depository (which is the holder of the PGS) give such default notice. There was nothing in 
the agreement that makes Credit Suisse liable for any breach with respect to term of Notes. 
Secure Capital Limited as the plaintiff in the case claimed that Credit Suisse was in breach of its duty 
to reasonably ensure information provided in Pricing Supplements is true and not misleading. Secure 
Capital argued in the suit brought against Credit Suisse that the information provided in the issuance 
                                                          
533
 Similar to Articles 17, 32, 41, 55  and 59 of CSCS Rules in Nigeria 
534
 Similar to Articles 23 and 24 of the CSCS Rules in Nigeria 
535
 The deed of covenant that empowers individual to enforce direct rights as if it was the owner of the asset 
536
 Similar to those captured in Article 57 CSCS Rules in Nigeria 
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document were materially inaccurate and misleading as the ‘mortality table’ which was used in 
estimating life expectancies, produced a result that over-inflated the life expectancies of reference 
individuals. This thereby rendered the Notes valueless. Pursuant to Article 8 of Luxembourg Law of 
Circulation of Securities 2001, Secure Capital sought to exercise the rights linked to the possession of 
the Notes including the right to institute and maintain an action for breach of the terms of the 
Notes. 
Credit Suisse applied to the court for summary judgment and an order to strike out Secure Capital’s 
claim on the ground that Secure Capital is not the bearer of the Notes and not in any contractual 
relationship with Credit Suisse. Credit Suisse further maintained that Secure Capital is merely 
interloping in a contract it is not a party to and at the same time seeks to import a law that is foreign 
to the contract in order to achieve its purpose. He maintained that under Nigerian law, Secure 
Capital has no leg to stand on with respect to a contract he is not privy to. 
This fact provides a rich illustration of issues around negotiability/transferability and circularity of 
securities. In view of the current fact that securities are now dematerialised, participants were firstly 
requested to identify the relevant legal issues in this fact. 
1. In view of the capacity for multi-layers, multi-party and multi-jurisdictional intermediation of 
dematerialised securities in Nigeria, what is the legal effect of a contextual interpretation of 
‘No Look Through’ provision in the CSCS rule and how can this promote or inhibit 
negotiability/transferability and circularity? 
2. For the purpose of seamless transferability and circularity, are securities governed by law of 
contract or property law? If securities are neither contracts nor property, but statutory 
creation of a special kind for the purpose of circularity, what about ancillary instruments like 
Agency Agreement and Trust Deed that bring about their seamless transfers and circularity? 
Could they be described as contract? Are Trust Deeds and Agency Agreements also governed 
by special rules outside the law of contract and property law? Does the contract law 
foreclose the ultimate investors’ claim rights in cases of intermediated instrument? How 
does context clarify these? 
3. In cases where the quality, quantity and interests within securities are so interwoven within 
multi-layered intermediation chains that it becomes difficult for the transferor to discharge 
its obligation to transferee, can contextual application of the law address this? How does 
context resolve holder in due course principle? 
4. Given the lack of linkages between Section 315 ISA and Section 304 Part 2 of ISA, how does 
the legal treatment of borderline instruments constrain transferability and circularity? To 
what extent can contextual interpretation cure this? 
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5.3 Responses from Focus Group Structured Interview 
5.3.1 The ‘No Look-Through Provision’, Context and Transferability/Circularity 
The formalist structure of the market and which also shapes the characterisation of ‘No Look 
Through’ provision confront market participants on a daily basis. Reactions from market participants 
and regulators demonstrate the limitations occasioned by the definition of securities under Section 
315 ISA 2007. No Look Through provision is a legal mechanism created as a result of 
dematerialisation and intermediation that ensures no privity of contract between investors and 
issuers. It also prevents any form of enforcement right between the issuer and investor. It therefore 
means that investor have no recourse to issuer except through the CSCS or account holder with 
CSCS. 
As shown in the data below, the acceptance of context sensitive judicial functionalism has received 
greater recommendation as the only means to navigate the demerits occasioned by formalism on 
the No Look Through provision. 
Figure 19 – Responses from interviewees on whether look-through support circularity/transferability 
Interviewee Number of 
Interviewees  
2014 2015 2016 Q1 Q2 Q3 
Custodian 6 2Yes  
4No 
3 Yes  
3 No 
6 Yes  
0 No 
* Yes * Yes * Yes 
Sub-
Custodian 
7 1 Yes 
6 No 
3 Yes 
3       No  
4Yes 
3 No 
* Yes * Yes * Yes 
Registrar  3 0 Yes 
3 No 
2       Yes 
1        No 
2 Yes 
1 No 
Yes Yes Yes 
Brokers  7 4Yes 
3 No 
7 Yes 
0 No 
7 Yes 
0 No 
Yes Yes Yes 
SEC 4 0 Yes 
4 No 
0 Yes 
4 No 
0 Yes 
4 No 
No No No 
NSE 5 0 Yes 
5 No 
1 Yes 
4 No 
2 Yes 
3 No 
No No No 
OTC NASD        
OTC FMDQ        
CSCS 3 0 Yes 
3 No 
0 Yes 
3 No 
2 Yes 
1 No 
Yes Yes Yes 
Investors 11 11 Yes 11 Yes 11 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Figure 20 – Table of interview questions asked (Key to Figure 19) 
Questions Details of questions 
Question 1 (Q1) Data on whether they think No Look Through provisions affect 
transferability and circularity 
Question 2 (Q2) Data on whether participants have legal ability to effect securities transfer 
in an atmosphere of formalist conceptualisation of transfer rules 
Question 3 (Q3) Data on whether operating words within legislation constrain the 
conceptualisation of securities 
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5.3.2 Form versus Function: The impact on the controversy as to whether securities is property or 
contract 
To what extent does the formalism in the conceptualisation of securities make it difficult to 
determine whether securities is still categorised under contract law, property law or of a special 
kind. Does the presence of ancillary agreement like Agency Agreement and Trust Deed change the 
characterisation? To what extent can context sensitive judicial functionalism help in clarifying these 
confusion? Does ‘holder in due course principle’ have any role to play? 
Between the period April 2014 to February 2017, market participants were engaged in group semi-
structured interview, structured interview and series of personal observations and interactions. Out 
of 54 interviewees engaged in this research process, a total of 49 interviewees responded. In 
September 2015, a discussion as to what extent the ‘No Look Through’ provision undermines the 
very essence of dematerialisation and intermediation by insisting on the CSCS rules to govern 
transfer. This is reminiscent of Lex Situs in property law. 59% of participants believe that securities 
are contracts, while 36% agree that they are property. 5% of participants stayed undecided. The 
chart below represents the data. 
Figure 21 – Data on whether security is property or contract 
 
 
 
5.3.3 Judicial context-sensitive functionalism versus intermediation chains in furtherance of 
circularity 
To what extent can context-sensitive judicial functionalist interpretation of rules governing 
intermediation chains promote transferability, negotiability and circularity? Naturally, a significant 
part of intermediation, circularity and transfer of securities happen within the market and most of 
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the time is governed by the CSCS rules. Therefore, the way and manner instruments are viewed by 
the CSCS is partly based on the nature and structure of their definition. Whereas, various 
participants have their views on the effectiveness of judicial formalism vis-à-vis formalism as a 
whole, the sum total of views weighed heavily in favour of context sensitive judicial functionalism. 
The diagrams below represent data obtained from a cross section of participants from the market 
between 2014 and 2017 on the question about the best approach. 
 
Figure 22 – Impact of Judicial Context-Sensitive Functionalism on Circularity 
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Figure 23 – Sectorial responses as to impact of Judicial Context-Sensitive Functionalism on Circularity 
 
 
The result of this data explains the hypothetical case and how they reached these decisions. For 
Chart A, an average of 60% of participants wants the Context-Sensitive Judicial Functionalism, 26% 
recommends Statutory Functionalism, 9% wants Judicial Formalism and 5% makes the case for 
Statutory Formalism. More specifically as is the case in Chart B which covered the overall sectorial 
responses for the Context Sensitive Judicial Functionalism, CSCS accounted for 24%, Sub-Custodians 
20%, Custodian 18%, Investors 18%, NSE 7% and Registrar 13%. Within the respective sectors, a total 
of 86% of CSCS staff prefer Context Sensitive Judicial Functionalism to other approaches. The same 
applied to 79% of Sub-Custodians, 78% of Investors, 73% of Custodians, 8% of SEC and 10% of NSE. 
 
5.3.4 To what extent does the context-sensitive judicial functionalist conceptualisation of securities 
and legal treatment of borderline instruments promote or constrain transferability and circularity? 
One of the most important discoveries in this empirical research is the role of language construction 
within statutory provision in the development or otherwise of instruments. In fact the relevance of 
the right operators and their locations within a particular provision affect their construction and 
meaning. This does not only in the understanding of these products; it also encourages their creation 
to meet diverse investment objectives. 
In developing markets like Nigeria, rigidity in legal design and regulation pose significant challenges 
to product innovation. The straitjacketed nature of instruments is a function of the stiffness in legal 
language that enables their creation and adoption. This has precipitated the call for changes to legal 
in the structure and design of norms. The Table below shows ratios on the willingness of the market 
to adopt the context-sensitive judicial functionalism in helping to shape a flexible jurisprudence for 
securities conceptualisation and development. 
Sectoral responses 
CSCS
Sub-Custodian
Investor
Custodian
NSE
Registrar
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Figure 24 – Judicial Context Sensitive Functionalism and Borderline Instruments 
Sectors  Number of 
Interviewees 
Responses 2014 2015 2016 2017 Variations 
in % 
CSCS 3 Yes 10:0 10:0 8:2 10:1  
Investors 11 Yes 9:1 10:0 10:0 10:0  
Custodians 6 Yes  3:7 5:5 10:0 10:0  
Stock 
brokers 
7 Yes  9:1 5:5 6:4 6:4  
SEC 4 No  0:10 0:10 0:10 0:10  
NSE 5 No  0:10 1:9 0:10 0:10  
NASD  No  6:4 5:5 6:4 7:3  
Registrar 2 Yes  6:4 8:2 6:4 6:4  
Sub-
custodian 
7 Yes  5:5 3:7 10:0 10:0  
 
Figure 24 above provides a picture of the current thinking of Capital Market operators in Nigeria. The 
data shows the increasing acceptance of a judicial functionalist approach as one sure way of 
facilitating product development in the Nigerian Capital Market. Despite incidences of protracted 
litigations, excessively procedural adjudicatory process and corruption in the system, there is a 68% 
variation in the view held by participants from April 2014 to February 2017. The positions of 
investing participants are radically different from views of regulators. This is presumably because of 
the positions they occupy and a clear desire to protect their spheres of regulatory powers. While as 
a regulator, there is the fear that judicial functionalism is likely to erode it. Similar opposition is 
voiced by the Self-Regulatory Organisations like the NSE, NASD and FMDQ OTC. Despite this 
opposition, the data show a positive shift in thinking and increasing buy-in by these regulatory 
bodies. The reason for this are: firstly, a proper examination of the rights and obligations of parties 
in line with the law, provides the basis to understand their effect in the market. This in turn 
influences the attitudes of operators. Secondly, the idea of a coherent test or standards for 
delineating the contours of these instruments helps in their classification and application with 
relative certainty, while providing room for innovation to meet diverse investment objectives. The 
choice of special courts with definite powers to act remains attractive. These views were also 
emphasised during the researcher’s in-depth probe using the hypothetical case. 
 
5.4 Unstructured Interview Data 
5.4.1 The No Look-Through Provision and Transferability/Circularity 
The question is whether No Look-Through provisions in CSCS Rules obstruct transferability and 
circularity of securities? The responses during deliberations on the hypothetical case are as follows: 
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Figure 25 – No Look Through provision and Transferability/Circularity 
Interviewees Responses 
Investors  The fact that investor’s rights of enforcement against Credit Suisse (Issuer) are 
abridged also has effect on the duty the Credit Suisse indirectly owes the 
investor. The enforcement of investor’s right through the CSCS (Account 
Holder) pursuant to a deed is a unique way of getting around the effect of loss 
of right by the investor. 
CSCS The nature and scope of enforcement right by the CSCS pursuant to the deed is 
a major concern if the CSCS is not the owner of the instrument as a matter of 
law. This is important because fungibility of securities leave investors with 
equitable interest in securities. Therefore, under the principle of nemo dat quo 
non habet, the CSCS cannot have a better title. 
Custodians 
 
Stockbrokers  
I disagree with the last speaker. The CSCS can only assume ownership where 
the instruments are assigned or transferred through novation to the CSCS. 
Except this is done, the CSCS can at best enjoy limited proprietary rights of lien 
which is in itself insufficient to protect the investor against a default from 
issuer. This is because, changes in values of the instrument are likely to remove 
it from the legal protection of a lien and convert to equitable interests.  
Investors  
 
Banks  
 
Registrars  
I agree with the last speaker to the extent that liens on their own cannot 
provide sufficient protection. The move to ensure the issuer also signs an 
undated letter authorising the sale of its asset in the event of default could 
protect investors. This however has the disadvantage of triggering sale of 
assets at the slightest default and standing in the way of achieving value for 
those assets. It also inhibits the effective use of assets within the market for 
capital formation and price discovery which can only be achieved through 
transfers and circularity. It reduces the appetite for enterprise and risk taking in 
the part of potential issuers. 
NSE (Lawyers) The legal entitlement to the instrument of participants in the chain between 
the investor and the CSCS on the one hand, and between the investor and 
issuer on the other hand is also controversial. I want to take the view that they 
are equitable entitlements flowing from the CSCS. This could in effect restrict 
transfers where there are no sufficient hedge against default by participants 
and the CSCS who is the Account Holder. 
SEC 
NSE 
NASD, FMDQ 
I disagree with the last point from the last speaker. The very core of the 
operations of any capital market is its capacity to intermediate ‘Unhedged’ 
risks. While these risks exist, their regulation to create wealth and value is the 
hallmark of the capital market. 
Investors  While it is clear that investors’ right could be affected by the chains, the right of 
the investors against the primary custodian in a single or double chain could 
impede transferability of the asset amongst custodians. For example, the 
custodian’s duty to transfer to investor upon request in line with investor’s 
right to receive, could obstruct pre-existing commitments between custodians 
and sub-custodians or nominees. 
 
The current structure created by the CSCS Rules does not support multiple chains. This is likely to 
crowd out custodians and sub-custodians thereby leading to restrictions in the flow of values with 
the market. Also the current chain initiated by CSCS has the capacity to modify right within the 
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securities which in effect also affects transferability. For example, the interest held by sub-
custodians and other participants within the market could be affected by the relationship between 
the investor and custodian or by securities financing transactions entered into by sub-custodians 
either by mistake or pursuant to an agreement between custodian and sub-custodians. This is the 
case except there are express provisions in the CSCS Rules which insulate the rights held by the sub-
custodians from the rights within the instruments so much so that commingling or erosion do not 
occur. Where this is the case, the second issue is whether the right of the sub-custodian to act on 
the instrument can be so remote that it does nothing to influence the nature of rights within the 
instruments. 
The restriction of claim right against the sub-custodian by the rules could preserve the capacity of 
sub-custodian (privilege) to act with respect to the instrument in a manner as prescribed by the rules 
in the market. This absence of duty to the investor pursuant to these restrictions is significant in the 
transformation of rights within the instrument. While it may not affect the equitable interest it has 
conveyed by virtue of fungibility and intermediation, such interest is preserved on a FIFO basis in the 
event of the insolvency of CSCS. 
 
5.4.2 Given the limitations placed by legal language on transferability and circularity as seen above, 
how does the form versus function dispute resolve the property law versus contract law divide in the 
conceptualisation of securities? 
Figure 26 – Form versus Function resolves the property versus contract divide 
Interviewees Responses 
Stockbrokers 
 
Registrar  
The identification of some instruments in Section 315 ISA as securities with 
certainty without stating what they convey or are capable of conveying, is a 
disservice to conceptualisation. The idea of whether these instruments should 
confer proprietary entitlement irrespective of location or designation, may just be 
an area that could inhibit circularity and transferability 
Investors  
 
Custodians  
Also the lack of clarity in the law as to what the deed is capable of conferring on 
the account holder to justify effective enforcement against the issuer is another 
area of concern to transferability and circularity. All that also needs to be tested is 
whether equitable interest can be proprietary. Therefore, the use of the operator 
‘Means’, is unlikely to help further interrogation of these issues through the courts. 
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5.4.3 Can the operating word within a provision enable or constrain transferability? 
Figure 27 
Interviewees  Responses  
CSCS 
Investors 
Custodians 
Stockbrokers  
Commercial Banks 
The nature of rights and duties differ between custodians and other 
custodians, between custodians and issuer, and between sub-custodians 
and issuers or custodians. This makes the language of laws or regulation for 
the conceptualisation of securities very important and strengthens the case 
for their flexibility. 
 
Investors  
Commercial Banks 
Registrar  
Stockbrokers  
Broker dealers 
 
 
Although the CSCS Rule commences with the word ‘unless the context ….’, 
which shows some semblance of statutory functionalism, there are however 
problems with the uneven application of this operator. Firstly, no policy 
reasons have been adduced for the formalist definition of securities in 
Section 315 ISA 2007 and the functionalist definition in Article 1 of the CSCS 
Rules. This is particularly questionable especially where the new SEC Rules 
also conceptualised securities using the formalist operator. The lack of 
policy clarity on this has implications for product design and development. 
Secondly, the follow up language of the provision of CSCS Rules are in direct 
conflict with the operative word. While the operative word context show 
divergence, the centralisation of powers around the CSCS in concrete 
language, leaves no room for internal movements of the component 
participants. This creates the basis for doubt as to whether the CSCS Rule is 
truly functionalist. Only a court centred approach is capable of making this 
determination. 
 
 
5.4.4 To what extent context-sensitive judicial functionalist conceptualisation of securities and legal 
treatment of borderline instruments promote or constrain transferability and circularity? 
Figure 28 
Interviewees Responses 
CSCS, Investors, 
Custodians, 
Stockbrokers, 
Registrar, 
Commercial Banks 
The extension and abridgment of rights and duties within instruments 
characterised as securities to suit changing or varied contexts, underscores 
and reinforces the context sensitive functionalist model. 
 
Investors  
Stockbrokers  
Broker dealers 
Banks   
This extension and abridgment of rights/obligation also extends to the 
instruments themselves. This is how borderline and hybrid instruments are 
created. For instance, the right to receive interest and principal in a debt 
could be extended by an option which is exercisable on the occurrence of 
certain factors or contexts. Also the right to exercise such option could be to 
sell (put) or defer sale (future); or buy (call) or defer purchase (future). It 
takes flexibility in legal and regulatory language to accommodate fluidity in 
instruments as they seek to transfer value and decentralise risks.  
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5.5 Observation and Interview Data Analysis 
5.5.1 This section of the research is for data analysis. It seeks to interrogate the data obtained 
through the interviews and personal observation. The researcher explores the questions in 
juxtaposition with the research objectives which are: 
1. To conduct critical literature review of legal concepts, rules, legislation, principles, 
hypotheses, philosophies and frameworks of investment products (equities, debt and 
derivatives). 
2. To thoroughly appraise through literature review those conditions that influences the 
development of equities, debts and derivatives products to stimulate growth within capital 
markets in countries and in Africa. 
3. To develop an approach research methodology and justify the choice of research strategies 
that best answer research questions. 
4. To conduct in-depth empirical research into the products growth driving forces and factors 
that inhibits their development within the Nigerian Capital Market. 
5. To carryout studies of sectors within the Capital Market in Nigeria to understand their 
approaches, strategies, processes and challenges. This is to ensure a proper conduct of in-
depth synthesis and thorough evaluation of research findings against literature on the 
regulation of equities, debts and derivatives in the Capital Market and the challenges 
therein. The aim is to validate the research. 
6. To develop a practical legal model that is national in approach but with structures to suit the 
Nigerian Capital Market’s proposed engagement with cross border activities. 
7. To conclude that different continents have their unique conceptualisation structures that 
underpins their understanding of securities. Consequently, the effectiveness of a country’s 
structure for conceptualisation depends on how it sits within the context of the continental 
and global framework 
 
5.5.2. On the question about how formalist approach applied on No Look Through provision impede 
transferability and circularity of instruments, and whether a context-sensitive judicial functionalism 
can address these problems. 
Responses indicate that the formalist language of statute with regards to the framing and definition 
of securities actually impedes transferability and circularity. The No Look Through provisions 
contained in the combined provisions Article 42, Article 3, Article 7, Articles 15-17, Article 27-29, 
Article 2, Article 2, Article 44, Article 51 of CSCS Rules have been formalistic in outlook and 
application. For instance, the vesting of lien solely on the CSCS with respect to all rights registered 
therein has grave implications for circularity, transferability and enforceability of rights for the 
benefit of investors.537 This includes firstly, incapacity of investors to enforce rights against issuer if 
CSCS is unwilling to do so. The refusal/failure of Euroclear’s to act against the issuer (Credit Suisse) 
for contractual infringements against investors, led to the unsuccessful claim by Secure Capital Ltd. 
The court simply held that the appellant (Secure Capital) who was acting for the investors, has no 
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 Interview data (summary) from custodians, stockbrokers, investors, banks and registrars in 2014 to 2017 as 
captured in sub-paragraph 5.4.1 
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contract with the respondent (issuer) - Credit Suisse. Therefore, the effect of concentration of all 
rights in the CSCS means that all participants are at the mercy of the CSCS if they must transact or 
enforce their contractual rights.538 This is clearly a disincentive to innovation, circularity and value 
creation in the market as highlighted by interview. It also offends the principles distributive 
justice.539 This abridgment of rights also applies to all other market participants with the final 
consequence of an overly rigid and highly formalistic marketplace.540 The court-centred context 
sensitive judicial interpretation of those provisions on the other hand sees the legal relations 
between the CSCS and other participants as Hohfeldian-type personal contracts where rights and 
obligations are equally shared and distributed. In that case therefore, the CSCS is under a duty to 
transfer those rights in its custody on the basis of a contract between CSCS and the participants.541 
Secondly, the provision of Article 15-17 CSCS Rule (Nigeria) confers proprietary rights on the CSCS. 
These rights include a lien over all rights registered with it. The CSCS also has right to exclude all 
market participants from those rights in its custody. The CSCS cannot take directives from the 
investors with respect to those rights and more importantly, it can exclude others including the 
custodian. The CSCS can authorise sub-custodians to use the registered rights in its custody to 
finance third party obligations. All these point to the fact that the CSCS enjoys ownership rights over 
and above other participant with respect to those registered rights. With the exercise of ownership 
right by CSCS, it also means that laws which created and regulate CSCS apply exclusively to all 
registered rights in its custody. This has the legal effect of Lex Situs since the laws and regulations 
that would apply are the ones in the jurisdiction of the CSCS irrespective of where other participants 
are situate. In the case of a court-centred context sensitive functionalist interpretation, the domestic 
law can only where the context dictates. Otherwise contract law of other jurisdictions should apply 
where significant elements of the transactions are outside the jurisdiction of the CSCS; this because 
the thought of property and Lex Situs clearly run against the grains of circularity, negotiability and 
transferability which form the core of securities. As securities dematerialise for the purpose of 
intermediation, cross-border application of multi-jurisdictional legal regimes are in operation. 
Therefore the formalist operationalisation of the CSCS Rule is likely to discourage flexible interaction 
amongst participants with the domestic market and foreign markets. 
The court-centred context-sensitive functionalist through its flexible operation is likely to deliver 
multiple streams of legal relations with potentials for the development of more products. Hybrid 
equity, debt and derivative products can emanate to manage risks relations within networks of sub-
custodian and custodians, issuer and investors, investors and custodians and issuer and CSCS. This 
could serve the market by deepening investment activities, providing multiple streams of income, 
providing greater pools of instruments for risk management, trading, payment and investment. 
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 This was the unanimous view of the majority of interviewees who believe that court centred context 
sensitive functionalist approach 
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5.5.3 Form versus Function as it relates to whether securities are property or contract 
This question is important because of the following points. First, the application of the CSCS Rule of a 
particular country to all instruments exchanged within the market, indicate the application of a 
system akin to the Lex Situs rule. Second, the capacity to apportion rights to the account holder by 
mere registration with the CSCS in such a way that the right of such account holder could be in many 
respect greater than that of the investor within an intermediated chain, points to the ultimate 
ownership right of the CSCS over investor’s assets registered with it. This is the substance of the 
interpretation and not the mere legal formality that describes CSCS as a servicer or administrator of 
registered title/interests. The controversies between the formalist and functionalist are captured as 
follows: 
According to the functionalist, the powers conferred on the CSCS via the formalist rules, coupled 
with the lack of clarity in the definition of securities in Section 315 ISA, confers ownership rights on 
the CSCS with respect to CSCS’ registered titles.542 This is why the CSCS can override any contract 
entered into between the investor and custodian and between custodian and sub-custodians.543 The 
CSCS also has power to restrict, abridge and extend the rights of the investors, custodian and sub-
custodian.544 The CSCS makes it compulsory for its rules to form part of the agreement between the 
investor and custodian, and between the custodian and sub-custodian.545 The functionalist also 
argues that the capacity to enforce the CSCS rules must be part of any contract between investor 
and custodian and sub-custodian is evidence of proprietariness.546 The CSCS can choose who to sue, 
the circumstances and whether or not to sue as in the case with Credit Suisse and the Euroclear.  
All these have the trappings of proprietary interest of CSCS in the registered interest, however a 
formalist character of property and application of Lex Situs rule means only Nigerian law will apply. 
This could lead to the following adverse consequences in the market: (1) low patronage of market by 
foreign participants who are not comfortable with the structure of Nigerian law, (2) lack of 
innovation on the part of market participants who recognises the restrictive nature of Nigerian 
law.547 The contextual functionalist approach will make it possible for the rule to be interpreted as 
providing a proprietary interest to CSCS over rights, but also liberty to parties to enter into in-
personam contracts. 
5.5.4 To what extent can context-sensitive judicial functionalist interpretation of rules governing 
rules governing rules of intermediation chains promote transferability, negotiability and circularity? 
Firstly, the specific rights or the relationship between investors and CSCS are not captured within the 
rules. Therefore, it has been difficult to clarify where the rights and obligations lie. This makes a 
strong case for judicial functionalism to close the loopholes that currently exist; although a case 
could be made for such omission because investors are classified as constituting part of participants 
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in the market when they are registered as account holders. This is not to say that it is bad practice to 
spell out the possible rights and obligations of participants. The idea of clustering all their rights and 
obligations together, believing that contract will separate them is bad drafting. Interview data makes 
it clear that contracts can help support clarity in formal rules if support by court centred context 
sensitive operationalisation of contractual terms and legal principles.548 Secondly, the definition of 
securities in the CSCS is statutory functionalist and different from the formalist approach in Section 
315 ISA 2007.549 This is a major source of confusion because there is no policy justification for the 
difference in statutory approach between two important legal instruments that are meant to 
regulate transferability and circularity in the market. These controversies further strengthen the case 
for a context sensitive judicial functionalism to close these loopholes and create the needed clarity. 
In terms of the rights of participants within the market, the extent to which claim right of an investor 
conflict with the CSCS rules in terms of power to enforce such right is a legal one. This is especially 
the case because the CSCS is not definite on the type of right that investors can hold. It however 
provides certain privileges to the custodian and sub-custodians. The context-sensitive judicial 
functionalism is attractive because it is capable of resolving questions that bother on (1) whether 
sub-custodian can attach securities interest for their benefit to client assets, (2) whether sub-
custodian can create security interest over all assets of another sub-custodian to the extent that the 
other sub-custodian transfer of asset within the market is restricted. The CSCS is one sub-custodian 
that is so empowered to do the above. However, it is unclear whether other sub-custodian has equal 
powers even where they may attempt to use extended language in terms to create this effect. 
The functionalist versus formalist debate is also important in making the right clarifications where an 
automatic internal funding mechanism is set up which mistakenly segregate account without client’s 
consent and client asset and investor’s asset and attached, due to pre-existing arrangement made by 
other departments in relation to the account unknown to the party that is managing client money. 
The determination of whether such provision is capable of hampering circularity and transferability 
is a legal one which is to be determined by the courts. Also in situations where custodian accept 
terms which creates security interest to the benefit of third party, the determination of whether he 
is in breach of a contract where the investor has not perfected such contract, is also a legal one. The 
context-sensitive judicial functionalism is important in this determination. This is also the case where 
3rd party attaches the asset regardless of whether the client of the custodian or investor permitted it 
or not. 
5.5.5 To what extent context-sensitive judicial functionalist definition of securities and legal 
treatment of borderline instruments promote or constrain transferability and circularity? 
One of the most important discoveries in this empirical research is the role of language construction 
within statutory provisions in the development or otherwise of instruments. In fact, the relevance of 
the right operators and their locations within a particular provision affect their construction and 
meaning. This is not only useful in the understanding of these products, but also encourages their 
creation to meet diverse investment objectives. In developing markets like Nigeria, poor product 
innovation borne out of rigidity in regulation, pose significant challenges. The straitjacketed nature 
of instruments is a function of the stiffness in laws and regulation that enables their creation and 
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adoption. Therefore, the table below shows the increasing popularity of context-sensitive 
functionalism that is spearheaded by courts in helping to shape a flexible jurisprudence for securities 
conceptualisation and development. 
Figure 29 – Context-Sensitive Judicial Functionalism and legal treatment of borderline instruments 
Sectors  Number of 
intermediaries 
Number 
of YES 
Number 
of NOs 
2014 2015 2016 2017 Variations 
in 
percentage 
Custodian 6 17 7 2 Yes 
4 No 
3 Yes 
3 No 
6 Yes 
0 No 
6 Yes 
0 No 
 
Sub-
Custodian 
7 17 3 1 Yes 
3 No 
4 yes 
0       
No 
5 Yes 
0       
No 
3 Yes 
0 No 
 
Registrar 3 1 2   1 Yes 
2 No 
  
Broker 7 10 3   6 Yes 
3       
No 
7 Yes 
0 No 
 
SEC/NSE 9 0 9  0 Yes 
4 No 
0 Yes 
5 No 
  
CSCS 3 2 1   2 Yes 
1 No 
  
Investors 11 34 4 8 Yes 
0 No 
10 Yes 
0 No 
7 Yes 
4       
No 
9 Yes 
0 No 
 
 
 
The Figure 29 above shows that a number of practitioners within the group do favour a court 
centred context-sensitive approaches despite the incidence of protracted litigation, excessive 
procedural adjudicatory process and corruption in the system. The data show the variations in views 
held by different practitioners within the market. While lawyers in the Securities and Exchange 
Commission favour statutory formalism, lawyers within the CSCS, custodian, stockbroking and 
investor community favour judicial functionalism; the reasons for this may not be farfetched. The 
retention of regulatory control may have been informed by choice of lawyers in the Commission. 
Market participants relish the freedom to innovate within standards and test applied on a flexible 
basis by a specialised securities court. 
Other reasons for these decisions are: firstly, a proper examination of the rights and obligation of 
parties in line with the law provides the basis to understand their effect in the market. This in turn 
influences the attitudes of operators. Secondly, the idea of coherent standards for delineating the 
contours of these instruments helps in their classification and application with relative certainty, 
while providing room for innovations to meet diverse investment objectives. This is to be made 
possible by setting up specialised courts with incontestable powers to act. Therefore to resolve the 
myriads of challenges created by the definitional incoherence, this research proposes a definition 
that captures the following terms that show: 
1. How the conceptual meaning of the instrument connect with the recognisable central 
framework for delineating securities. This entails the identification of the underlying concept 
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on which securities is built and operate the supporting mechanisms. This research proposes 
the central core of the concept of securities to be based on “un-hedged risk” with 
negotiability and transferability as enablers. 
2. Negotiability and Transferability should be piloted by flexible rules of Transfer of Proprietary 
Intangibles which should be enacted and made to apply side by side the ISA 2007, SEC Rules 
and other guidelines. 
3. The character/nature of negotiability and transferability must be prominent within the 
structure and language of the Section 315 ISA definition of securities. 
4. The role of the intermediary should mediate the risk between investors and market 
5. Proper qualification of the financial instruments to reflect their distinct but interrelated 
character while also cross-referencing within the ISA. This is to create a better picture of the 
scope and application of these instruments. (Cross-referencing of Section 315 ISA2007 
definition of security and Section 304 ISA 2007). 
6. The use of the word “means” should be removed and replaced with the phrase “.. context 
….”. this should then be followed by clearly laid out guidelines for the regulators and courts 
to follow. 
7. The definition section ‘Section 315 ISA 2007’, should expressly define the following 
operating words within the definition of securities. These include: ‘Issue’, 
Incorporated/Unincorporated’, ‘Listing’, ‘Negotiable’, ‘Transferable’. 
8. There is need to develop new Rules and Guidelines on the ‘Transferability of Securities’. 
9. The use of the term “OR” should be inserted in the definitional section to be read 
conjunctively where the context permits. The status of the interpretations Act Section 18(3) 
should be clarified and made subject to the provisions of the ISA 2007 for the purpose of this 
construction  
5.5.6 With these suggestions above, the recommended definition of securities for Nigeria’s 
Investment and Securities Act should be as follows: 
Unless the context otherwise admits, securities means 
1. Those financial instruments herein listed in Section 304 Part II of the Investment and 
Securities Act 2007 whether in physical or dematerialised form 
2. In so far as they are issued by incorporated, unincorporated entities, whether by domestic or 
foreign bodies 
3. and provided they are made negotiable and transferable either physically or through 
electronic means within the market either through issuance and/or listing or any other 
means to be determined by law. 
4. This does not include financial instruments that are: 
a. Specifically listed in Rule 8 and any other provision within the SEC Rules that so 
designate any instrument(s) as excluded. 
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Summary 
The chapter shows that formalistic legal design truly places constraints on legal language and 
conceptualisation of securities. This is shown by its language construction and inability to 
accommodate diverse contexts which securities represent. Therefore, the inability to capture the 
network of interaction between these legal and non-legal themes, significantly limits the 
understanding of the nature and scope of securities. Poor appreciation of these features means 
faulty application and regulation. It however goes ahead to practically demonstrate the capacity of 
functionalist effect to create and facilitate product development by identifying and explaining 
various flexible products that are operational in functionalist markets across the globe. 
This research explores the Nigerian model and makes the case that a context-sensitive strategic fit 
must be achieved between structure/language of the law and non-legal themes within a particular 
systems. In other words, there is a need to understand the effect of political economy, historical, 
social and technological contexts in the conceptualisation of securities law. 
The research therefore goes ahead to identify the building blocks for the development of a 
functional context sensitive definition and conceptualisation of securities. These include: 
a. Reverting to the phrase ‘unless the context otherwise admits, securities means…’ On this 
basis, the court should be empowered to determine ‘contexts’ in the circumstance. This is 
because it is undemocratic to confer regulatory, administrative and adjudicatory powers 
solely in the hands of regulators. It is also the case that the regulators are ill-equipped to 
capture the relevant empirical data needed to determine the requisite contexts. The 
evidential value of data obtained from litigants and the specialist skill of the court at 
weaving them into legal and non-legal contexts is extremely useful. Therefore the courts 
should be provided with guidelines to follow. 
b. The research proposes that flexible rules on Transfer of Proprietary Intangibles be enacted 
and made to apply side by side with the Investment and Securities Act (ISA) 2007, SEC Rules 
and Guidelines. This Rule should set the nature and scope of the terms ‘Negotiability’ and 
‘Transferability’. 
c. The definition section of the ISA 2007 and/or this proposed rule should clarify the nature 
and scope of these terms. 
d. There is the need to cross-reference Section 315 ISA 2007 definition of securities and Part II 
Section 304 ISA 2007 which identifies the types of financial instruments. The definition also 
proposes exceptions. 
e. The extension of Section 315 ISA 2007 needs to be extended to include a definition of 
‘Issue’, ‘Incorporated’, ‘Unincorporated’, ‘Listing’, ‘Negotiable’, ‘Transferable’. 
f. The use of the word ‘or’ should be read into the definition ‘conjunctively’ where the context 
permits. This will mean making Section 18(3) of the Interpretation Act inapplicable or 
subservient to the ISA 2007. 
On the basis of these building blocks, the research proposes a context-sensitive and functionalist 
definition of securities for the Nigerian Capital Market. 
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Conclusion 
The impact of language construction within legal contexts in the conceptualisation of securities can 
no longer be isolated. In fact, this chapter illustrates the importance of strategic fit between this 
theme, philosophy and letters of the law in the understanding of securities as a concept. As a follow-
up to the need for strategic fit, it is now clear that similarities in legal structure are not 
determinative of sameness in outcomes. While explaining the deleterious effect of formalism, this 
research strengthens the need for a flexible, functionalist court-centred context-sensitive model for 
the conceptualisation of securities. By so doing, it suggests a definition of securities that should 
replace the current one under Section 315 ISA 2007 (Nigeria). 
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Chapter 6 – General Conclusion and Recommendations 
6.1 Securities under wraps 
It is slightly fashionable to characterise the self-preservative philosophical tensions between 
formalism and functionalism as the sinking voice of diminishing orthodoxy. Conflicts of this nature 
are sometimes underestimated when ingredients for measuring market productivity are 
developed.550 Generally, well-managed conceptual conflicts stimulate creativity by exposing new 
trends and patterns.551 However the poor understanding and application of these trends could have 
calamitous consequences. The law therefore exists as a tool to moderate these divides with the 
support of complementary philosophical understandings. In this chapter, the research sums up the 
findings of the entire thesis as a way of resolving questions that continuously create fractures 
around legal conceptualisation and application in the market. Scholars have debated some truths 
that form follows function.552 They situate their argument on idealism as a precursor for 
functionalism.553 This to them provides rare insights into identifying a concept in its natural form 
before an exploration into its competences and functionality. An opposing argument looks at 
function as preceding form because the utility of the concept is determined at the time of 
conception. Therefore, functionality determines the existence of an idea itself. This research 
examines key insights into this conflict and submits that form should exist within a function and not 
outside it. The conflict between formalism and functionalism is not only ideological; it has significant 
effect when explored through the lenses of contexts. 
The case is made that ideological basis for supplanting arguments raises new expected problem of 
legal determinacy and indeterminacy.554 Legal scholars are divided on this point and questions 
around whether laws drive social forces in society or vice versa.555 This is hinged on the idea that 
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societal function is first determined by accepted social practices which eventually crystallises into 
laws. Others see laws as the principal initiator of social dispositions.556 They argue that societies 
function on the bases of social networks moderated by agreed norms and standards. Therefore, the 
idea that these norms are the architect of the network is as controversial as arguing that the 
networks can exist without the norms. This division represents the fundamental disagreement 
between formalism and functionalism. As arguments rage on both sides of the intellectual divide, a 
more disturbing question which seems to emerge is on whether or not the law should determine 
party autonomy. This question attempts to interrogate the very core of the prevailing ideological 
differences that persist without recourse to prevailing dynamism of markets. Such inverse 
questioning has elevated the dispute between formalism and functionalism and created fractious 
effects in market across the globe. In most part, the slow adoption of legal tradition which has 
inhibited enterprise growth is one of the outcomes. The effect hangs a fragmented regulatory 
market environment in the balance across the globe. Firstly, the quest to protect national 
sovereignty and identity by insisting on preserving historical legal traditions has created significant 
legal differences with less complementarity. The gaps emanating thereof are increasing sources of 
inefficiencies in the system. There are potent risks in ignoring controversies of this nature especially 
as they affect legal interpretation. The ease at which they are glazed over should be accompanied by 
attempts at understanding their impacts on history, culture and intellectual truths of the 
proponents. This to some extent should include their capacity to generate community consensus. 
Language which is one of the products of these historical exchanges is evidenced in prehistoric 
nature and practices of a people. This is why its interpretation is extremely controversial. Secondly, 
the incidence of technological disruption of the securities market is expanding and exploiting the 
gaps created by fragmented markets. Researchers have identified the impact of technology on 
language.557 They demonstrated through empirical research that the traditional structures of 
language are shifting and that today’s technologies are ‘linguistic machines’.558 The outcome of these 
therefore is a market and products are least understood and appreciated because the traditional 
metrics for their determination are now inadequate to capture new and evolving trends. This is 
therefore exacerbating domestic tensions as individual countries strive for opportunities and 
economic relevance. Consequently, the strains resulting from the above problems support the need 
for choice of legal systems that best appreciate these fast moving trends and patterns in global 
markets.  
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These are some of the challenges which this research attempts to resolve within securities 
market.559 So that, while on the one hand language is relevant, its interpretation on the other hand is 
more relevant as markets looks to a system that understands and capture its dynamic contexts. On 
these bases, therefore and in response to the research questions, this thesis makes three primary 
conclusions: 
1. Markets gravitate towards a system that is flexible enough to understand their dynamism, 
capture their themes and accommodate their contexts. As a result, this research 
demonstrates that a court centred context sensitive functionalist model will help achieve 
this by drilling down empirical data obtained through court process to understand the 
nature of parties’ contractual intentions. It also clarifies the basis, scope and application of 
the components in relation to parties’ wishes. 
2. Rigid or context insensitive interpretation of the language of legal texts place significant 
constraints on their ability to capture the dynamic dimensions and their functions within the 
securities market. Therefore this research demonstrates that formalism places limitations on 
statutory capacity. Although the formalist approach may be seen as democratic from the 
point of view of party autonomy, its rigidity makes the approach practically and procedurally 
undemocratic. This is because of its linear interpretative makeup.560 
3. A functionalist court centred context sensitive framework has the capacity to identify and 
weave together all the multi-lateral contexts that constitute securities as a concept. These 
contexts exist in silos because of fragmented markets and regulations. As a result, the 
understanding of these products is deeply inhibited and standing in the way of product 
innovation to address investors’ diverse objectives. Therefore, this study demonstrates that 
the framework is useful at helping to integrate all interests into a coherent whole so as to 
achieve strategic fit between these legal and non-legal themes in the conceptualisation 
process. 
A case has been made that flexible framework is able to cater for the divergent interests, multi-
lateral networks and dimensions that constitute securities. The research demonstrates that formalist 
approach is ill-equipped to accommodate the various contexts that constitute securities. Therefore, 
excessive and unsupported reliance on formalist structure and language, leads to definitional 
incoherence. Given the impact of non-legal themes in the structure and content of securities as 
established in this study, an opportunity has been created to also settle the age long debate 
between legal theorist on the question of legal determinacy and indeterminacy.561 It has also firmly 
confirmed the view that the purity of law is determined by its capacity to accommodate the shifting 
dynamics in contexts and variable that shape society. 
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6.2 Conflicts and Tensions in Conceptualisation 
The history of legal interpretation has been one rooted in language interpretation without the 
necessity of exploring the constituents of language itself.562 Courts have seldom looked beyond the 
immediate legal text especially where they seem to make literary sense.563 The idea of ordinary 
meaning is distinct from its effect and implications on wider society. Like an emperor without 
clothes, language is dressed in its self-belief. This feeling that linguistic differences impacts 
interpretative differences which in turn creates divisions in legal characterisation of the components 
of securities is eloquently displayed by variations in current conceptualisation models. The risky 
effect therefore created is different in the understanding of securities as different jurisdictions 
warehouse unique components and language interpretation of these components. 
This study examines the philosophical conflicts of two distinct schools that shape the 
conceptualisation debate. An examination of these conflicts and their outcomes reveals three 
unique models that more or less encapsulate the general conceptual understanding of securities. 
These are the UK model as it relates to the EU variant. This is very much mirrored by Mexico and 
other Latin American countries. The similarity is not so much about literal content, but in their rigid 
formalist structure.564 This is followed by the US in North America and South Africa in Africa; and 
then Singapore model in Asia. Although there seems to be general uniformity within these three 
distinct variants, there are however wide disparities in the specifics of individual countries’ 
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understanding and application of the concepts.565 These differences which tend to overshadow the 
gains of a possible consensus achieved include: 
1. Disagreement in the actual components that constitute securities, their understanding and 
application in the market which generally entail negotiability, transferability; 
2. Differences in the practical interpretation and application of the underlying components that 
constitute securities; 
3. Frictions arising from differences in individual country’s capacity to curtail the divergence 
between traditional building blocks of societies and new technological understandings 
 
Therefore, the first chapter of this thesis introduces the research by identifying the above 
differences, gaps, contradictions and their origins. It also highlights their operational interactions 
and effects on the market. Chapter 2 takes the research further when it successfully demonstrates 
the capacity of functionalist court centred context sensitive model for the conceptualisation of 
securities to address the gaps, contradictions and incoherence created by the formalist approach. 
The incoherencies identified are (1) National divide on the nature of interest in securities as 
intangible, given the controversies as to whether they are treated as tangible. This is prominent 
when explored against its effect on cross-border engagements.566 Apart from cross-border 
disagreements, domestic markets are also conflicted within national boundaries as legislature and 
judiciary continuously grapple with the incidences of securities.567 These anomalies have both 
practical and theoretical implications.568 From the conflict and lack of understanding of the 
components that constitute securities to the disagreement on the choice of classification criteria, 
the concept of securities is entangled in intense controversies.569 
The confusion and gaps that emanates from these disagreements are traceable to the legal design 
and interpretative philosophies of respective countries.570 Controversies amongst systems stand in 
the way of understanding and interpreting the components of securities.571 The concept of 
negotiability and transferability means different things to different countries. In Europe, MiFID has 
failed to achieve efficient and effective harmony.572 Even where MiFID 2004/39 Art 4(18) defines 
                                                          
565
 Niamh Moloney (2014), ‘EU Securities and Financial Markets Regulation’, Oxford University Press; Louis 
Loss, Joel Seligman (2014), ‘Fundamentals of Securities Regulation’, Aspen Publisher; Iris H-Y Chiu (2008), 
‘Regulatory Convergence in EU Securities Regulation’, Wolters Kluwer 
566
 Eva, Micheler ‘Intermediated Securities and Legal Certainty’, LSE Law Society and Economy Working Paper 
Series, 03-2014 
567
 This is more prominent in the United States 
568
 On the practical level, poor coordination among nations leading to high transaction costs, slow pace of 
product adoption and increasing inefficiencies in markets due to its fragmentation. The theoretical level 
exposes the conceptual dilemma between adaptive and conformist regulation 
569
 Niamh Moloney (2014), ‘EU Securities and Financial Markets Regulation’, Oxford University Press; Louis 
Loss, Joel Seligman (2014), ‘Fundamentals of Securities Regulation’, Aspen Publisher; Iris H-Y Chiu (2008), 
‘Regulatory Convergence in EU Securities Regulation’, Wolters Kluwer 
570
 The differences between conceptual purity (formalism) and market-focused approach (functionalism) 
571
 The securities components are negotiability, transferability, transferable securities 
572
 MiFID: Compliance Function and Complaint Handling, 31 December 2016, Hogan Lovells, 
https://www.hoganlovells.com/~/media/hogan-
lovells/pdf/mifid/new_mifid_update_31_dec_2016/iwd/ib015463852v1mifidcompliancefunctioncomplaintsha
ndling23.pdf; Revision of the Market in Financial Instrument Directive (MiFID II), Linklaters Fact Sheet (July 
2014), www.linklaters.com/pdfs/mkt/london/MiFID2-Fact-sheet.pdf; Jeremy Grant and James Wilson, ‘Private 
210 
 
“Securities as transferable securities covering those classes of securities which are negotiable on the 
capital market except instruments of payment such as shares in companies and other securities 
equivalent to shares in companies, partnership or other entities and depositary receipts in respect of 
shares; bonds or other form of securitised debt, including depositary receipts in respect of such 
securities. Any other securities giving the right to acquire or sell any such transferable securities or 
giving rise to a cash settlement by reference to transferable securities, currencies, interest rate or 
yields, commodities or other indices or measures.” This definition merely highlights the exception 
rather than the rule. It identifies distinctions between classes of securities that are negotiable in the 
capital market and those instruments of payment without clarifying the meaning of these concepts. 
The absence of definition of the terms ‘negotiable in the capital market’ and ‘transferable securities’ 
create absolute confusion from conceptual and transactional perspectives;  on the conceptual angle, 
attempts have been made to define securities generally to reflect regional consensus and inter-
relationships on the concept. Article 1(1)(a) of the Convention of the aw Applicable to Certain Rights 
in Respect of Securities Held with Intermediaries (also known as the Hague Convention) defines 
securities to mean any shares, bond or other financial instruments or financial assets (other than 
cash), or any interest therein.” This definition in relation to MiFID definition has the follow flaws, gap 
and contraction. 
1. This Hague definition does not clarify disclose where it sits within the context of the MiFID 
definition (whether it refers to transferable securities or classes of securities which are 
negotiable in the market). 
2. Like the MiFID definition which does not seem to clarify at what point classes of securities 
are deemed to be negotiable in the capital market, the Hague definition also failed to clarify 
to what extent the securities so defined in its definition represent instruments of payment 
rather than those investment. In addition, the specifics of those instruments named in the 
Hague definition of securities are not properly explained so as to identify the uniqueness 
and/or distinctions.573 
3. The conceptual confusion identified in numbers (1) and (2) makes the broad understanding 
of the nature of distinct pieces of instruments known as securities, very difficult. For 
instance, a preference share as perceived in Germany is conceptually different from the 
same product in the UK, France and Italy.  
In the UK, a share is defined by reference to the share capital which is seen as personal property of 
members.574 However, Scottish law includes moveable property which is nowhere defined within the 
law.575 In fact, the distinction between personal property in the case of English law and moveable 
property under Scottish law needs further clarity. While Germany576 and Italy577 are conflicted 
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between the US model and EU civil law as they remain indecisive. This also relates to how a share is 
seen divergently in Latin America. Mexico for instance considers shares as a type of contract while 
Argentina and Brazil look to shares as a form of property. Even though Singapore, Hong Kong, India, 
South Africa looks to share distinctly in the same way they are seen in the UK, their application in 
practice differs. The same applies to debt instrument. Secondly, and apart from the conceptual 
incoherence as above, the difficulties created from the application in practice is another source of 
great concern. This is aptly demonstrated in the area of cross-listing or multi-listing.578 There are 
clear fungibility issues which continuously throw up issues around re-registration, convertibility, 
differences in operating conditions due to market (foreign exchange volatility), regulatory 
fragmentation and settlement problems. 
On the question of fungibility, it may be difficult currently to purchase a share in US Company issued 
in New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and sold on the same day in London Stock Exchange (LSE) even 
where the US Company is cross-listed in both markets. The need for re-registration becomes 
necessary to accommodate the structural defects in both markets inability to agree on conditions 
that guarantee equivalence status.579 The desire to maintain local sovereignty and uniqueness seems 
to take precedence over increased transactional cost for market participants. One particular feature 
that present a problem with this approach is that, even though a share that was purchased at New 
York Stock Exchange of a particular US Company is exactly the same as one bought of the same US 
Company in London Stock Exchange, the respective clearing and settlement systems of both 
countries will be responsible for the respective purchases within their local jurisdiction. This is the 
same with shares listed in Frankfurt.580 
There is also a practical question on the impact of these changes to technical nomenclature and 
terminologies that regulate securities in the market. For example the question of whether shares 
‘admitted for trading’ are treated similarly with ‘listed’ shares remains controversial. While the host 
market regulator, clearing and settlement systems have not much to say, shares that are admitted 
for trading this is not the case with listed shares. The differences in these regulatory approaches are 
not only borne out of desire to maintain unique identities, but also as a result of differences in 
regulatory regimes and conceptualisation. For example, the concept and nature of interests 
warehoused within specific instruments are essentially different in jurisdictions. One key feature is 
the differences in the understanding of fungibility and proprietariness. These variations and the 
associated transaction costs have more often eroded some of the benefits of cross-listing which 
includes market access for economies of scale, increased liquidity to guarantee reduced cost of 
capital, increased transparency due to better disclosure, investor protection by leveraging bonding 
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mechanism with low regulatory environment and increased visibility. Others include search for 
better opportunities and diversification into more productive offerings. 
One major difference is the question of fungibility. The idea of fungibility between both markets 
radically changes the nature and colouration of tradable risks.581 This goes to the very question of 
the nature of the instruments themselves. Four distinct models seem to evolve from the study of 
how tradable risks are captured from the point of view of financial instruments.582 These models are  
1. UK, Germany, France and Portugal models in Europe and they relate to Mexico and other 
Latin American countries 
2. The US as it relates to the North American model and South Africa’s model in relation to 
African countries 
3. The Singapore/Hong Kong model as they relate to Asia 
The practical consequences of these disagreements played out when golden shares issued by some 
countries in Europe were struck down by the European Court as illegal and inconsistent with 
European Union Law.583 Attempts by MiFID and IOSCO to resolve this dilemma has yielded no 
significant fruits. These have implications for cross-border engagements: 
a. It inhibits the free flow of co-ordination 
b. It affects the opportunity to clearly define the financial instruments with certainty both 
domestically and internationally. 
c. The absence of clarity and understanding of these instruments inhibits the possibility of 
product development and diversity within the market. 
While acknowledging that the court centred functionalist approach in the United States is not full 
proof in terms of the non-uniformity in the application of certain test within the prong, this research 
demonstrates that these defects do not affect the core utility of the model and its capacity to 
facilitate a flexible liquid market. However, the lack of uniformity in its application has created gaps 
in knowledge and incoherencies in the definition of what constitute investment. As a result, it has 
become difficult to differentiate an investor from an employer.584 For instance, the element of profit 
created a heated dispute in the determination of their scope and limits. There are issues as to 
whether it arises from income streams or savings from profit.585 This also raises question whether 
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such profit must emanate from pre-sale activities or profit arising from post-sale activities. The 
differences in interpretation reflect the court understanding of the variations in contexts and their 
impact on the appreciation of legal texts. For instance, the ideological conflict between the lower 
courts or Circuits on the understanding of vertical and horizontal commonalities is further 
perpetuated by the palpable silence of the US Supreme Court on the issue. In concluding, the 
chapter highlights the conflicts between formalist and functionalist approaches. It exposes how the 
tensions impact the understanding of securities. The limitation in the scope of statutory language 
presents constraints to its adaptability to meet dynamic investment preferences. The demand on 
national governments to justify economic priorities are no longer on the basis of historical 
connection, but predicated on the implementation of systems that guarantee national prosperity, 
self-preservation and national identity.586 This makes a strong case for a functional, flexible court 
centred context sensitive approach in legal design. That framework should be about adopting a 
uniform jurisprudence to accommodate uniform meaning. The chapter concludes that it is no longer 
attractive to appreciate these global fractures in the conceptualisation of negotiability and 
transferability as essential components within securities. 
Chapter 3 and 4 takes the above conclusions and demonstrates through empirical evidence the 
impact of gaps created by the formalist design. The ideas explored include why market participants 
are unable to leverage statutory language to create products in the market. This is achieved by 
exploring the multiple causalities and how they impact the language and structure of legal text. The 
research also demonstrates a link between the definitional incoherence of securities and poor 
product development in the market. The data points from empirical research reveals poor 
understanding of the nature of proprietary interests warehoused within shares, bonds, debentures, 
notes and other financial instruments. The chapter discloses the following: 
a. Absence of coherent and consistent operating language in the definition of securities borne 
out of clashes between the two competing forces of legal and non-legal themes 
b. Confusion and lack of clarity with regards the nature of these instruments and their 
applicable laws. The challenge as the whether they should be regulated by property law or 
contract law remains potent. 
c. Lack of clarity with regards the nature of proprietary interests and rights that are conveyed 
d. Issues around identification or specificity of securities for the purpose of establishing 
proprietary interest 
e. The blurring nature of respective instruments. For example the differences between 
respective asset types, classes and categories are not express within legal frameworks. 
f. Lack of clarity and understanding of the role of custodian in relation to issuers and the 
nature of their legal relationship 
g. Confusion with regards the place of these assets within their respective legal relationship. 
This study identifies the tensions that exist and demonstrates how these tensions impact language 
structure, their interpretation, institutional structures and legal compliance. The effect of data 
outcomes shows up in the lack of clarity and demarcation between excluded securities and 
registrable securities, uncertainties with regards to the differences between excluded transactions 
and excluded securities, lack of clarity between excluded securities and included transactions, lack of 
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certainty between included and excluded transactions and lastly, the incoherence in the 
characterisation of the distinct financial instruments themselves. The chapter concludes that these 
conflicts and their effects are created partly by 
a. Lack of coherent jurisprudence on the conceptualisation of securities. This is because of lack 
of clarity and unanimity with respect to the definition of the underlying components 
b. Inconsistencies in the operating words, their meaning and application within a definition 
c. The conflict between the legal and non-legal themes and their impact on market 
understanding of securities 
The research therefore concludes that the absence of strategic fit between the legal and non-legal 
themes, contributes to definitional incoherence of securities. 
Chapter 5 argues that the formalistic legal design accentuates the problem of strategic fit between 
legal and non-legal themes. This is aptly demonstrated by inability of formalistic language to 
accommodate diverse contexts which securities represent. The inherent incapacities in the formalist 
design to capture the networks and dimensions that constitute the securities significantly limit its 
understanding. This in turn affects its application and regulation. To resolve these dilemmas, this 
research practically demonstrates that the functionalist court-centred context-sensitive approach 
has the capacity to elucidate and weave together all those components and underlying dimensions 
of securities in a flexible manner as to create and facilitate the development of investment products. 
This system has been found useful in the US and Singapore.587 The research identifies the absence of 
the above as responsible for poor product development in formalist market. It further discloses that 
formalism is one of the challenges with the UK’s model despite its attempt at adopting a measure of 
flexibility. It therefore submits that the United Kingdom’s model has developed a lot more than 
Nigeria’s because of its evolution into greater flexibility in legislative language. This is in furtherance 
of its attempt to achieve strategic fit between legal and non-legal themes. 
The research concludes that the context sensitive functionalist approach remains the only viable 
option that is necessary to weave together all the contexts of securities into a coherent whole. In the 
case of Nigeria, the research concludes that the functionalist context sensitive approach is the 
solution to the definitional incoherence of securities and poor product development in the Nigerian 
market. To achieve this, the research proposes the following changes to the Investment and 
Securities Act 2007 to include: 
1. Changes to the statutory definition of securities under the Section 315 of the Investment 
and Securities Act 2007. This includes reverting to the use of the phrase “unless the context 
otherwise admits, securities means …” this should be followed by clarity in the Act as to 
which bodies are vested with powers to determine the context. It is highly recommended 
that a mix of court and regulatory bodies should be vested with the power to determine 
context. 
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2. There is the need for flexible rules on Transfer of Proprietary Intangibles to be enacted and 
made to apply side by side with the ISA 2007, SEC Rules and Guidelines. This rule should 
clarify the meaning, status, scope and nature of negotiability an transferability. 
3. There is the need to cross-reference Section 315 ISA 2007 definition of securities with Part 2 
Section 304 ISA 2007 which identifies financial instruments.588 
4. An extension of Section 315 ISA definitional function is proposed to include a definition of 
the following: ‘Issue,’ ‘incorporated,’ ‘unincorporated,’ ‘listing,’ and ‘negotiable’, and 
‘transferable’. 
5. The use of the word ‘or’ should be read into the definition conjunctively where the context 
admits. This means making Section 18(3) of the Interpretation Act inapplicable or subject to 
the provision of the ISA 2007. 
On the basis of the above recommendations, this research proposes a court centred, context 
sensitive and functionalist legal framework and definition for the conceptualisation of equity, debt 
and derivatives in the Nigerian Capital Market. 
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 This definition should have exceptions for purpose of clarity 
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Chapter 7 Conclusion 
7.1 Introduction 
This thesis unearths the fundamental causes of definitional incoherence of securities and shows how 
this has led to poor understanding and development of these instruments in the Nigerian Capital 
Market. It demonstrates that formalist conceptualisation of securities limits the capacity of language 
to optimise the concepts and liberate their character for development. Based on these discoveries, it 
is now clear that changing contexts in markets can only be captured when the language of law 
encourages flexibility especially at a time where the market seeks cross-border linkages. Below is a 
brief summary of findings. 
 
7.2 Findings of this research 
Firstly, the research demonstrates that a court centred context sensitive functionalist approach to 
the conceptualisation of securities is the only way to achieve improved product understanding and 
development in the Nigerian capital market. It further posits that this context sensitive model has 
the capacity to integrate national framework into regional and global contexts for improved cross-
border activities. The level of symbiosis between the national and regional and global model is 
effective at strengthening cross-border exchanges and providing the boost to investors’ confidence. 
Apart from low cost of transaction flowing from increased liquidity, market practitioners are bound 
to enjoy the ease of access that strengthens confidence. The capacity to integrate philosophical 
viewpoints is one of the key strengths of this model. This includes bringing together both structural 
and linguistic positions within the context of conceptual and philosophical environment. The mutual 
exchanges between these themes help in the identification of agreements and frictions within the 
concepts. The recommended model589 has the capacity to clarify the underlying assumptions that 
have hitherto regulated the understanding of securities and transform empirical data obtained 
through court process into usable investment strategies. This is the by-product of its ability to 
harvest and transform contractual intentions of parties into tradable rights. A court centred context 
sensitive model provides the ability to monetise parties’ rights while providing liquidity in the 
market. These rights may include express or implied intentions that are conceptually captured within 
the context of parties’ intentions. The model is also capable of leveraging language and its limitation 
to create usable investment propositions. This is possible through the recognition of the power of 
language in the design of party autonomy.  
Secondly, and after the examination of data, the research made the following additional findings: 
a. That the nature of rights and duties and how they are conceived in a market affects their 
functioning 
b. The formalist or strict allocation of duties to transferor without necessary contextual 
safeguards will restrict the rights of transferee and third party. This in turn will limit the 
negotiability component and characteristics of circularity. 
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 The recommended model in this case is the Conceptual Onion 
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c. Where transferor is made to owe a separate duty to transferee, the weight of duties will 
create a unidirectional flow of duties and a multi-dimensional rule of liability. This creates a 
Privilege - No Right relations which inadvertently reduce the rules of liability. 
d. The Power – Liability relations guaranteed by rule of law will make the transferor owe two 
separate duties to transferee and third party, but cannot owe the same duty to both. This 
creates Privilege – No Right relations which provide the disruption of seamless circularity. 
e. The interference of the right to non-interferability promotes circularity but disrupts 
transferee’s duty of vigilance. This affects negotiability and circularity. 
From the above findings and more, it is therefore clear that the manner of construction of legal 
instrument is important in product development and optimisation. This means that the United 
States for instance has effectively created a system that leverages on the capacity of language to 
capture varied contexts and epochs. The framework in Figure 4 successfully resolves the conflicts 
between the formalist and functionalist philosophies by integrating both paradigms in the 
exploitative determination of context.590 The framework in comparison with other models around 
the world has been uniquely successful at weaving together all the legal and non-legal themes to 
arrive at a coherent standard across the United States.  
Thirdly, this thesis illustrates the point that the variations in the conception of rights and duties 
constitute the main disagreement in the proper construction of investment products. It identifies 
differences in language and structure of definitions as partly responsible for this divide. As a result, 
the research further finds that the formalist structure and language are ill-equipped to 
accommodate the diverse contexts that constitute those variations in the concepts; variations which 
are brought about by the philosophical dispute between form and function coupled by technological 
disruptions of Digital Ledger Technologies and Crypto-Instruments. Therefore excessive reliance on 
formalist structure and language in the conceptualisation of securities leads to definitional 
incoherence. It also establishes the role of non-legal themes in shaping the content and structure of 
securities contexts and regulation. 
Fourthly, this thesis furthers the on-going policy debate which is on how best to influence national 
policy towards a flexible regulatory approach in investment conceptualisation, regulation and 
application to guarantee seamless trade and movement of capital across border at greater pace and 
lesser cost. This dialogue in important given the myriad of institutional disagreements that have 
heralded the concept and its application in the market591 especially as it relates to quest for a model 
to enhance seamless global coordination, mutual recognition and enforcements of these 
instruments. The conflict or dilemma in the choice between the European formalism or conceptual 
purity and the United States functionalism or market focused approaches remains unresolved. Apart 
from the ideological impact of this dispute, the obstructive erosion of the underlying dimensions of 
securities, stand in the way of its contextual examination on a case by case basis. This is despite the 
desire of flexibility in the face of attempts by statutes to regulate party autonomy. The choice of 
                                                          
590
 This Figure 7 Model of capturing context for the understanding of securities is potent given the 
multifaceted nature of securities as disclosed in its cellular structure as captured in Figure 1 
591
 The clashes that results from these institutional disagreements on the nature and interpretation of the 
components that constitute securities continuously erodes party autonomy despite its success at creating 
unique regulatory structures in countries across the globe. For example the global shares argument captured 
in this chapter. 
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technique is predicated on the society’s design of the law, its purposes and its operational contexts. 
Therefore, given the multidimensional nature of securities, its purpose and regulation can only exist 
within the realms of context. This means that appreciating these contexts can only be achieved 
through effective and flexible regulatory structure. 
Fifthly, through the analysis of data, this thesis discloses the following as a justification for its 
definitional incoherence and the incapacity of the laws to galvanise product development and 
optimise the potentials of products in the Nigerian Capital Market: 
a. This research submits that the design of ISA 2007 on the definition of securities is 
formalistic. This conclusion is informed by the presence of the following statutory features: 
1. The word ‘means’ which points to certainty does not take into account the 
multidimensional nature of securities as indicated in Figure 1 of this thesis. 
2. The lack of definition and consistency in the operational words within the definition in 
Section 315 of the ISA 2007. 
3. Lack of definition of key instruments mentioned in the definition itself 
4. The sum total of the Investment and Securities Act 2007 as a whole and the rigid 
underlying linkages with other statutes 
b. Absence of framework to consider other internal and external contexts. 
The Section 315 of ISA 2007 definition has not taken into account the nature of security as an 
amalgam of legal and non-legal themes. Even its similarities with the United Kingdom’s design on the 
basis of historical connection are insufficient to guarantee similarities in legal outcomes within the 
market. It further finds that the effectiveness of a design is not so much about its uniqueness, but on 
where the model sits within the context of regional, continental and global frameworks. Therefore a 
framework is needed to weave together all the contexts so as to achieve strategic fit between the 
legal and non-legal themes. As part of devising a conceptualisation framework for the Nigerian 
market, this thesis finds as follows:  
a. That there should be incorporation and actualisation of strategic fit between legal and non-
legal themes in the conceptualisation of securities. This includes driving a consensus 
between traditional (indigenous) approaches and new technological (received) approaches. 
b. Ensuring political economy, socio-cultural, technological, historical, psychological and 
philosophical contexts are factored into the conceptualisation of securities. 
c. That a definition of securities as replacement for the current Section 315 ISA 2007 definition 
is necessary to provide the basis for its contextual understanding. There is a need to make 
significant adjustments to the language and operating words in the definition. 
d. That a court centred context sensitive functionalist model is necessary to facilitate and guide 
the courts in reaching judgements in order to fashion a comprehensive and coherent 
jurisprudence for securities in Nigeria. 
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7.3 Original Contributions to Literature 
Significant opportunities are often wrapped within tensions and disagreements. The very nature of 
conflicts between formalism and functionalism throws up significant opportunities and challenges. 
Apart from the symbolism of idealistic positioning by the distinct schools of thought, this research 
captures the challenges and opportunities as its core contributions to knowledge. These are clearly 
laid out in paragraphs below: 
 
1. Identification of gaps, contradictions and tensions in pre-existing literatures and their impact 
on the understanding of securities. The problems identified in current literature on the 
conceptualisation of securities are: 
a. Conflicting philosophies on securities which increasingly contributes to its conceptual 
gaps and contradictions 
b. Understanding the nature of these instruments leading to its definitional incoherence. 
c. Lack of identification of pre-existing conflicts in relation to new and emerging 
conflicts.592 
d. The impact of these conflicts on philosophical understanding and conceptual certainty of 
securities 
e. How paragraphs (a) to (c) above impact the underlying components and dimensions of 
securities; and how these continuously unsettles its framework and structure 
f. How the unsettling of the gradual evolution of securities is further disrupted by new 
emerging forces and the impact of such disruption on the framework and understanding 
of securities 
g. The need to develop a framework that recognises these divergence and how the 
capacity to integrate them help in the understanding of securities 
h. The importance of understanding securities to promote its development in the market 
and its impact on market development and economic growth 
i. How the flexibility built into this framework helps to capture market dynamism, contexts 
and weave together and possibly reverse engineer the philosophical conflicts and 
divergent contexts towards economic growth and development. 
 
2. Identification of the tensions between pre-existing and new traditions resulting from: 
a. Changes in language and erosion of traditional interpretative approaches leading to 
significant alterations in the underlying dimensions of securities 
b. Disruptions in pre-existing relationships that were once predicated on historical nexus 
and the creation of new ones based on measures that align with contemporary national 
priorities other than history. 
c. The uncertainties created from heightened tensions emanating from differences in legal 
and non-legal themes. 
d. How these controversies are expanded and exploited by geopolitics, political economy 
and technology. The typical effect of these challenges on the market and underlying 
dimensions of securities. 
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 This philosophical conflict now exacerbated by technological disruption of the space 
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3. Developing a framework to manage these tensions and contexts in Nigeria and by extension 
West Africa. This functionalist court centred context sensitive framework otherwise known 
as the Conceptualisation Onion meets the requirements for the resolution of the conflicts 
and inadequacies of the formalist model through the following inherent capacities, features 
and characteristics 
a. Identification of the key components of securities and ability to weave around them a 
coherent jurisprudence that is flexible and context sensitive. These components include 
unhedged risk, negotiability and transferability 
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Figure 30 - The Conceptualisation Onion 
 
 
This is a model that consists of intra/inters connected concentric rings that discloses the linkages 
between the various components that constitute securities as a concept. With each component 
standing alone, the absolute and relative effects are felt when explored against one another within 
varied contexts. The fact that financial instruments are mere descriptive labels as discussed in the 
body of this thesis strengthens the view regarding its unrepresentativeness with respect to the 
inherent content and economic effect they create. Therefore, the need for their examination using 
various tools becomes imperative. No attempt has been made so far to properly delineate each of 
Financiial Instruments 
Negotiability/Transferability 
Case law Induced Context 
Un-hedged Risk 
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these instruments with specificity. The negotiability and transferability component593 still suffers 
from lack of clarity due to absence of definition. Even more disturbing is the lack of definiteness of 
the substance that is being negotiated or transferred. This model identifies case law induced context 
as an administrative process for clarifying the gaps and identifying the core substance or property 
that is being transferred and negotiated. From a synthesis of case law and empirical data, the model 
identifies unhedged risk as the core of investment securities. Unhedged risk is the substance and 
property that makes up financial instruments and constitutes the basis for negotiability and 
transferability within a regulated market. While exploring the context of other components, the 
assessment of the constituents and contexts of unhedged risk remains the most important 
determinant of the true nature of investment securities. Therefore all other components within the 
model must be explored by first looking at their individual contexts and then those contexts within 
the context of unhedged risk. 
The interpretation and expansion of the term ‘unhedged risk’ as it relates to 
negotiability/transferability and financial instrument generally is extremely important. On the 
question of financial instruments Section 304 ISA Part II specifically identified instruments that are 
and should be known as financial instruments. While these instruments merely represent listing of 
intentions, there is clearly no unifying principle that brings them together and establishes their 
essence. With a context sensitive model, the very essence of their existence is brought alive where 
the concept of unhedged risk is identified as the ‘value’ or ‘property’ that present investment 
proposition to investors. The capacity of the model to weave together the entire legal and non-legal 
contexts into a tradable product or proposition that has the ingredient of proprietary risk 
(unhedged) is the unique feature. The incidence of unhedged risks explains the importance of risk-
reward element in investment. As a useful tool, risk sits at the very core of investment because the 
capacity to measure, value, commoditise and trade it as a property speaks to the sophistication and 
functionality of a system. This is more so where the system allows for ownership of risks and their 
possible breakdown into varied slices for the purpose of circulating them in the market as negotiable 
investments. Therefore the definition of Financial Instruments within the meaning of Part 2 Section 
304 of ISA 2007 which is recommended to be referenced in the new Section 315 ISA 2007 as 
proposed must have at its very core risks that are unhedged, negotiable in nature and freely 
transferable within the market.594 The conceptual nature of this risk property must be determined 
on case by case basis. In other words, the substance and economic effect of transactions between 
parties should dictate the contextual nature of the risk property. The determination of context is a 
role to be shared by the regulator and the court, but with the court having the upper hand because 
of the following characteristics: 
1. The court have the benefit of legal expertise on both sides, the judicial panel, existing 
precedence and court procedures/rules with which to carefully sift empirical data from 
various sources towards the determination of real intent 
2. The court have the benefit of understanding real time the new thinking of society on the 
subject and how that is reflected in parties decisions and likely legal/commercial effect it 
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 As discussed in Chapter 2 of this thesis 
594
 The risk must be free and unhedged to qualify as security. This is because a hedged risk is conceptually a 
contract for payment for good delivered or to be delivered and/or services rendered. The unhedged nature 
also makes the risk freely transferable without encumbrances that are usually tied to contracts for payment.  
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elicits. This justifies how the courts are able to achieve strategic fit by weave legal and non-
legal themes into a coherent jurisprudence on the subject 
 
This is the concluding chapter. It simple rests views on the conclusions reached in previous chapters 
and highlights the likely benefits of the model below to the Nigerian market by proposing the 
following definition for securities in the Investment and Securities Act (Nigeria). 
Unless the context otherwise admits, securities means 
1. Those financial instruments herein listed in Section 304 Part II of the Investment and 
Securities Act 2007 whether in physical or dematerialised form 
2. In so far as they are issued by incorporated, unincorporated entities, whether by domestic 
or foreign bodies 
3. and provided they are made negotiable and transferable either physically or through 
electronic means within the market either through issuance and/or listing or any other 
means to be determined by law. 
4. This does not include financial instruments that are: 
b. Specifically listed in Rule 8 and any other provision within the SEC Rules that so 
designate any instrument(s) as excluded.  
 
7.3.1 Conceptualisation Onion: Implications and Recommendations for Research, Policy and 
Practice 
This research reviews and synthesises the dichotomies and advances so far made in securities 
regulation across the globe. The uniqueness in these achievements is most felt by systems that have 
recognised the intersection of multiple disciplines in the field of capital market investment and risk 
management. Prompted by multiple calls for a multidisciplinary approach to investment regulation, 
market practitioners and policy makers are increasingly seeing the importance of exploring 
knowledge intersection a lot more deeply to better appreciate securities as a tool for human 
interaction. 
Several centuries of dealing in securities have failed to capture this unique feature in the 
understanding of the substructures that constitute securities. The basis upon which these 
instruments were understood took account solely of associated performance of market practitioners 
and investors’ contractual preferences. Little attention was paid to the very contexts that shaped 
individual actions of investors and market practitioners. Also the effect of these actions on rules and 
market conduct were not so visible in most analyses. This led to frequent market failures due to gaps 
between notions of investment and the contexts that drive market activities. Chapter 2 of this thesis 
chronicles these gaps and contradictions as a way of further exposing the inefficiencies in the 
fragmented regulatory structures of securities across the globe. 
Apart from perceived tensions borne out of fragmented regulatory structure, specific failures in 
clarifying the measurement criteria for each of the components and dimensions that constitute 
securities became evident. As presented in both chapters 2, 4 and 5, data available identify the 
constraints placed by differences in interpretative standards on the uniform understanding of these 
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components across the globe. Therefore the impact and changes witnessed in language structures 
continue to impact the nature and understanding of securities. Chapter 4 clearly identifies some of 
the themes that have shaped language construction and appreciation across various contexts. Aside 
historical context, socio-political contexts and economic situations have imperilled any potential for 
integrated structures. It however provides examples of how systems have adopted functional and 
flexible approach to integrate context with a view to creating useful products in the market that 
meet diverse investment objectives. 
The thesis recommended the functional approach for the conceptualisation of securities in Nigeria 
while providing a working definition and various changes to the Investment and Securities Act 2007 
(Nigeria). In view of this introduction and previous sections, this part of the final chapter looks to 
examine the implication of these findings on policy and practice in the area of securities regulation in 
Nigeria, West Africa and by extension across the globe. This is to enable the development of new 
approaches to the understanding, conceptualisation, application and enforcement of securities. 
 
7.3.2 A glimpse into the future of securities regulation in Nigeria with the Conceptual Onion 
(The Epistemology of the Contributions) 
Securities is to be viewed as a means of communication across contextual divide and a cultural tool 
that represent an amalgam of various legal and non-legal contexts. The basis for the determination 
of harmonisation criteria will no longer be based on solely mathematical models but on 
constituencies in the social variables. Therefore the content of every instrument will be explored to 
understand the parties’ intention, economic and social equivalence. Parties will provide evidence of 
their contractual intentions as it relates to respective contexts of their market. This information will 
help in testing the equivalence criteria against other contexts. With this fully entrenched, a picture 
of the jurisprudence that shapes the concept of securities will start building up that body of 
principles that reflect specific contexts of a market in relation to regional, continental and global 
context. Therefore, its approach hopes to assess its proficiency on the basis of how well it 
strategically fits to its internal and external contexts. The criteria will include how flexible the capital 
market system is at accommodating dual listing, cross listing, multiple listing, and free movement of 
securities within and outside the market as ownership of instruments change without inhibitions.595 
The capacity of instruments to store and retain value and certainty with regards the measurement of 
value in the determination of price. Clarity in the pricing of risk for the purpose of determining value 
and their clarity and capacity to cut these risk properties into slices representing determined value 
for their easy movements within the market is important. How these slices are representative of 
varied investment preferences of investors becomes a question. This conceptualisation is 
represented in a six staged process: 
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 This uninhibited movements is effected despite changes in ownership of these instruments 
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Stage 1 – identify and determine the equivalence in macroeconomic variables596 to distil equivalence 
criteria597 
Stage 2 – test recognition or equivalence criteria against parties’ contractual intentions 
Stage 3 – by doing stage 1 and 2, a picture of the jurisprudence that shapes the concept of securities 
will emerge to reflect specific market context.598 
Stage 4 – assess the proficiency of the output from stage 3 on how well it strategically fits to 
market’s internal and external contexts 
Stage 5 – also assess how the equivalence criteria integrates the flexibility of the capital market 
system in accommodating dual listing, cross listing and multiple listings within markets, clarity in risk 
pricing/valuation, capacity to fractionalise and circulate risks in the market. 
Stage 6 – integrate the findings from applied research and market practice into knowledge base to 
create a symbiosis between researchers, practitioners and the knowledge base. Create linkages 
between the knowledge base and the people to capture their context by applying various media 
sources. 
Within the market, policy makers, regulators, market operators, practitioners will now operate from 
the position of knowledge that securities is not merely a contract between parties, but a socio-
political and economic tool of communication that warehouse various contexts. This view is clearly a 
departure from that which is known and appreciated over the years. The full realisation of this 
reality is the sum total of research findings captured in chapters 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 of this thesis. 
Therefore, the broader vision is to condense these findings into the Conceptualisation Onion from 
where policies and practices can emanate by taking advantage of diverse contexts. The functionality 
of the Conceptualisation Onion will be judged on its capacity to weave together diverse internal 
context and external contexts/themes. One of the main challenges of the regulators and market 
participants is in their inability to bridge research and practice. The lack of interaction between 
practice and research within the market remains a problem that has impacted productivity and 
efficiency. It is likely that the Conceptualisation Onion will help to bridge this gap by interpreting 
current knowledge with new knowledge. 
The criteria of measurement provided for effectiveness can provide a major source of integration of 
these paradigms. Therefore research and practice can be integrated through the development of a 
cumulative knowledge base that serves both interests interchangeably. The mutual exchanges 
between the knowledge base and pre-existing theories could lead to the development of new 
theories. With principled research and practices feeding into the knowledge base, the level of 
interpreting between the knowledge base and theories which improves the quality of knowledge 
base will then help to shape future practices and research. Figure 8  (the Contextual Web) below 
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 The macroeconomic variables include economic, socio-cultural, political, technological, environmental and 
legal elements 
597
 To determine the equivalence in macroeconomic variables, a critical study of their  interconnections and 
intersections is carried out to identify commonalities 
598
 This discloses the economic and commercial effect of the transaction 
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which is also known as the Context Web represents this diagrammatically and goes to reinforce the 
inter-connectedness of these elements. 
 
Figure 31 - The Context Web 
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A thorough examination of this diagram explains the network of relationships between the Markets’ 
Knowledge Base and the Conceptual Onion in their quest to implement context sensitivity. The 
Conceptual Onion primarily achieves a dual purpose of determining context and linking research to 
market practice.599 It also takes advantage of the interactions taking place within the Knowledge 
Base itself which includes the meeting of research, practice, theories and public through the media. 
Apart from this function, what remains critical in the implementation of the Conceptualisation Onion 
is on how it can be used as a tool to broaden the knowledge base of the market and increase their 
conceptual understanding of securities and their potentials. It is also helps to delineate the elements 
that provide the jurisprudential measurement of the instruments for the purpose of 
recharacterisation. In achieving these, the thesis proposes the following guidelines. First, the thesis 
recommends the functional characterisation of securities from a multi-disciplinary standpoint within 
the market. this research finds that multi-disciplinary approach to the conceptualisation and 
characterisation of securities would provide a conceptual bases to identify all the thematic strands 
and contexts which securities represent. The method hopes to elucidate the commonalities within 
the concept for the purpose of identifying the governing variables that should shape and be shaped 
by regulation. Second, the research draws attention to legal language construction methods adopted 
as critical to the extensiveness and selectiveness of policy and regulation of securities. Therefore, the 
language must be expansive and context-sensitive in sufficient measure to capture all the legal and 
non-legal themes that constitute securities. 
Before looking at what these broad measures means specifically for research and practice in the 
world of securities, it may be important to clarify that adoption of a functionalist approach to 
securities conceptualisation must not be confused with a presumption for one universal model of 
conceptualisation. The measure is aimed at achieving unity in diversity by situating, delineating and 
clarifying a coherent jurisprudential framework for the conceptualisation of securities where 
national model can easily find its place within the context of regional, continental and global models. 
The opportunity to emphasise this point is indeed crucial for social; and political reasons. It is 
imperative to interpret multi-disciplines within a functional language regime. So much can be 
achieved through these measures shaping the quality of research around the field of investment 
securities and securities regulation within the field of research and research practices. 
 
7.3.3 Implications and  Further Recommendations 
This research places emphasis on the need to have future examination of the concept of securities 
on that point of intersection between multiple disciplines so as to understand its place and nature of 
interaction. The reason for this is to research three cardinal areas: 
a. The place of current knowledge and literature on securities, its antagonising and supporting 
features. 
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 The Conceptual Onion achieves this principally by drawing on statistical and applied research tools to 
combine data analytics with behavioural science. It can democratise the process by limiting the pre-conceived 
biases of a single data originator or likelihood of wrong/false data. The statistical and measurement tools 
include various data collection and analytical tools/models that are now enabled by advanced software, 
algorithms (artificial intelligence, machine learning technologies). Secondly, the suggested applied research 
tool for the purpose of the Conceptual Onion is the Contextualisation Triangle or the Context Engine 
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b. The likely impact of research features on knowledge base through the interaction of 
research and practice 
c. Research into modalities for reinforcing existing knowledge base and building upon new 
evolving/emerging knowledge bases. 
The entire gamut of this research advocates for a departure from traditional approaches to 
securities conceptualisation that are essentially formalistic and linear to a functional multi-
disciplinary approach that accommodates diverse contexts. With this approach, new forms of 
knowledge are bound to emerge that caters for varied subject areas and their perspectives at 
understanding securities as a concept. This is likely to enrich design of legislative framework, 
legislation, regulation and enforcement. It is also likely to accommodate views from non-lawyers in a 
collaborative manner in the framing, delivery and enforcement of securities legislation. Therefore, 
this thesis submits that the design parameters, interpretative techniques, language content and 
enforcement of securities laws and regulation are likely to be impacted by the Conceptual Onion 
model of conceptualising securities. The research further takes the view that additional studies is 
required to deeply explore the point of intersection of disciplines, their nature, dynamics and impact 
on the concept of securities. 
It is however unclear how much can be achieved through microscopic studies of intersection of 
disciplines for the purpose of capturing the intricate but dynamic underlying dimensions of 
securities. This is because of fluidity of applied research to the dynamic substructures of securities 
that are in constant evolution. It is not that applied research cannot be useful where the baseline 
problem areas are identified and addressed with practical solutions from research, the academic 
arguments for and against the effectiveness of applied research and their contribution to 
fundamental knowledge, remains potent. While the importance of basic research remains sanguine, 
applied research conveys significant transformative effect on knowledge base. The usefulness of the 
applied research is subject to the following tests: 
a. Whether applied research captures the dynamics of complex systems and their interventions 
b. Whether the research galvanises collaborative research enterprise between researchers and 
practitioners to achieve distinct but complementary research solutions 
c. Whether the research guarantees continuous refinement and development of research 
products 
d. Whether the research creates the capacity to explore theories and practice in uniquely 
diverse ways 
If answered affirmatively, the applied research will lead to the development of prototypes that 
captures diverse contexts. Such development has the potentials of increasing wider adoption of 
research principles and further increases the need for research intensity and relevance. A research 
output achieved with rigour cannot be easily replicated by competitors. This could provide an edge 
for the initiating bodies to take the lead in the application and understanding of design and 
measurement criteria. While placing significant emphasis on research and product of research, 
funding is essential and should emanate from funds created by market participants and regulators. 
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7.4 Conclusion 
This research set out to identify the gaps, contradictions and inconsistencies in the market that have 
contributed to the definitional incoherence of securities. The language of statute and the 
interpretative philosophies were identified. These were measured against the need for parties’ 
contractual intentions so as to discourage disenfranchisement. Formalism in language as a 
philosophical position was identified as placing constraints on language and party autonomy. The 
determination of what amounts to the right context and how context should be allocated became a 
problem. Firstly, the research agrees through the Conceptualisation Onion that context must drive 
the meaning of the various components within the Onion. It also agrees that context remains the 
only productive way to harmonise the disagreements amongst the components. 
Therefore by the above submission, it became critical to understand the true situation of context 
itself. A multi-disciplinary approach is agreed because of its capacity to capture legal and non-legal 
themes. The determination of these themes and their points of intersection was critical in 
addressing their impact on the components of the Conceptual Onion. The usefulness of utilising 
contextual synthesis in product development was eloquently demonstrated in the examination of 
functionalism in chapter 4. The lingering question was on the determination and proper allocation of 
the elements within context itself to ensure its appropriate deployment within defined parameters. 
This will help in the reliability and validity of research outcomes generated from contextual 
exploration. 
One other area that militates against proper contextual synthesis is the prevalence or insistence on 
disciplinary boundaries. The need to expand the criteria and research tools for the synthesis of 
contexts remains valid. Therefore, the need to actively encourage and promote multi-disciplinary 
collaboration in contextual synthesis is likely to impact the knowledge base, influence theoretical 
changes in the field, impact policy by changing the nature of prevailing social structures and quality 
of interactions therefrom. This is more likely to impact the research tools, the media engagement 
methodology, quality of practitioners, regulators and laws/rules and regulations on securities as a 
concept. The public and investors’ awareness is likely to be improved as every individual sees their 
field of specialty or enterprise squarely represented in investment instruments. This is more likely to 
improve speedy adoption and engagement by all and sundry as they see securities not just as 
instrument of contract between contracting parties, but a communication tool that constitute an 
amalgam of diverse interests, themes and contexts. 
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Appendix 
Focused Group Structured Interview Questions (Questionnaire enclosed) 
1. Do you agree that the No Look Through provisions affect transferability and 
circularity? In view of your answer, is it safe to ascribe securities to contract law or 
property law? 
2. Given the multi-layered intermediation of these instruments, can you still safely say 
that the No Look Through provisions have any effect? Why? 
3. Do you agree that your ability to move securities around in the market is constrained 
by the formalistic nature of securities definition? To what extent do you agree? 
Why? 
4. Do you think the structure and language of the definition of securities constrain 
conceptualisation? Why? 
5. Can judicial context sensitive approach resolve this definitional incoherence? 
 
Unstructured questions were built around the following: 
1. Specificity of instruments in the face of multi-layered intermediation and its legal 
effect on transferability and circularity - (The No Look Through controversy) 
2. The legal effect of capacity within the purview of Agency and/or Trust relationships 
in the quest to ensure clean break, transferability and circularity. The legal effect of 
Agency Contract and Trust Deed in the market. 
3. The legal effect of holder in due course within the context of transfer and circularity. 
4. Identification of borderline instruments and how their respective legal treatment 
constrains transferability and circularity. 
 
Data capture processes The occasion 
Focused Group interaction  Meeting with lawyers in common room, court 
premises  in Lagos 
Questions to business journalists 
on Channels Television, Nigeria  
Every week questions were put to regulators and 
market participants on live programmes through the 
journalists using my Twitter handle @ikpems 
Interaction with staff of NSE Informal interaction with a member staff and lawyer 
with the NSE 
Staff of SBL, Nigeria Bar Association Questions embedded into agenda and discussions 
Disguised-non-participant 
observation 
Visit to some law firms and broker dealers operating 
in the market 
 
** Names included in this research are as provided by respondents ** 
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Mode of Data Capture 
 
Data Capture  Interview  Persons-in 
charge 
Org. 
interviewed 
Occasion  Date  
Focused 
group int. 
Structured  Researcher  Legal 
Practitioners 
for market 
participants 
and 
regulators 
Planned 
interactions  
11/03/2014 
10/03/2015 
17/10/2016 
 
One to one Unstructured  Former Staff 
of NSE and 
Staff of SEC 
About the 
NSE and SEC 
legal 
operations 
Planned 
conversation 
07/07/2014 
NBA - SBL Unstructured  Staff of NBA-
SBL 
Legal 
Practitioners 
Conferences 
and Seminars 
22/6/2016, 
18/6/2017 
TV Staff Unstructured  T. Asaju 
B. Omofaye 
H. Agbenyi 
Mkt 
Participants, 
NSE,NASD-
OTC, FMDQ-
OTC,SEC, 
CSCS 
Capital Mkt TV 
Programme 
Business 
Morning TV 
Programme 
Every week 
from the 
25/11/2015 
to 
31/01/2018 
Disguised 
Non-
Participant 
Observation 
Observation  Mr A. Inyang Market 
participants 
and lawyers 
Informal 
interactions 
with lawyers 
and market 
participants in 
Nigeria during 
my visits 
26/03/2015 
12/10/2016 
27/01/2017 
18/10/2017 
09/03/2018 
 
 
** Names included in this research are as provided by respondents ** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
250 
 
Securities Conceptualisation Questionnaire 
 
No Look-Through Provision 
1. Do you agree that the No-Look Through provisions affect transferability and 
circularity? In view of your answer, is it safe to ascribe securities to contract law or 
property law? 
 
2. Given the multi-layered intermediation of these instruments, can you still safely say 
that the No-Look Through has any effect? Why? 
 
Formalism  
1. To what extent do you agree that your ability to move securities around in the 
market is constrained by the formalistic nature of securities definition –  
(a) Agree                                 (b) Disagree  
Why? 
 
Structure of definition 
1. What role do you think the language of legislation play in constraining?  
 
Judicial Context-Sensitive Functionalist Approach 
1. Can judicial context-sensitive functionalist approach resolve the above? 
 
 
 
